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In “Modernist American Poetry as a Study of Objects,” I focus on a group of 
modernist American poets—Robert Frost, Marianne Moore, William Carlos Williams, 
and George Oppen—who demonstrate an interest in objects and their transformation into 
aesthetic things. To distinguish between “objects” and “things,” I use “thing theory,” 
which grew out of the work of Bill Brown and, to date, has not been adequately applied 
to lyric poetry. While the object represents an entity one encounters in the world, the 
thing contains diverse associations and meanings that exceed its material function.  
Among modernist poets, it is essential to study this point of transformation, from object 
into thing, to examine the “ideas in things” that get invested in this process.  
Such a study proves necessary in light of the significant role we understand things 
to play in modernist literature and in the modern era, when subjects were beginning to 
negotiate selfhood through and against a world of material things. Further, “things” are 




commonly recognized as a particular focus of modernist poets, thanks in part to 
Williams’s famous dictate in Paterson, “no ideas but in things.” Poets ranging from 
Gertrude Stein, Wallace Stevens, Ezra Pound, and T.S. Eliot, in addition to those in my 
study, all present poems in which things serve as a rhetorical focus. While several critics 
have acknowledged this modernist fascination, no study has addressed how modernist 
poets use the thing to resolve personal and poetic preoccupations. By focusing, 
specifically, on the subject’s relationship to the object, I explore how things reveal the 
poet’s process of constituting a poetic self by shedding particular anxieties over poetic 
function and projecting a voice of authority.  
By bringing poets as diverse and Frost and Oppen into critical conversations 
about modernism, this study broadens understanding of a uniquely American strain of 
modernist poetry. American modernists were deeply conscious of the cultural authority 
inherent in the poetic act, as they sought formal and vocal innovations that could grant 
the poet a linguistic means to resolve feelings of fragmentation and alienation in the 
creation of poetic things. 

























Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the 
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 













Professor Elizabeth Bergmann Loizeaux, Chair 
Professor Michael Collier 
Professor Peter Mallios 
Professor Sheri Parks 
Professor David Wyatt 
 

























































I would like to thank my dissertation committee, Elizabeth Bergmann Loizeaux, 
David Wyatt, Peter Mallios, and Michael Collier, for their insight and thoughtful 
critiques, as well as Judith Harris, who has been an astute reader from the beginning. I 
would also like to thank my writing group, a collection of brilliant woman whose 
feedback and support were essential: Jennifer Wellman, Mary Frances Jiminez, Schuyler 
Esprit, Heather Brown, and Nina Candia. To my family: I could not have done this 
without each and every one of you; I will forever be grateful for everyone’s part in 
getting me here. I offer special thanks to John Denver, without whose Rocky Mountain 
Collection this dissertation would never have been completed. And, finally, to my 
husband and my girls, who have born this burden the most, I love you. I did it. 










Modernist American Poetry as a Study of Objects…..……………………………1 
 
Chapter One:   
“But I Was Going to Say When Truth Broke In”:  
Robert Frost and the Self-Projected Thing………………………………………40 
 
Chapter Two: 
Marianne Moore’s Observations  
and Imaginary Possession of the Thing…………………………………….……88 
 
Chapter Three:  
“THE WORLD IS NEW”: William Carlos Williams’s  
Imagination and the Renewal of Things………...……………………………...134 
 
Chapter Four:  
“The Sequence of Disclosure”: The Truth Hidden  
in Things in George Oppen’s Discrete Series......………………………………176 
 
Chapter Five: 
“the tipping of an object toward the light”:  






















Introduction: Modernist American Poetry as a Study of Objects 
 
The birches are mad with green points 
the wood’s edge is burning with their green, 
burning, seething—No, no, no. 
The birches are opening their leaves one  
by one. Their delicate leaves unfold cold 
and separate, one by one. Slender tassels 
hang swaying from the delicate branch tips— 
Oh, I cannot say it. There is no word. 
Black is split at once into flowers. In 
Every bog and ditch, flares of 
small fire, white flowers!—Agh, 
the birches are mad, mad with their green. 
The world is gone, torn into shreds 
with this blessing. What have I left undone  
that I should have undertaken?  (CPI 172-173) 
 
 From “Portrait of the Author,” William Carlos Williams  
 
 The above poem is the only one from William Carlos Williams’s nearly 50-year 
collection that he titles “Portrait of the Author.” And yet, without this claim prompting 
readers to consider the author’s personal connection to the material, the poem’s opening 
could be read as another impersonal modernist meditation upon an object, with the 
speaker employing detailed descriptions to probe the birch’s nature. What stands out in 
Williams’s attempt, however, is his personification of the object, as well as his 
exploration of it through its transformation into an aesthetic “thing.” The speaker laments 
the inadequacies of language, even as he must rely upon it to gain access to the object. As 
Williams describes the birch leaves unfolding, his characterization settles on a single 
personified quality: madness. And the repeated description of the trees as “mad, mad with 
their green,” particularly following the vocal gesture of screaming, suggests some 
element of the speaker’s experience reflected by the object. This green madness, 
signaling vitality as much as it does disturbance, represents a state of being both agitated 




and alive; it becomes a “blessing” for its power to destroy prior perception and make the 
world disappear (“the world is gone, torn into shreds”).1 “Madness”, then, propels an 
intense, searching gaze upon the object world as the speaker’s layered descriptions betray 
more about his own conception of poetic self than they do about the birches. Through the 
object, the speaker negotiates personal preoccupations and conditions.     
  I begin with Williams’s “Portrait of the Author” because it encapsulates the topic 
of this dissertation, the tensions between subjects and objects in modernist poetry. The 
poem illustrates a speaker distinctly apart from the object he gazes upon, but one who 
nonetheless identifies aspects of himself through it; a speaker attempting an impersonal 
object representation, but one who, in the process, reveals deeply personal aspects of his 
experience. It also presents a speaker who initially recognizes a whole object—the birch 
trees, characterized by some essential quality of madness—but one who gradually re-
assesses his ability to know such “wholeness,” instead pursuing knowledge by cataloging 
the object’s parts. In these respects, this poem reveals a particularly “modern” 
relationship between subjects and objects and illustrates a story of modernism that has 
not yet been fully told.  
 This dissertation argues that the objects in modernist poetry stand to tell us more 
about the subjects enacting their aesthetic representation than those subjects’ grasp of 
fixed external things. As these poets present objects in ways that challenge conventional 
associations and meanings, they also take up issues of poetic mastery and authority. This 
modernist fascination with objects, and the effort to transform them in the poetic space, 
                                                 
1 As one of the final poems of Sour Grapes (1921), “Portrait of the Artist” also serves as an important 
precursor to the explosive opening prose of Spring and All (1923), in which Williams demands complete 
destruction of the material world so that, through the imagination, he can create the world anew.  In my 
chapter on Williams, I focus on Spring and All as the collection in which he most explicitly demonstrates 
tensions in the subject’s representation of objects. 




reflects a desire to assert authority over meaning and claim knowledge of the “thing”; yet, 
simultaneously, the thinking subject recognizes the limitations of knowing objects 
outside of the self. As the poet looks upon the object world, what looks back is the 
subject’s own reflection, even as the poet seeks empowered perception that will resolve 
and suppress anxieties, stabilize fluctuations, and foster poetic authority. The “thing,” in 
turn, preserves the preoccupation that results from this conflict—the poet’s desire to 
project meaning through the act of naming, as well as his or her recognition of the 
impossibility of this task.  In the poems I explore, objects mark particular concerns with 
which the poet is grappling as he or she strives for poetic mastery. The specific 
preoccupations for each poet—whether over gender, technology, or creative labor itself—
all relate to the poet’s larger consideration about his or her function in the modern 
moment. Interaction with the object world raises, first, questions about the subject’s 
identity and emotional state: the self as an entity in relation to other things. Yet, further 
questions arise when the poet attempts to describe this relationship through language. In a 
moment when the certainty of language is being called into question, these poets turn to 
language to transform objects into things. What results is a group of poems that record a 
subject-object interaction marked by the poet’s concerns over attaining an authoritative 
voice through which to assert meaning through things.   
 Before I delve into further analysis of “Portrait of the Artist,” let me clarify a 
critical distinction I make between “objects” and “things.” In a poet’s aesthetic rendering 
of an object, the material frequently contains meanings beyond itself, and its actual or use 
value as “object” becomes distinct from its entity as “thing.” As Bill Brown explains in 
his acclaimed 2001 special issue of Critical Inquiry, in which he laid claim to the 




burgeoning field of “thing theory,” the thing encapsulates ideas, associations, and 
meanings that exceed the object’s materiality:  
You could imagine things, second, as what is excessive in objects, as what 
exceeds their mere materialization as objects or their mere utilization as 
objects—their force as a sensuous presence or as a metaphysical presence, 
the magic by which objects become values, fetishes, idols, and totems. 
Temporalized as the before and after of the object, thingness amounts to a 
latency (the not yet formed or the not yet formable) and to an excess (what 
remains physically or metaphysically irreducible to objects). But this 
temporality obscures the all-at-onceness, the simultaneity, of the 
object/thing dialectic and the fact that, all at once, the thing seems to name 
the object just as it is even as it names something else. (“Thing Theory” 5) 
I employ Brown’s distinction between the object under examination and the aesthetic 
thing created in the poet’s formal treatment. So while the object may be a device 
structuring the poem rhetorically—as in several modernist poems where a speaker 
ruminates upon or impersonally describes an object—the object becomes a “thing” as the 
poet invests it with meanings beyond its material existence.  
 Studying the point of poetic transformation, in which the object becomes a thing, 
reveals something important about the dynamic between subjects and objects in 
modernist poetry, precisely because the thing encapsulates ideas in excess of the object, 
as Williams so famously claimed in his modernist dictate, “No ideas but in things.” I use 
“ideas” in this dissertation in the broadest sense to include all meanings exceeding the 
object’s use value, including feelings and emotions, as well as intellectual considerations. 




W. J. T. Mitchell underscores the way that things become “simultaneously nebulous and 
obdurate, sensuously concrete and vague” (156):  
The thing is invisible, blurry, or illegible to the subject. It signals the 
moment when the object becomes the Other, when the sardine can look 
back, when the mute idol speaks, when the subject experiences the object 
as uncanny and feels the need for what Foucault calls “a metaphysics of 
the object, or, more exactly, a metaphysics of that never objectifiable 
depth from which objects rise up toward our superficial knowledge.”  
(156-157) 
Mitchell’s claim that the object proves “invisible, blurry, or illegible” speaks to the 
subject’s inability to know things outside of the self. The object’s capacity to appear, 
simultaneously, both familiar and strange—Freud’s very definition of the uncanny—puts 
an epistemological burden upon the poet: to find a process of gaining knowledge of the 
object. For the modernist poets in my study, this process becomes one of transforming 
objects into things, whereby things represent something more than objects, becoming 
markers of the subject-object encounter. As poetic creations, things also evidence the 
poet’s achievement of authority in the act of representation. I argue that this 
epistemological pursuit extends beyond the subject’s capacity to know external objects 
and, additionally, reflects preoccupations with how the subject comes to know itself, 
since identity formation is a process of identification with and differentiation from 
external objects. Although the thing may be, as Mitchell suggests, “invisible, blurry, or 
illegible to the subject,” it remains a thing through which these poets can pursue more 
concrete knowledge of abstract ideas. By using language to fix and contain the thing, they 




attempt to resolve the overwhelming and—to again borrow Mitchell’s terminology—
“nebulous,” “obdurate” and “vague” conditions characterizing anxiety in the modern 
moment.2  
 A study exploring the “thing” in modernist poetry may not seem particularly new, 
given critics’ frequent acknowledgement of the modernist attention to objects. In fact, a 
survey of objects recorded in poetry at this moment, from William Carlos Williams’s 
“The Red Wheelbarrow” and Wallace Stevens’s “Anecdote of the Jar,” to H.D.’s “Sea 
Rose” and Pound’s “An Object,” confirms this fascination. F.S. Flint’s call for “direct 
treatment of the ‘thing’” in his 1913 Imagist manifesto, Williams’s aforementioned claim 
in Paterson (1946) for “No ideas but in things”, and Stevens’ response in “Not Ideas 
About the Thing But the Thing Itself” (1954) all suggest an interest in objects as “things” 
through which to explore modern experience.3 Rejecting the abstraction and pursuit of 
absolutes through images that Symbolism offered, modernist poets turned to the concrete 
particular, the localized object. Imagism, for Flint and Pound, was a move toward visual 
purity in response to Romantic excesses and Victorian discursiveness; the “thing” 
                                                 
2 Although my argument is historically-grounded within a particular period of the early twentieth century, it 
is worth pointing out the way that certain terminology I employ—words such “anxiety,” “object” and 
“object-relations”—resonate within psychoanalytic theory. Although I am not undertaking a psychoanalytic 
reading of modernist poetics, psychoanalytic theory adds new dimensions of meaning to these concepts. 
For example, for Sigmund Freud, anxiety is an inescapable condition of psychic experience, an automatic 
response to traumatic stimuli at all stages of the subject’s development: the trauma of birth, separation 
anxiety with the loss of the mother/object, and castration anxiety in the Oedipal phase. Yet, as Lisa 
Hinrichsen notes, “Anxiety, by definition, is nebulous: an affect more sensed than sensible, indefinite in its 
origins and ends, psychically and spatially dislocated, and linguistically difficult to describe” (44). In 
Freud’s theories, “object-finding” becomes a means for the child to overcome the loss of the mother’s 
breast. He writes, “It is not without good reason that the suckling of the child at the mother’s breast has 
become a model for every love relation. Object finding is really a re-finding” (582).  
3 Williams first announced this claim in his 1923 lyric “Paterson,” although it later becomes prominent in 
the first book of his epic Paterson. I include Stevens’s 1954 poem—the final piece in his Collected 
Poems—as a means of bracketing this modernist attention to things. Stevens’s interpretation marks the final 
word on things from a high modernist figure. When George Oppen returns with his 1962 The Materials, he 
approaches the notion of “things” from a more post-modern perspective, which I gesture toward in my 
conclusion. 




allowed the poet to establish emotional distance between the subjective ego and the 
external world on which it meditates. Yet, questions persist over the subject’s distance 
from the object and whether the poet gained knowledge and authority by impersonally 
representing the thing (particularly given the move, by poets such as Williams, to 
universalize the particular). Thus, it is important to consider how the modernist 
relationship between subjects and objects sheds light on an aspect of modernism that has 
been less critically explored: the way that “things” reveal the poet’s process of 
constituting subjectivity, of shedding preoccupations and projecting authority; in this 
task, these poets envision a particular conception of the poet figure in the twentieth 
century as an essential cultural voice promoting wisdom, knowledge, universality, and 
truth. While several critics have acknowledged a modernist attention to things,4 no study 
to date has addressed how modernist poets use the thing to explore the poet’s experience 
and, in the process, chart a new direction in American poetry. This study therefore 
challenges traditional conceptions of modernist poetry that deem the movement’s main 
goal as “impersonality” or “objectivity,” as I demonstrate that these poets return again 
and again to deeply personal concerns, even as they present seemingly impersonal 
objects. I explore this pattern in the poetics of four American modernists—Robert Frost, 
William Carlos Williams, George Oppen, and Marianne Moore—whose use of objects 
reveal particular concerns about the poet’s role in crafting the thing. In locating a 
                                                 
4 Several studies have examined the role of modernist objects in relation to still life and avant-garde 
aesthetics and explore mediums in addition to poetry. The most prominent of these works include Ellen 
Johnson’s Modern Art and the Object: A Century of Changing Attitudes (1976) and John Erickson’s The 
Fate of the Object: From Modern Object to Postmodern Sign in Performance, Art, and Poetry (1995). J. 
Hillis Miller’s Poets of Reality: Six Twentieth-Century Writers (1969) also marked a shift in scholarship 
looking at the material world of modernist poetry. More recently, Douglas Mao’s Solid Objects: 
Modernism and the Test of Production (1998), Daniel Tiffany’s Toy Medium: Materialism and the Modern 
Lyric (2000), and Charles Altieri’s The Art of Twentieth-Century American Poetry: Modernism and After 
(2006) have continued this exploration.  




common impulse among such a diverse group of American poets, this study broadens 
critical understanding of both modernism and the uniquely “American” lineage these 
poets were writing out of.  
 The poem that initiated this introduction, Williams’s “Portrait of the Author,” 
provides just one example of how the speaker’s encounter with the object betrays a sense 
of “terror” about the poet’s authority to know and represent objects, as well as his own 
condition of isolation in relation to other things. When the speaker laments, “What have I 
left undone/ that I should have undertaken?”, he asks to what extent he, designated as the 
“author,” should “undertake” the object, or assume the role of transforming it into 
something new. The first stanza of the poem presents the poet’s own struggles to find an 
appropriate representation. After his first description of “the wood’s edge” as “burning 
with their green,/ burning, seething,” the speaker interrupts with his dissatisfaction, “No, 
no, no.” His second attempt ends with “Oh, I cannot say it,” before he settles on the 
condition of madness. Frustration over the creative act and the poet’s inability to capture 
the object underlies the very madness that he characterizes as inherent within the thing. 
 The speaker presents this experience as one that leaves him isolated and lonely, 
seeking connection with others. He directs his comments to a “brother”: “We are alone in 
this terror, alone,/ face to face on this road, you and I,/ wrapped by this flame!” (CPI 
172). Underlying the urgency and desperation is a desire to know and be known, to find a 
connection with humanity that will promote recognition and understanding: “Take me in 
your arms, tell me the commonest/ thing that is in your mind to say,/ say anything. I will 
understand you--!” (173). And yet, what follows this plea is another observation about 
the trees: “It is the madness of the birch leaves opening/ cold, one by one.” The speaker 




endures the condition of madness—which the poem suggests is propelled by his 
frustrations over representation—lacking connection with surrounding people or things; 
he responds by projecting this experience onto the trees.  
 Despite the speaker’s self-reflective characterization of the birches, the poem 
chronicles his pursuit of a more detached means of relating to objects, wherein the object 
can provide a controlled space in which to resolve these personal conditions; it also 
grants the opportunity to gain authority over language in the thing’s construction. The 
speaker’s shifting object descriptions throughout the poem reflect this desire for 
emotional release and a corresponding “cold” perspective on the world. Initially the 
descriptions contain clear signals of the speaker’s emotional discord, from the emphasis 
on the birches’ madness to the statement that “familiar objects” have been “changed and 
dwarfed.” The speaker explains, “My rooms will receive me. But my rooms/ are no 
longer sweet spaces where comfort/ is ready to wait on me with its crumbs./ A darkness 
has brushed them” (173). These observations reveal less about the precise materials in 
these rooms that have undergone change and more about the subject’s condition, where 
“darkened” things correspond to the speaker’s conflicted self:  
  I am shaken, broken against a might 
  that splits comfort, blows apart 
  my careful partitions, crushes my house 
  and leaves me—with shrinking heart 
  and startled, empty eyes—peering out 
  into a cold world. 
The subject is fragmented and torn, aware of his separation from other things. He is left 
isolated with only perception to forge new connections or understanding. His shift toward 
greater emotional control in the final lines makes this goal more transparent: “And coldly 
the birch leaves are opening one by one./ Coldly I observe them and wait for the end./ 




And it ends.” The subject pursues a “cold” perspective—one that releases him from his 
own tumultuous emotion. In this process, the object becomes a deliberate vessel through 
which the poet can distill chaotic experiences into finite forms.  
 Despite this tonal change, the final lines fail to resolve the personal conditions the 
speaker’s descriptions have thus far revealed. He cannot observe the world coldly and can 
achieve distance only by projecting his madness outward. By the poem’s end, the speaker 
lets go of the object world altogether, instructing, “Drink and lie forgetting the world.” 
The poet shifts into detached objectivity in an attempt to reclaim emotional control and 
authority as he waits for the end. Thus, the poem depicts the very process by which this 
speaker has used the object to stabilize personal turmoil. Becoming lost in the object—“I 
am drowned in you”—grants the opportunity to subsume chaotic conditions within the 
thing. Yet, the poem proves particularly significant for opening this dissertation because, 
even in the pursuit of a “cold” perspective, Williams cannot overcome the “terror” of 
representation that, by the poem’s end, still drives the speaker “mad.” Preoccupations 
with poetic function and authority consume the poet and mark his representation of the 
thing.   
Modernist and Contemporary “Thing Theory” in Conversation    
 This dissertation builds upon the work of Bill Brown and the developing 
discourse of “thing theory” that has begun to ask important questions about the way 
objects “mediate relations between subjects . . .  and  . . . subjects mediate the relation 
between objects” (SOT 18). Traditional scholarly approaches to cultural materialism have 
focused on the consumption and exchange of objects in a commodity culture, examining 
consumer practices to determine how particular social structures ascribe value to objects. 




In this model, the self becomes a subject acting upon and through specific material 
needs.5 Yet, as Brown argues, the cultural materialist approach denies both subjects and 
objects an identity outside of production and exchange. Instead, he emphasizes the need 
to look beyond this limited reading of objects, suggesting that “our relation to things 
cannot be explained by the cultural logic of capitalism” (6). When Brown re-examines 
existing critical works, he finds new implications of the questions they pose: “These are 
texts that, as I understand them, ask why and how we use objects to make meaning, to 
make or re-make ourselves, to organize our anxieties and affections, to sublimate our 
fears and shape our fantasies” (4). Things carry meaning far exceeding their value as 
commodities. In fact, things become markers of particular human relationships with the 
object world, just as they offer a medium for exploring and expressing pent-up feelings. 
When Brown asks, “How are things and thingness used to think about the self?”, he 
explicitly invites us to ponder the relationship between self and thing.  
 For all the value of Brown’s work in providing a theoretical foundation to my 
own, his most significant contribution to thing theory, A Sense of Things: The Object 
Matter of American Literature (2003), does not focus on modernism and does not address 
the role of modern poetry in relation to his ideas (although Brown does turn to Williams’s 
oft-cited dictate to illustrate the difficulties of pinning down the precise “ideas” invested 
in “things”). Instead, he examines American novels from the 1890s to provide “a 
                                                 
5 Brown refers to works such as The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective (1986), 
History from Things: Essays on Material Culture (1993), The Sex of Things: Gender and Consumption in 
Historical Perspective (1996), and Material Cultures: Why Some Things Matter (1998). In addition, 
Douglas Mao’s Solid Objects: Modernism and the Test of Production examines modernism’s 
“extraordinarily generative fascination with the object understood as neither commodity (Goods) nor as 
symbol (Gods), but as ‘object,’ where any or all of the resonances of this complexly polysemous word 
might apply” (4). Mao’s study traces a complicated relationship of attraction and repulsion to objects as 
commodities, and thus to commodity culture itself. In contrast, my study explores the subject-object 
relationship beyond this cultural materialist reading. 




prehistory of the modernist fascination with things” (14). In this sense, my study picks up 
where Brown’s work leaves off, with the purpose of focusing attention on an under-
studied genre of thing theory: lyric poetry.6 Lyric poetry, by definition, is the genre in 
which the subject speaks from a particular moment in time, reflecting on his or her 
experience in the world in order to better understand it. And, as the modern subject faces 
increasing anxieties over the conditions of selfhood, the lyric mode provides an optimal 
means to work through resulting questions and complications. As we see in the work of 
numerous modern poets—including Eliot, Pound, Stevens, H.D., Amy Lowell, and those 
featured in this study, Frost, Moore, Williams, and Oppen—interaction with the object 
becomes a prominent device for structuring self-exploration. As these poets consider 
objects, the transformed “thing” reflects the concerns of a self expressing, and often 
negotiating, particular preoccupations, which prove individual for each poet. 
 Critics espousing the value of thing theory acknowledge the long-overdo attention 
to things as a device for understanding human experience. As Geoffrey Galt Harpham 
points out, “To call something a thing is not to describe it, but to position it in a sequence 
of emergent understanding. What we call things have emerged into the conceptual field 
as a problem, a challenge to our vocabulary: their identity has not been determined, but 
ignoring them is no longer an option” (135). To live fully with and among things requires 
us to reflect upon how they come to mean, as well as how they give meaning to our 
subjective experience. Harpham’s idea of the thing here speaks to the object’s resistance 
                                                 
6 Susan Harrow emphasizes this very lack of attention to modernist poetry in her recent work, The 
Material, The Real, and the Fractured Self: Subjectivity and Representation From Rimbaud to Réda 
(2004), in which she examines French modernist poets who manifest “a problematic (and problematizing) 
exploration of subjectivity with a resolute commitment to outwardness” (4). Harrow focuses on the body as 
the point of intersection with materiality, arguing that “the body—and by extension, embodied 
consciousness--. . . . is inextricable from our sense of self and of other, and our corporeal awareness is 
crucial to our understanding of what it is to inhabit modernity” (218). The poets in her study, she 
concludes, look at things in order to subvert ideologies and perform cultural critiques. 




and autonomy; thus, the thing’s construction allows the poet to overcome certain 
epistemological challenges by gaining knowledge, possession, and authority over objects. 
Through things, Harpham claims, “the mind can discover in the world tokens of its own 
subjectivity, points of purchase for its energy, a principle of receptivity or responsiveness 
in the domain of the nonsubjective and nonsentient” (136). He calls the thing “an 
externalized version of identity, absorbing vague longings, momentary reflections, and 
fugitive impulses, and giving them back in enriched and articulated forms, giving body to 
fleeting cognitive or affective events that might never reach consciousness otherwise.” 
This final notion sounds a great deal like Williams’s directive to locate ideas in things, 
whereby ideas and feeling states must be made tangible in accessible external form. Yet, 
as Harpham points out, “much depends, of course, on the thing. And the very best things 
are products of human agency.” For the poets of my study, things prove even more useful 
for accessing the subject because they are the products of poetic agency; things remain 
the poet’s creation and exist only in the work of art. For example, Williams’s “rose” may 
be inspired by his interaction with an actual rose7, but his representation of the object 
reflects a process of asserting human agency, of transforming that object into an artistic 
thing. My reading explores the parts of the poet’s experience, the “fleeting cognitive or 
affective events,” that get invested in the creation of things. 
 What Harpham critiques in Brown’s “thing theory” is his resistance to define that 
theory too concretely or to draw clear conclusions about the ethical laws that get 
embodied in things. He states, “If—Brown nearly says—we could devise a proper theory 
of the ways we make and remake ourselves by infusing objects with subjective energy, 
                                                 
7 In fact, Williams claimed his inspiration came from seeing a black-and-white reproduction of Juan Gris’s 
painting Flowers (1914). In this sense, Williams’s process of representation responds to another artist’s 
attempt at representation; the thing is removed, by several layers, from its corresponding object.  




then we would be in a better position to understand the whole human field of human 
responsibility and cognitive agency” (143). Yet, Harpham concludes, Brown fails to 
articulate how this process takes place and its implications for human behavior. In turn, 
Harpham identifies a lack in Brown’s attention to the ethical function of things. Finding 
that “the thing in Brown’s sense has much in common with ethical law,” Harpham 
suggests, “Brown and others might well wish to pursue this possibility further” (144). 
Other critics, including Douglas Mao and Lori Merish, question Brown’s claims precisely 
on this point of whether they imply sweeping generalizations about human behavior, 
agency, and ethics. While Merish urges Brown to acknowledge social difference and to 
take culturally-specific aspects of identity into account in considering subject-object 
relations, Mao voices similar reservations: 
The point itself—that there are all kinds of relations between humans and 
things not subsumable under concepts like commodity fetishism—is as 
persuasive as it is important. But . . . Brown tends to drift from this 
defensible claim to a less sturdy implication: that the residue left after we 
exhaust commerce-centered analysis is in some literal sense one residue, a 
transculturally and transhistorically persisting fascination. Writing 
confidently of a pedestrian fetishism we all experience, Brown gently 
diverts us from questions about whether people in the premodern West felt 
this same attraction to objects, whether people in nonwestern cultures 
share it always, and whether its form under modernity is to be traced not 
to a primal yearning but to an array of historical determinants (in addition 
to commodification per se). (219) 




 I would like to use these aspects of critique to put Brown’s notion of “thing 
theory” in conversation with more historically-specific notions of the “thing” articulated 
by modernist poets. My argument, while applying thing theory’s methodology of 
examining subject-object relations, is nevertheless grounded in the moment of modernity. 
Although the poet’s exploration through objects has not been limited to 20th-century 
modernists, I argue that a relationship so prominently defined by the poet’s preoccupation 
with his own function at a moment of isolation and fracture is unique to modernist poetry. 
Harpham’s critique propels us to consider the larger implications of these poets’ uses of 
things, which prove integral to their effort to forge an American poetics grounded in the 
local, but which can nonetheless promote more universal, and communal, experiences. 
The thing, then, proves a vessel serving a broader function.  
For the Romantic poets, the predecessors whom modernists such as Eliot and 
Pound most explicitly positioned themselves against, the contemplation of objects served 
to structure self-exploration in spiritual terms. Objects fostered the poet’s reconnection to 
a spiritual energy—what Ralph Waldo Emerson calls the “Over-Soul”—latent within all 
things. As Emerson explains,  
We live in succession, in division, in parts, in particles. Meantime within 
man is the soul of the whole; the wise silence; the universal beauty, to 
which every part and particle is equally related; the eternal ONE. And this 
deep power in which we exist, and whose beatitude is all accessible to us, 
is not only self-sufficing and perfect in every hour, but the act of seeing 
and the thing seen, the seer and the spectacle, the subject and the object, 
are one. We see the world piece by piece, as the sun, the moon, the animal, 




the tree; but the whole, of which these are the shining parts, is the soul. 
(“Over-Soul” 262) 
Emerson’s notion of the “Over-Soul” represents a master illusion of wholeness, a felt 
sense of unity to which the romantic subject strives to experience. One need only think of 
Walt Whitman’s excessive cataloging of objects, his lists of the minutia he encounters in 
his environment, as the manifestation of Emerson’s principles: the self that finds no 
barrier—gender, race, time, history, or even mortality—that can thwart its communion 
with external things. Finally, for the Romantics, the poet plays an essential role in 
promoting this type of connection to the physical world. Poets, what Emerson calls 
“liberating gods” (“The Poet” 335), can emancipate humanity from enchained patterns of 
thinking. “On the brink of the waters of life and truth, we are miserably dying,” Emerson 
states; instead, “we love the poet, the inventor, who in any form, whether in an ode or in 
an action or in looks and behavior, has yielded us a new thought” (336). The poet 
performs an essential role in transforming the culture: “And this is the [poet’s] reward; 
that the ideal shall be real to thee, and the impressions of the actual world shall fall like 
summer rain, copious, but not troublesome to thy invulnerable essence” (340). The poet 
shall see and testify in order to transform the perception of his readers. 
 The modernist poets in this study extend certain ideas of their Romantic 
predecessors, in particular their vision of the poet as an authoritative cultural voice 
offering insight into things. Nevertheless, in their approach to objects, we can also 
identify distinctions. For example, modernist poets do not pursue communion and 
convergence with the object to promote transcendent harmony. The world itself is not 
whole but, rather, fractured, and the subject remains distinctly separate from its 




surroundings. As we might glean from the title of Oppen’s Discrete Series (1934), the 
world proves a series of discrete and disjointed parts. This position of separateness and 
distinction proves a barrier that itself engenders newfound anxiety. In an historical 
moment distinguished by the death of God and the destruction of humanist meta-
narratives that helped stabilize the subject’s place in the world, the Romantic subject’s 
aspiration for coherence becomes replaced by the modern subject’s overwhelming 
awareness of its fragmentation. Creating the thing provides an opportunity to stabilize the 
subject amidst these conditions, because the poet can explore the very objects marking 
(and, in some cases, causing) the subject’s isolation.  
In addition, although these modernists claim the poet’s authority to renew 
perception of the object world, they recognize this effort as a challenging—and not 
automatic—pursuit. Poets such as Williams and Frost were outspoken in their views 
about the poet’s important cultural role—what Williams promotes in his calls to inspire 
contact with the physical world such that the imagination can render the world anew.8 
Nonetheless, these modernists were not simply reiterating neo-Romantic aspirations. 
Their perception of their role as poets was rendered more complicated by the poet’s 
destabilized sense of authority. Representing things to provide a new kind of access to the 
object proves a difficult task, a preoccupation that accounts for the variety of technical 
experimentation we find in modernist poetry.   
                                                 
8 In the case of Robert Frost, Paul Giles argues that Frost cultivated an “oracle effect”—a theory adopted 
from Pierre Bourdieu—whereby “the representative figure succeeds in translating himself from history into 
mythology, thereby seeming to rise above the contingent divisions of material circumstances by presenting 
himself as ‘a transcendent moral person’ (732). In order for Frost to attain this effect, Giles finds that he 
engages in a “splitting of personality” such that “a more impersonal manipulation of fragmented 
perspectives becomes a necessary part of the enterprise.” Frost seeks a national voice that can speak to, and 
on behalf, of an eager audience; yet, to attain this voice of authority he must separate it from other more 
anxious and uncertain voices that mark his own condition. The process of projecting authority is one then 
of gaining control over the fragmented aspects of the poet’s self.   




 The subject’s fractured condition remains a concern for the poets of my study, as 
well as for modernist writers more broadly. According to Dennis Brown, selfhood and 
the limitations of its representation are central problems in modernist texts, which 
“radically probed the nature of selfhood and problematised the means whereby ‘self’ 
could be expressed” (1). He finds modernist selfhood to be “characteristically 
deconstructive” (1), while it nonetheless “presupposes some kind of pre-existent unity 
which is in the process of being broken down” (2). The fragmented subject laments its 
loss of wholeness, even as it considers whether and how to represent the conditions of its 
destruction. The experience provokes anxiety because the modern subject still believes in 
some previous state of wholeness that should be reconstituted. Murray Roston also finds 
modernity marked by a “crisis in identity” that results in real and overwhelming anxieties 
of selfhood. He cites several historical factors, including the mass destruction of World 
War I, the large-scale socio-economic upheaval associated with urbanization, the rise of 
religious skepticism, and the shifting beliefs in evolution prompted by advances in 
rational science. To this list, we can add changing forms of labor and (often-related) 
transformations in gender roles, as well as new relationships to the environment in the 
shift between rural and urban ways of life. Such historical transformations contribute to 
the subject’s instability as it engages a changing modern world. It is in this context, 
amidst conditions that induce particular concerns, that we must consider modernist poets’ 
engagement with objects. It is from a place of self-fragmentation and otherness that poets 
are drawn to create something whole within the “thing.” 
 The early twentieth century is also a moment in which subjects are beginning to 
understand themselves through and against a world of material objects. Following late-




nineteenth-century advances in technology and industry, as well as the advent of a 
consumer culture, particular subjects, such as the modern figure of the “new woman” or 
the “New Negro,” are beginning to form entirely new modes of identity through 
interaction with material culture. Just as twentieth-century subjects face increasing 
anxiety over their own fragmentation, they encounter a world of commodities that seem 
whole and stable. This illusion of the commodity’s wholeness masks the complex 
relations of production lurking within it, as Marx reminds us through his fetish nature the 
commodity. Nevertheless, the commodity provides another master illusion of wholeness 
to which the modern subject can aspire. Wholeness remains a particular fascination for 
the poets of my study—both in the creation of the thing (rendered whole in the poem’s 
construction) and the thing’s resulting relation to a stabilized speaking subject.9 In fact, 
Gertrude Stein claims that wholeness was a central concern of modernism, arguing that 
“the United States began a different phase when, after the Civil War, . . . they created the 
Twentieth Century”  by “assembling the whole thing out of its parts, the whole thing 
which made the Twentieth Century productive” (152). Stein classifies her own 
experimentations with punctuation and grammar as an effort to linguistically represent 
this idea of the whole. More broadly, for the poets of this study, exploring objects 
becomes one way to represent the “whole things” that make modernity productive while, 
simultaneously, evidencing the poet’s own authority in his or her productivity. By 
negotiating anxieties in this way, the subject stands to reclaim a sense of wholeness, a 
“supreme fiction,” as Wallace Stevens might way, where fragmentation can be stabilized 
                                                 
9 I do not mean to imply here that modernist poets necessarily represent things as whole entities; in fact, 
certain techniques employed by several poets of my study, including Williams and Oppen, promote the 
object’s fragmentation and distortion. My argument is merely that even these techniques aim at 
universalizing objects in a way that grants greater understanding of them.  




and disconnected parts restored. Although wholeness remains a fiction—thus making 
fantasy and imagination such prominent concepts to consider—it proves a necessary one 
for modernist poets seeking to resolve anxieties of fragmentation. As Eliot states toward 
the close of The Waste Land, “These fragments I have shored against my ruin.” 
 Driving interaction with the thing, then, are questions about the subject’s own 
condition—more specifically, how perception of the thing helps the subject come to 
know and stabilize the self. In the poets of my study, this consideration of self is most 
often played out around the concept of a poetic self. How can the poet project a voice of 
authority in his or her representations of whole things? Pound acknowledges the 
difficulty of fixing a self in Gaudier-Brzeska: “In the ‘search for oneself,’ in the search 
for ‘sincere self-expression,’ one gropes, one finds some seeming verity. One says, ‘I am’ 
this, that, or the other, and with the words scarcely uttered one ceases to be that thing” 
(85). Here, Pound describes the very fragmentation I have been discussing, a modern 
sense of the self’s impermanence, fluctuation, and fracture; it is a self that one “searches” 
for and yet cannot cohere. He also describes a poetic process in which the act of 
“groping” for language reflects an experience of locating the poet’s self amidst shifting, 
and temporary, conditions. Just as Williams demonstrates in “Portrait,” language proves 
an imprecise device, for it can never firmly fix the thing or the self. Yet, language 
remains the tool available as modern poets pursue coherence—even if its achievement 
exists only in its representation on the page.  
Although the self’s relationship to the thing proves difficult to translate 
linguistically, it is this relationship that Pound’s image strives to convey: “In a poem of 
this sort one is trying to record the precise instant when a thing outward and objective 




transforms itself, or darts into a thing inward and subjective” (89). Pound’s promotion of 
Imagism as “direct treatment” of the subject or object was a form of descriptive purity in 
response to Romantic excesses and Victorian discursiveness. Yet, Imagism was always 
more than objective visual description. The image reflects the subject’s internalized 
response to the object, a response that conveys a great deal about the subject’s condition. 
Underlying his interaction with the image—Pound’s vessel for transforming the object 
into a thing—is self-expression that can explore the subject’s experience.  
 In addition, T.S. Eliot, who along with Pound is most strongly associated with an 
“impersonal” modernism, reveals a poetic practice that uses things to aestheticize the 
self’s condition.10 In his 1919 essay “Hamlet and His Problems,” Eliot designates the 
“objective correlative” as an object-use that preserves personal emotion, albeit 
transformed into accessible, universal, and impersonal form: 
The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an 
“objective correlative”; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain 
of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that 
when external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are 
given, the emotion is immediately evoked. (101) 
Here, the idea within the thing is the emotional state of the speaker, even as Eliot moves 
to represent these conditions through impersonal materials. The goal is to universalize the 
                                                 
10 Walter Benjamin also offers a notion of the modern object as a container for selfhood. He celebrates the 
books in his library outside of their function or status as texts—in fact, he admits he has not read many of 
them—but rather as vessels for a deeply personal history. Each object becomes an artifact solidifying his 
sense of self, despite conditions of transition, disruption, and exile. Benjamin describes, “—ownership is 
the most intimate relationship that one can have to objects. Not that they come alive in him; it is he who 
lives in them” (67). In the case of Benjamin’s collection, the possession is literal; however, the modernist 
poets of my study also demonstrate a form of ownership through their artistic representations, their 
rendering of objects into things, whereby possession becomes the means to assert meaning; this idea is 
exemplified most clearly in my chapter on Marianne Moore. In both cases, the concept that “lives” within 
the object (as thing) is the self, for the thing exists only through the subject’s relation to it. 




poem’s emotion by shifting it away from the author’s personality and individual 
experience, and employing a more objective means of prompting the intended emotion 
within the reader. This suggests a very different claim for objects than that proposed by 
the New Critics—who nonetheless use Eliot as their theoretician—for whom objects 
serve a particular function within the modernist poem: to maintain ironic distance 
between the subject matter and the poet. 
 Eliot’s definition of the objective correlative proves a somewhat mechanical 
application of objects and experiences that masks the complexity of locating an object to 
encapsulate a speaker’s emotion. The objective correlative—or the made “thing”—grants 
the reader access to “ideas” within it, in this case, the speaker’s emotions. As Eliot 
constructs it, the objective correlative remains a tool of representation, addressing how 
the poet can communicate meaning to the reader. This model assumes an authoritative 
poet-speaker who engages in a somewhat automatic process wherein both the selection of 
the objective correlative and the communication of its meaning proves a straightforward 
process. Yet, the poets of my study recognize a more complicated process of interaction. 
As we saw in the experience Williams depicts in “Portrait of the Author,” the task of 
locating an adequate objective correlative can terrorize the poet. Negotiating the subject’s 
response to an object—and translating a temporal experience, via language, into some 
lasting form—is never straightforward. Thus, the process of representation, of locating 
and, ultimately, asserting meaning through the thing, becomes an important process to 
study. 
 Applying Bill Brown’s “thing theory” to the poetic statements of Eliot and Pound 
helps validate an approach that studies these poetic devices—the objects, whether as 




impersonal images, objective correlatives, or other forms—as points through which to 
access the subject’s anxieties, pleasures, intellectual responses, fears, and emotions: those 
feeling states that modernist poets are often reluctant to explicitly claim. And while I 
resist drawing universal conclusions about the way subjects define themselves through 
and against objects, I do find a common pattern in this group of modernist poets, despite 
the variety of relations that each forges with particular objects. The poets of my study 
frequently engage with objects in a manner that mediates personal preoccupations, often 
with poetic function, so the poet can project more stable authority. It is important to point 
out that Pound, Eliot, and Williams are not, in their own theoretical statements about 
images, objective correlatives, and things, respectively, articulating the same concept as 
Bill Brown’s object/thing distinction. Nevertheless, all three poets distinguish between 
the artistic representation of materiality and actual materiality; further, they all suggest 
that something other than the object itself—something pertaining to the subject’s 
personal experience—must be represented in the thing and yet done so in a way that still 
promotes the thing’s universalizing potential. They all wrestle with the best technical 
means to promote meaning in things that can speak to, and beyond, the individual poet’s 
experience. In this sense, these modernist poets present concepts consistent with those 
found in contemporary “thing theory” and that are, therefore, worth exploring through 
Brown’s terminology. 
Ideas in Things 
In this dissertation, what proves significant is not only the act of contemplating 
objects—a rhetorical move dating back to the 10th-century Exeter riddles—but the 
diverse ways in which the poets I examine, Frost, Moore, Williams, and Oppen, provide 




access to the ideas residing within them. Since modernist poets find previous models of 
object meditation inadequate for the conditions of modernity, they must explore new 
techniques for interacting with objects. This accounts for the variety of technical 
experimentation that we find among practitioners of modernism. Yet, if Williams’ 
ambiguous dictate—“No ideas but in things”—can be reduced to any single claim, it is 
that abstract ideas must be made concrete through material fact.11 His claim also 
introduces the problematic concern of where these ideas are generated. Do they exist as 
some latent identity within the thing? Are they social or political ideas projected onto the 
object by culture, the poet, or even the reader? Can we separate one such harvested 
“idea” from another? Although I do not deny the presence of numerous and diverse ideas 
that get carried within objects, I am most interested in those ideas that get invested as the 
poet considers the task of representation; in this way, I unpack ideas that relate most 
specifically to the poet’s conception of poetic function as a response to modernity.  
For example, the speaker of Frost’s “After Apple-Picking” does not pre-determine 
a condition of anxiety about his labor that he correspondingly projects onto the apples he 
has picked; instead, it is his very interaction with these apples—the speaker’s lingering 
uncertainty about his role in their picking, his sense of exhaustion and failure, despite the 
brimming barrels—that produces his psychologically complex response. And, as I will 
                                                 
11 Coming on the heels of American pragmatism, a philosophical movement ushered in by William James’s 
Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (1907), these ideas prove consistent with 
pragmatism’s attention to the concrete consequences of abstract thinking (in other words, greater attention 
to the “thing” than the “ideas” within it). James states, “The attitude of looking away from first things, 
principles, ‘categories,’ supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, 
facts” (34). Observable facts—objects—become the vehicle through which one can assess truth, rather than 
through pre-existing belief systems or ideologies. I point this out to show the circulation and intersection of 
ideas about objects throughout this modernist period, although there is little evidence to suggest that 
Williams was invoking pragmatism directly. Of all the poets of my study, only Robert Frost was a 
documented follower of Jamesian philosophy, with Jay Parini confirming that Frost taught James’s texts 
Talks to Teachers on Psychology, Psychology: The Briefer Course, and Pragmatism during his tenure at the 
Plymouth Normal School in 1911-1912 (106-110). 




argue in Chapter One, it is through Frost’s formal approach, most specifically his 
employment of metaphor, that he renders the apples more than the literal products of 
labor, but tangible markers reflecting the poet’s preoccupations with his role in the 
creative process. These poets are not simply locating ideas they imagine to be lurking 
within the object, as though the object contains its own sealed meaning, and the poet’s 
function is simply to access it.12 Frost’s apples do not carry some definitive, elusive 
meaning. Instead, his interaction with the apples raises to the surface the subject’s 
attitudes regarding his poetic labor, with all of the thing’s functions—as allusion, 
metaphor, symbol, and literal object—granting impersonal distance from what is an 
otherwise deeply personal encounter.  
Breaking down the formal process of the transformation from object into thing 
allows us to study the ideas the poet invests in the thing. And while the rhetorical 
approaches differ as much as the particular concerns generated, the poets of my study 
reveal a pattern. They explore the “thing” as a response to destabilizing conditions, with 
each poet searching for a poetics that can reconnect the subject to more useful truths (the 
“supreme fictions” discussed above): Frost uses things to craft a poetics of wisdom; 
Moore presents artistic things through which she can promote connections across time 
and history; Williams claims a visionary imagination that can grant access to universal 
knowledge; and Oppen searches for “truth” or “actualness” of experience, in the process 
                                                 
12 Baudelaire describes this type of relationship of children to their toys where “toys become actors in the 
great drama of life, reduced in size by the camera obscura of their little brains” (198). He concludes that 
“the overriding desire of most children is to get at and see the soul of their toys” (202); in turn, the child’s 
inability to access this soul—some abstract identity, or idea, granting the toy an interior life—introduces 
the child to the modern condition of melancholy and gloom. Baudelaire imagines a relationship to objects 
in which the child pursues ideas he or she can never attain. Lacan offers a similar concept of the 
inaccessible “Thing” that lurks at the center of the real. While the object is a tangible material thing, 
language attempts to name its interior “Thing”—ideas to reconnect the subject to a pre-lingual state. 
Nevertheless, as for Baudelaire, accessing the real proves an unattainable pursuit.  




exposing ideologies within emerging mechanisms of modernity. Yet, just as the thing 
stabilizes the poetic subject, granting authority through poetic creation, it also reveals 
underlying concerns about the poet’s ability to fulfill this function.  
 Voice, as one vehicle for creating the thing, exposes such preoccupations. As all 
of these poets pursue an authoritative means of effecting the object’s transformation, 
iterations of voice—and the degree to which each poet can attain a voice of authority—
become important to consider. For Frost, studying voice exposes concerns over gender 
and labor as the poet pursues masculine authority. For Moore, poetic authority proves a 
vocal performance achieved through impersonal, gender-neutral, and polyphonic 
description; the achievement of the thing comes only through a particular achievement of 
voice. In Williams’s work, the poet employs a sparse, declarative voice to bring objects 
into being—and, in turn, elevate local experience to the universal; for Williams, the act of 
naming itself grants a certain authority that can reveal the thing’s universalizing potential. 
Voice proves a useful device to analyze in Spring and All for the vocal contrasts between 
the book’s poetry and prose. As Williams moves between the two media, we see the 
prose’s more anxious, energetic iterations of voice muted into the verse’s precise and 
controlled description. Finally, Oppen’s fragmented voice reflects the experiences of a 
self destabilized by modern objects and the ambiguous ideological forces of modernity; 
his subject stands to regain authority specifically through the object’s representation, but 
the vocal act is one of passive deconstruction rather than active assertion. In short, by 
exploring the way these poets utilize voice, we can unpack the complicated 
preoccupations carried in the thing to better understand each poet’s conception of poetic 
authority.  




Voice also proves significant in a study of American modernism, given the 
outspoken aims of poets such as Frost and Williams to pursue a poetics that could more 
authentically express American experience, in both its attention to American landscapes 
and its representation of an American idiom. The “voice” of a poem suggests a rhetorical 
register attuned to the diction and rhythms of American speech. Reading voice becomes a 
manifold approach, for the poems often reveal multiple voices, including the various 
poetic subjects speaking within the poem (a dramatic function most clearly demonstrated 
in Frost’s dialogue and monologue poems), the use of quotation (a technique we see most 
prominently in Moore’s work), and the voice of the poet, which, at times, stands apart 
from the speaker. 
 Voice is just one device I study in exploring the formal treatment of things. 
Formal techniques mediate the reader’s relationship to—and, in some cases, even 
recognition of—objects under examination; yet, formal practices alone do not lead to 
simple declarations of meaning. As Brown points out, “Asking what amounts to two 
rather simple questions—How are objects represented in this text? And how are they 
made to mean?—results in rather complex, partial, and provisional answers” (18).  And 
while Brown resists offering a single answer, instead proclaiming that in his experiment 
“the answers, for predictable and not so predictable reasons” often “swerve off track,” I 
argue that modernist experimentations with form yield important insight into how objects 
are “made to mean.” Frequently, despite the poet’s desire to project some final meaning, 
the poem itself reinforces the impossibility of a single authority. Due to this complexity, 
wherein the poet strives for poetic authority even as he or she realizes its limitations, each 
poet’s formal treatment of the thing becomes central for exposing the means and 




limitations of preserving ideas in things. As I have suggested above, this preoccupation 
with poetic function, in fact, drives modernist experimentation as each poet pursues new 
techniques for attaining meaning in things.  
 For example, Frost’s use of metaphor reflects both an attempt to transform 
questions into wisdom, as well as his anxiety about this process. Although critics would 
not classify metaphor as a typically “modernist” technique, particularly in light of the 
Imagist dictate for “direct treatment of the thing,” Frost’s use carries modernist 
implications in the concerns it negotiates. Despite Frost’s defense of metaphor as the 
primary force of poetry—as he famously claims in “Education by Poetry,” “unless you 
are at home in the metaphor, … you are not safe anywhere” (CP 106)—his speakers 
continually face the risks that accompany metaphor, where meaning is vulnerable to 
multiplicity and misinterpretation. Although metaphor provides release from 
complexities that the poem’s “reality” cannot resolve, Frost’s metaphors are themselves 
fraught with anxiety over poetic function, as his speakers continually recognize the 
limitations of metaphor for presenting truth. 
 In the case of Oppen, disruption of traditional syntax makes visible the way 
language has naturalized the subject’s strange relations to modern objects; in turn, he 
directs readers to consider new relations to the materials with which the subject interacts. 
These technical experimentations also underscore the challenges of reaching some final 
“truth” within the thing. Instead, the fragmented syntax demonstrates a subject testing his 
own experience through what Oppen calls the “sequence of disclosure” (“Statement on 
Poetics” 26) as he negotiates feelings of passivity and powerlessness in the face of 
modern technological materials. Moore also complicates the notion of authority in her 




extensive use of quotation; her very idea of authority as a polyphonic register of voice 
suggests that Moore sought to destabilize traditional ideas of power and poetic authority. 
Yet, her excessive revising points to an uncertainty about the qualities Moore wanted to 
project in her poetic voice. Finally, Williams’s experiments with line and syntax, which 
tend to fragment the object by reading it in pieces, also reveal the poet’s preoccupation 
with rendering a new creation. Williams advocates a mode of perception, via the 
imagination, that strips from the object pre-existing associations, or aspects of 
“thingness,” in order to renew it. By presenting fragmented descriptions of the object’s 
parts, Williams can carefully examine the subject’s actual experience of encounter. It is 
through this very local contact that Williams aims to prompt universal access. Yet, 
tension exists over whether—and how—the poet can make the local object a universal 
thing, transferring within it some larger knowledge of human experience and 
understanding. Thus, for all the poets of my study, particular poetic techniques provide 
the means of projecting poetic authority, while simultaneously revealing preoccupations 
and anxieties in the subject’s position. 
 In addition to questions of form and representation, I address the more 
fundamental question of which objects get represented, since the particular items 
attracting each poet’s attention reflect something about the ideas dominating his or her 
concerns.13 For example, Oppen frequently focuses on objects of technology and urban 
modernity—the elevator shaft, the car, a refrigerator—and in the process sheds light on 
particular anxieties that mark the modern subject’s relationship with technology. Through 
formal techniques that defamiliarize objects, Oppen demonstrates the speaker’s strange or 
                                                 
13 Even for Baudelaire, the child’s choice of toy suggests a great deal about his or her aesthetic inclinations: 
“I believe that generally children dominate their toys; in other words that their choice is determined by 
dispositions and desires, vague, if you wish, and by no means formulated, but very real” (200). 




“unreal” relations to modern materials. His interaction becomes an experience of 
displacement and alienation—a point made even more significant in his representation of 
a modern world in which the self has been submerged within technology, with the 
speaker, at times, speaking from inside of modern things.  
 Williams also gives attention to trivialized, everyday objects; yet, unlike Oppen, 
his objects are not typically markers of “modernity” as he often focuses on natural objects 
encountered in his landscape. This attention to particular and yet common or universally-
encountered objects speaks to Williams’s self-perceived function as a poet promoting 
new ways of seeing. A modernist who dismissed the reverence to European tradition he 
saw in poets like Eliot and Pound, Williams actively promoted a native arts that could 
attest to multiple experiences of “contact” with the American landscape. In his praise of 
Juan Gris, on whose 1914 painting Flowers Williams’s well-known roses poem was 
based, Williams credits Gris with focusing on “Things with which he is familiar, simple 
things—at the same time to detach them from ordinary experience to the imagination” 
(110). Williams advocates local experience as the optimal means for pursuing the 
universal, because through the local the subject can authentically examine the conditions 
of his contact—and in a manner that will be identifiable for readers. Nevertheless, his 
focus on the subject’s experience of the object rather than the object itself reflects certain 
questions about how and whether the poet can truly universalize local experience.   
 Frost also focuses on natural objects reflective of his regionalized New England 
landscape, most frequently exploring natural objects the speaker encounters—trees, 
flowers, blueberries, apples, brooks, or birds. In the poems, Frost transforms natural 
materials into artistic things. His objects become significant for their condition as tamed 




and often-domesticated natural objects—things over which the poet has gained authority 
through the poetic process. For Frost the wild object poses the most threat (and is most 
often gendered female) as he seeks to regulate untamed aspects of self. In contrast, many 
of his objects, such as the birch trees of “Birches” and “Wild Grapes,” prove vulnerable 
to the ravages of untamed nature. The speaker gains mastery precisely when he gains 
poetic and formal control over things.  
In contrast, Moore tends to avoid natural objects altogether, only addressing them 
when they have been transformed into man-made forms, or artistic representations. Her 
interest in the art object—as a thing that has been transformed from its real-world 
counterpart, and which she then transforms again in the poetic space—elucidates her 
concern with how subjects respond to created things. The particular objects that garner 
each poet’s attention induce for each a form of meditation resurrecting already-dominant 
anxieties about the poet’s role in creating things. The process of overcoming these 
concerns through some form of poetic control offers the opportunity to project greater 
stability as a figure effecting cultural power.  
  Finally, I am cautious of readings that suggest that modernist poets were after no 
idea in the thing,14 that they pursued the thing as thing-unto-itself and demonstrated little 
                                                 
14 Bill Brown articulates the thinking around this point of view, even as he questions it by exposing the 
complexity of ideas in things. Asking, “How is it, then, that such a fantasy—of ideas in things—sustains 
one version of what we name American modernism?,” he concludes: 
The answer, of course, is that this literalization of Williams’s creed violates his own 
poetic practice of rendering things—“a red wheel/ barrow”—in their opacity, not their 
transparency. “No ideas but in things” should be read as a slip of the pen: a claim—on 
behalf of replacing abstractions with physical facts—that unwittingly invests objects with 
interiority, whereas Williams meant to evacuate objects of their insides and to arrest their 
doubleness, their vertiginous capacity to be both things and signs (symbols, metonyms, or 
metaphors) of something else. On the one hand, that slip may be read as a mark of the 
limitation of language, for how else could one put the matter—“no ideas but in things”—
so epigrammatically? On the other hand, it may be read as the mark of a limit within 
modernism’s effort to accept opacity, to satisfy itself with mere surfaces. (11-12) 




interest in penetrating its surface to access meanings within. This reading suggests that 
the thing carries no symbolic value beyond the fact that an object exists beneath the 
poet’s gaze. J. Hillis Miller articulates this view in Poets of Reality (1969), arguing that 
modern poetry “follows in its motion the flowing of time and reveals, through this 
mobility, the reality of things as they are” (11).15 Such a reading may seem to be 
supported by Wallace Stevens in his late-modernist long poem “An Ordinary Evening in 
New Haven,” a poem Miller also cites at the close of his introduction:  
We keep coming back and coming back 
To the real: to the hotel instead of the hymns 
That fall upon it out of the wind. We seek 
 
The poem of pure reality, untouched  
By trope or deviation, straight to the word, 
Straight to the transfixing object, to the object 
 
At the exactest point at which it is itself, 
Transfixing by being purely what it is, 
A view of New Haven, say, through the certain eye, 
 
The eye made clear of uncertainty, with the sight 
Of simple seeing, without reflection. We seek 
Nothing beyond reality. (CP 471) 
 
Yet, Stevens acknowledges that working toward the “poem of pure reality” is not a 
natural or easy process. He recognizes that “The objects tingle and the spectator moves/ 
With the objects” (470), for “We fling ourselves, constantly longing, on this form.” He 
                                                                                                                                                 
In fact, Brown finds that Williams himself promotes this idea of the thing emptied of its doubleness, even 
as he invites consideration of the thing’s interiority. 
15 Of the relationship between subject and object in this model, Miller emphasizes distance and separation: 
“To walk barefoot into reality means abandoning the independence of the ego. Instead of making 
everything an object for the self, the mind must efface itself before reality, or plunge into the density of an 
exterior world . . . . The effacement of the ego before reality means abandoning the will to power over 
things . . . . Only through the abnegation of the will can objects begin to manifest themselves as they are, in 
the integrity of their presence” (7-8). Miller argues that his new division and detachment between the mind 
and things allows for a new kind of “copresence” (9). My argument opposes Miller on the nature of this 
relationship, although I also acknowledge a world in which the subject experiences detachment and 
isolation from other things. Many of these poets pursue some measure of detachment to gain authority over 
the thing. Nevertheless, these poets first forge a connection to the object even as they recognize detachment 
as necessary for its representation.  




describes a series of objects from which the self cannot truly separate: “Suppose these 
houses are composed of ourselves/ . . . So much ourselves, we cannot tell apart/ The idea 
and the bearer-being of the idea //. The point of vision and desire are the same” (466). 
Ruminating on the spectator in New Haven, the subject that seeks truth through things, he 
describes, “Our breath is like a desperate element/ That we must calm.” The anxious, 
“desperate” self must be stilled before it can achieve some pure perception of external 
objects. However, the poem continually questions whether the self can ever be stilled into 
quietude, particularly as it engages surrounding objects. Stevens captures a rather 
complicated process of accessing “reality,” where “The enigmatical/ Beauty of each 
beautiful enigma/ Becomes amassed in a total double-thing./ We do not know what is real 
and what is not” (472). The thing remains a “double-thing” because the spectator cannot 
easily distinguish its “reality” from the parts of his mind that have been projected on and 
through it.  
 Despite interpretations of this poem concluding that Stevens ultimately articulates 
a Romantic vision—wherein the poet “seeks/ God in the object itself, without much 
choice” (475)—such a reading oversimplifies the complex difficulties facing a modern 
spectator, for whom “The instinct for heaven had its counterpart:/ The instinct for earth, 
for New Haven, for his room,/ The gay tournamonde as of a single world// In which he is 
and as and is are one” (476). Such a spectator cannot transcend the world around him; in 
fact, his “instinct” is to view the world in which he is a part. The goal then is a “final 
form,” a poetics that “directly and indirectly [gets] at” (488) the thing, as Stevens 
describes: “It is not the premise that reality/ Is a solid. It may be a shade that traverses/ A 
dust, a force that traverses a shade” (489). Despite appearances, the object is not a solid 




entity that remains fixed outside of the self; instead, it is an obscure reflected thing 
crossing over the world, a force that presses back upon that same partial, projected 
shadow. Stevens’s concept of even “pure reality” involves a notion of reflection and 
projection. It is a “thing” that proves obscure, darkened, and inherently double: “It is not 
an empty clearness, a bottomless sight./ It is a visibility of thought,/ In which hundreds of 
eyes, in one mind, see at once” (488). Poetry promotes an interaction effect, wherein 
“hundreds of eyes,” readers even well into the future, can gain access. The poet speaks 
from his own conditions but strives to universalize this experience to facilitate readers’ 
own engagement with “pure reality.”  
 This question of opacity undoubtedly challenges any definitive reading of 
modernist poetry. Brown finds that Williams’s short, sparse verse of Spring and All 
(1923) often leads to “opacity” of ideas rather than “transparency” and an “evacuation” 
of ideas rather than access. For my study, then, the materiality of the poem’s production 
becomes essential for accessing meaning. In the case of the red wheel barrow, or the 
other things of Spring and All, one cannot gain access to the particular meaning Williams 
invests in this “thing” without the context of the poem’s surrounding prose—hyperbolic 
philosophical writings that depict a poet grappling with his function to reinvigorate 
perception of the world. I employ a combination of textual materialism, formalism, and 
biography to locate clues about the governing preoccupations with authorship that 
mediate each poet’s relationship to the thing. My methodology looks at an accumulation 
of poems and formal approaches throughout full collections. For each of the poets of my 
study, I examine the early collection (or collections) in which the poet engages most 




clearly in this contemplation of objects, undertaking a process of transforming objects 
into things. 
 In chapter one, “‘But I Was Going to Say When Truth Broke In’: Robert Frost 
and the Self-Projected Thing,” I examine Frost’s second and third volumes, North of 
Boston (1914) and Mountain Interval (1916), tracing two particular anxieties of selfhood 
that get reflected through the objects in his landscape: anxieties over gender in what it 
means to regain a sense of control over one’s environment, and anxieties over labor in 
what it means to define a self through creative labor. At stake are specifically-gendered 
issues of poetic authority at a moment when Frost elevates the poet as an essential 
national figure. As Frost constructs things, he invests in them a particular version of 
identity that can stabilize him as a poet-figure of wisdom. In the process, he represses 
more anxious aspects of identity, particularly concerning masculinity and labor, which 
prove prominent for Frost and his speakers. Through things, Frost can negotiate two 
layers of anxiety: his speakers’ concerns over their own conditions, with objects 
frequently becoming the vehicles through which they can explore epiphanies or wisdom; 
and the poet’s larger preoccupation with the relationship between subjects and objects 
and the poet’s task to invest meaning in things.  
In this chapter I focus on metaphor and voice as two prominent devices Frost uses 
to transform objects into things. Even as metaphor allows Frost to project agency and 
control amidst feelings of alienation and powerlessness, this poetic technique has its 
limitations, which voice proves central for exposing. I apply Richard Poirier’s claim 
about the dialectic relationship of metaphor and voice in Frost’s poetry, wherein voice 
frequently reflects the speaker’s hesitancy about the chosen metaphor and, more broadly, 




about the speaker’s own capacity to create meaning. Even as Frost claims authority in his 
act of creating the thing, he often underscores the speakers’, and the poet’s, challenge in 
asserting meaning. Nevertheless, the thing provides an opportunity for Frost and his 
speakers to project a particular version of authority. 
In the second chapter, “Marianne Moore’s Observations and Imaginary 
Possession of the Thing,” I unpack the process by which Moore transforms objects into 
things, a process she classifies in the poem “When I Buy Pictures” as “imaginary 
possession.” In her first collection, Observations (1924), Moore demonstrates a 
fascination with art objects: a fish transformed into a glass bottle; a seagull engraved in 
lapis lazuli; artifacts featured in museum displays; even natural objects, such as a 
chameleon or snail, portrayed as images embodying the polish and refinement of her 
poetics. By so prominently featuring constructed, and perfected, exteriors, Moore 
elevates the artist as a figure of cultural authority and demonstrates her interest in the 
responsive power of aesthetic things. I examine her process of imaginary possession 
through terms Moore employs in two well-known poems, “When I Buy Pictures” and 
“Poetry”: “pleasure” and “contempt.” Although these concepts are oppositional, Moore’s 
poetic of things relies upon the poet’s successful engagement with both experiences of 
the object. First, Moore strives to gain a sense of connection to the object through the 
experience of pleasure, which may include sensual, emotional, or even intellectual 
delight. Nevertheless, she also aims to achieve (and evoke in the reader) “perfect 
contempt,” an experience that fosters disdain and critical judgment. This latter shift helps 
explain the speaker’s retreat to a place of critical distance within the poem’s rhetorical 
act, as well as Moore’s use of techniques that distance readers from the material, 




including her elevated, scientific and Latinate diction, unattributed quotations, vague 
pronouns, syllabic forms that denaturalize syntax, and frequent concluding lines and 
revisions that shift into abstraction. Moore’s poetics thus illustrates a tension between 
closeness and distance, between pleasure and contempt, as the poet negotiates what it 
means to assert possession over the object and gain a voice of authority in its 
representation as a thing. 
In chapter three, “‘THE WORLD IS NEW’: William Carlos Williams’s 
Imagination and the Renewal of Things,” I focus on Spring and All (1923) as the book in 
which Williams most clearly demonstrates a concentration on objects, with the intent of 
renewing materials through their creative transformation. Although Williams does not 
employ the same terminology as Brown’s thing theory, he conceives of two separate 
object forms: the original object encountered in the landscape and a separate thing made 
through the artist’s creation. In Williams’s poetics these distinctions get represented in 
the terminology of the “local” and “universal.” Williams advocates a form of local 
contact that grants access to some universal realm. The tension in Williams’s work lies in 
this opposition between local and universal, as the poet strives to represent things in a 
manner authentic to both. I argue that his concepts of both the local and the universal 
require the subject to represent an individual experience of the object. The local object, 
even as it is transformed into a universalized thing, marks actual human contact and 
records the feelings, questions, desires, and anxieties generated through the subject’s 
interaction. Further, Williams’s concept of the universal allows him to forge connections 
between the individual subject and broader humanity. At stake is the very transformation 
of a culture as Williams privileges the subject’s local experience to gain greater 




knowledge of the conditions in which he lives. At a moment distinguished by the 
subject’s isolation and fragmentation, Williams aims to inspire within his readers a 
communal sense that human experience can be universalized and shared. 
While Williams focuses on a poetics of things that can reveal some transcultural 
and transhistorical form of “universal” experience, Oppen explores things to expose a 
subject testing his relations to materials—relations that must be historicized in relation to 
particular social and political conditions. In chapter four, “‘The Sequence of Disclosure’: 
The Truth Hidden in Things in George Oppen’s Discrete Series,” I focus on Oppen’s 
exploration of objects in his first book, Discrete Series (1934), a series of experimental 
poems highlighting urban conditions in the midst of the Great Depression. In this text, 
Oppen explores the subject’s relationship to objects of modern technology, exposing 
layers of meaning that often remain hidden in the subject’s interaction. In contrast, he 
seeks to discover the “truth” hidden in things. Through his experimental use of syntax 
and the line, Oppen invites the reader to explore new relations to the materials; in the 
process, he models a stance of inquiry the reader can apply to objects in his own world. 
Oppen reveals the subject’s diminished sense of agency in relation to modern 
technologies, as well as his alienation from natural objects that have become unreal and 
strange. The things of Discrete Series help expose conditions of labor, sexual power 
relations, and social ideologies that have limited the subject’s knowledge of its own 
conditions. In exploring the poet’s work specifically through its transformation of 
objects, I argue that Oppen proves distinctly modernist: a poet whose self-conscious act 
of making things out of the subject’s material interaction reveals his larger preoccupation 
with the poet’s function at a tumultuous moment in history.  




 My concluding chapter compares this fascination with things in the work of 
Elizabeth Bishop. For this post-modern poet, the “thing” reinforces the self’s 
fragmentation and insecurity, as well as her sense of isolation and separation from the 
objects she encounters. Bishop still engages in an elaborate process of looking, and her 
object undergoes a similar transformation into an aestheticized thing. I examine Bishop’s 
early poem “The Fish,” in which the fish becomes a marker encapsulating the speaker’s 
preoccupations with looking. For Bishop, the act of knowing—which for all of these 
poets involves projecting authority through form—takes place through acknowledgment 
and recognition, and the self’s genuine moment of connection and love for the object she 
examines. Yet, Bishop no longer strives for possession or authority, and the poet 
ultimately acknowledges the limitations of her knowledge. By contrasting Bishop to the 
modernist poets of my study, I evaluate how this group of American poets in the early 
twentieth century resolved preoccupations with poetic authority in their construction of 
things. 




Chapter One: “But I Was Going to Say When Truth Broke In”:  
Robert Frost and the Self-Projected Thing 
  
 When one considers the prominent focus on objects as “things” in modernist 
poetry, Robert Frost may not initially seem the poet to best epitomize this trend. Yet, a 
scan of titles in his early collections reveals Frost’s frequent consideration of objects. 
Titles such as “Mending Wall,” “The Mountain,” “A Hundred Collars,” “The Black 
Cottage,” “Blueberries,” “The Wood-Pile,” “Christmas Trees,” “The Telephone,” “Hyla 
Brook,” “The Oven Bird,” “Birches,” “The Exposed Nest,” and “Snow,”16 all take the 
form of nouns or noun phrases, and the poems frequently follow a rhetorical pattern in 
which the speaker encounters an object and sets about to ruminate on the experience of 
interaction. Through Frost’s elevation of the individual voices and experiences of his 
speakers, he proves an ideal figure to illustrate the process of the object’s transformation 
into what, in his case, I am calling the “self-projected thing.” As Frost constructs things, 
he invests in them a particular version of identity that can stabilize him as a poet-figure of 
wisdom. In the process, he represses more anxious aspects of identity, particularly 
concerning masculinity and labor, which prove prominent for Frost and his speakers. 
Through things, Frost can negotiate two layers of anxieties: the speakers’ anxieties over 
their own conditions, with objects frequently becoming the vehicles around which they 
can explore epiphanies or wisdom; and the poet’s larger anxiety about the relationship 
between subjects and objects and the poet’s task to invest meaning in things.17 
                                                 
16 These poems appear in Frost’s second or third collections, North of Boston (1914) and Mountain Interval 
(1916). Due to subtle revisions Frost made to these collections in later editions, I will be citing the original 
volumes.  
17 Nowhere in his correspondence or essays does Frost himself outline this trend I am identifying, nor does 
he frame his focus as one aimed at either objects or things. Nevertheless, the evidence lies in the poems 
themselves, wherein Frost’s objects often contain multiple unarticulated meanings. To borrow from Bill 




To better position Frost’s in relation to the modern trend I have been outlining, it 
is necessary to consider the way voice functions in his poems. The voice of a Frost poem 
can reflect the dialect of a particular speaking subject, or multiple speaking subjects in 
the case of his dialogue poems, with the poet positioned at some ironic distance from 
these speakers. At times, a narrative voice mediates or describes such characters, offering 
a poetic interpretation of their experiences. Yet, at other times this narrative speaker is 
reflecting on his own moments of encounter—in poems such as “The Wood-Pile” or 
“The Road Not Taken”—such that it is easy to imagine the speaker as Frost himself. 
Even in these poems, however, it is often possible to identify multiple rhetorical registers, 
or places where the voice shifts in tone and attitude. Analyzing voice in relation to the 
object becomes essential for locating precisely where Frost transforms anxiety into 
wisdom and turns personal insecurities into poetic authority. 
 This projection of wisdom through an assertive, masculine poetic voice fosters 
Frost’s sense of his poetic persona. Both his pursuit of this version of identity, as well as 
his awareness of his own vulnerability in the process, prove essential qualities of Frost’s 
modernism. Frost as the authoritative national poet of wisdom, the long-mythologized 
New England poet-farmer, what Frank Lentricchia has called “Robert Frost, famous 
American poet” (MQ 111); and Frost as the darker, more abstract and anxious speaker of 
“Stopping By the Woods on a Snowy Evening” remain identifiable figures even for 
casual readers of his poetry. At times the earlier persona seems most dominant, given 
Frost’s deliberate cultivation of a public persona that would cast him in the role of 
national bard, following in the tradition of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Walt Whitman. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Brown’s distinction, again, in Frost’s work, things can be said to “name the object even as [they name] 
something else” (“Thing Theory” 5).    




Through his near-constant travel for readings and other appearances across mainstream 
American culture, Frost successfully commodified this persona, becoming one of the 
highest-selling poets in American history. Yet, readers of Frost’s poems have long 
identified with other, darker aspects of self.18 A study of Frost’s early work, before he 
emerges at the helm of middle-brow literary culture, reveals that Frost’s cultivation of a 
poetic self was in fact fraught with a great deal more anxiety than his public persona 
suggests.  
 Lentricchia classifies Frost’s early volumes, North of Boston (1914) and 
Mountain Interval (1916), as an intermediary period of experimentation between the neo-
Romanticism of his first collection, A Boy’s Will (1913) and “his final major 
transformation into the sententious poet of public fame who came to dominate most of 
what he wrote after the publication of his third volume” (94). This intermediary phase of 
Frost’s career corresponds historically to Pound’s development of Imagism, a fact that 
becomes more significant given Frost’s composition of these books during his years in 
England from September 1912 through February 1915. While in England, during a 
particularly creative phase of 1913-1914, Frost spent time in the London literary scene 
interacting with figures such as T.E. Hulme, F.S. Flint, and Ezra Pound as they were 
debating and formalizing theories on modernist poetics. Although in many ways Frost’s 
version of modernism was distinctly separate from that of Imagism—he disavows free 
verse, for example, in his commitment to form, and his prominent use of metaphor 
                                                 
18 Among the earliest critics to point out this darker strain in Frost was Randall Jarrell, who in 1953 wrote, 
“Besides the Frost that everybody knows there is one whom no one even talks about” (28). Lionel Trilling 
extended this idea in his infamous speech delivered at Frost’s eighty-fifth birthday party. Toasting the poet 
in attendance, Trilling remarked, “I think of Robert Frost as a terrifying poet. Call him, if it makes things 
any easier, a tragic poet, but it might be useful every now and then to come out from under the shelter of 
that little word. The universe he conceives of is a terrifying universe” (451). 




contradicts Imagism’s call for “direct treatment of the thing”—Frost was nevertheless 
taking up similar questions as his contemporaries in his engagement with objects and his 
move to invest them with meanings beyond their material or use value.  
 I borrow from Lentricchia’s sense of the divisions within Frost’s career to assess 
how things function in these early poems, when Frost is actively engaged in creating not 
only highly-crafted poetic objects but also a powerful poetic persona. Things, then, assist 
Frost in constructing a poetic self. Yet, even as Lentricchia recognizes distinct phases of 
Frost’s career, he acknowledges the story as never simple: “It is a story that partially 
misrepresents, because it segregates what at Frost’s most original was the fusion from 
early on, in a single literary impulse, of lyrical, narrative, dramatic, and didactic moods” 
(95). He finds the “deceptive” poems of Frost’s first volume to speak most acutely to the 
varied impulses underlying Frost’s poetics. Just as Lentricchia acknowledges the merging 
of diverse impulses within volumes, or even within individual poems, I argue that 
complicated impulses diverge within Frost’s construction of things, which allow him to 
both repress anxieties and project poetic authority. 
 Karen Kilcup also finds Frost’s career one in which the early books convey a man 
experimenting with self-representations. Kilcup’s work adds an important dimension to 
my study because of her specific attention to gender. She argues that early in his career, 
Frost participates in feminine literary traditions as he expands representations of 
consciousness and selfhood, engendering what she calls a “poetics of empathy” (8).19 He 
adopts poetic forms beyond the lyric—a form all too limited by the consciousness of the 
                                                 
19 Of the particular “feminine” traditions that Frost engages, Kilcup identifies Frost’s “affiliations with 
American sentimental poetry, regionalist fiction and nonfiction, homoerotic writing, and premodern and 
early modern women’s writing—including children’s literature—while they outline readers’ responses to 
his changing self-representation” (5). 




“I”—to allow for “a different kind of self-conception on the part of the poet as well as an 
altered relationship to his or her audience; when poetry is defined only as lyric, many 
other possible performances of selfhood are excluded” (6-7). Despite these efforts in the 
early volumes, in later Frost, Kilcup traces four distinctly masculine voices encapsulating 
different aspects of self: “the wisecracking Yankee sage, popular and familiar in some 
sense but detached in another; the political critic, too invested in emotion and personality 
for high modernist taste; the bard; and the lyricist” (191-192). Thus, she concludes that 
Frost ultimately moves beyond the feminine to pursue a poetic identity on largely 
masculine terms. Kilcup’s work is useful for illustrating how Frost draws upon several 
poetic traditions and impulses in the books between A Boy’s Will (1913) and New 
Hampshire (1923). My conclusions diverge over how Frost deals with the question of a 
masculine or feminine poetics. I argue that Frost’s resolution of the conflict of self, even 
at this early stage, is always approached as a conflict between feminine passivity and 
masculine authority, with the poet-figure emerging in the realm of masculine creative 
control.20 
 Given this effort to trace particular shifts in Frost’s career, the “middle” phase of 
Frost’s second and third volumes becomes crucial, when the tensions of creating a poetic 
self prove most visible. In particular, one can trace anxieties through the poet’s 
engagement with objects in his environment. As he transforms objects into things, they 
                                                 
20 Katherine Kearns also finds Frost’s central conflict as fear of the ever-present, chaotic, and potentially-
destructive feminine—images Frost projects through his representations of nature as a female force, as well 
as mothers, wives, and daughters. She notes that women throughout Frost’s work “rise to stand seductive in 
the forest, generative, metamorphic, and duplicitous, emblems of desire and death” (21). In contrast, the 
“work of manhood is, then to urge control on the uncontrollable, to impose upon its own ‘femaleness’—
that which embodied in women seems so randomly destructive—moderation and orderliness.” Kearns 
characterizes Frost’s desire for poetic control as an effort to guard his manhood “against that which 
threatens the structural integrity” through things like “mothers, then lovers, wives, and daughters [that] eat 
away at the intact self” (29-30).  




frequently mark un-resolvable aspects of the subject’s experience and become devices 
through which Frost can project more stable authority. Because these concerns often 
cannot be resolved in the space of the poem’s “reality”—within the landscapes and 
material conditions in which these speakers live—the poet-speaker achieves release 
through metaphor, a medium providing agency and control amidst feelings of alienation 
and powerlessness. In fact, metaphor is the most prominent device through which Frost 
transforms objects into things and, in the process, turns poetic preoccupations into 
wisdom.  
 What constitutes an “object” for Frost in these early volumes? Setting his poems 
in the rural landscapes “north of Boston,” Frost most frequently takes up natural objects 
the speaker encounters in the landscape—trees, flowers, blueberries, apples, brooks, or 
birds—exploring how the poet can transform natural materials into artistic things, a 
question he poses explicitly in “The Oven Bird” when he asks “what to make of a 
diminished thing” (MI 35). Frost’s thematic concerns with the quaint, rural, New England 
landscape can also be read as an attempt to explore human experience removed from the 
conditions of modern Industrial labor; yet, particular preoccupations over labor intrude, 
even in these secluded poetic spaces. When he chooses objects in the form of man-made 
transformations of nature—a pile of chopped wood, stones mounted into a wall, or a 
cellar hole dug into the ground—Frost manifests concern over the labor that changes 
natural objects into things reflecting complex social and ethical codes beyond their actual 
use value. Occasionally more threatening objects appear in the form of technology, such 
as the saw that kills a young boy in “Out, Out—,”or the tree transformed into a telephone 




pole in “An Encounter,” suggesting a consideration of the way modern technologies 
threaten masculinity and existing codes of labor.  
Despite the variety of objects that appear, one way to consider them is through the 
relationship Frost stages between subject and object, demonstrated in the poem, “An Old 
Man’s Winter Night.” Here, he reveals a relationship where the subject may gaze at and 
ruminate upon objects, but the process of interpreting them reveals more about the 
subject’s conditions than those of the objects. In the poem, an old man looks out his 
window upon the night; yet, it is “all out of doors” that “looked darkly in at him,” while 
his eyes were “kept . . . from giving back the gaze” by “the lamp tilted near them in his 
hand” (15). As the man looks at objects, they literally look back, and we quickly see that 
his experience of things is through the experience of his own mind: “A light he was to no 
one but himself/ Where now he sat, concerned with he knew what/ A quiet light, and then 
not even that” (15-16). 
 Before he can fall into sleep, the man “[consigns] to the moon, such as she was,/ 
So late-arising, to the broken moon/ As better than the sun in any case/ For such a 
charge” (16). To dispel disturbed aspects of mind, he casts them outward, with the moon 
changing to the “broken moon.” This thing is “better than the sun” for such a task 
because it allows the man to consign away darker, unsettled notions of self. And this man 
is clearly unsettled as he ponders his place in “that creaking room” where he stood “with 
barrels around him—at a loss” (15). He has been walking in and out, a habit he claims 
has “scared the cellar under him/ In clomping there, he scared it once again/ In clomping 
off;—and scared the outer night.” Yet, the personification of the cellar with human fear 
illustrates how the actual object becomes a self-projected thing: in fact, it is the man who 




contains and then reassigns this emotion. When the poem ends, “One aged man—one 
man—can’t fill a house/ A farm, a countryside, or if he can,/ It’s thus he does it of a 
winter night,” Frost suggests that the man cannot gain a sense of wholeness against 
feelings of lonely alienation, except through the possibilities posed by such a winter 
night. Even as he looks out upon the landscape, it is the man’s self-focused gaze that 
grants him a sense of peace. While the degree of peace can be debated—for within the 
poem it is certainly ambiguous—Frost suggests a stance toward objects that animates 
them by way of the subject’s own condition. The poem also carries implications for the 
poet’s own act of representation, wherein the poet explores “the roar/ Of trees and crack 
of branches, common things” to better understand human experience. By the poem’s end, 
Frost suggests the uncertainty of ever gaining definitive knowledge; he exposes the 
instability of any man’s ability to “fill a house” and know the darker aspects of his own 
mind. The pursuit of such knowledge through “a winter night” remains an ambiguous 
achievement. 
To Be A Swinger of Birches: Creating a Poetic Self 
 Two other early poems demonstrate Frost’s process of constructing the self-
projected thing: “Birches” and “Wild Grapes.” A close reading of these poems allows us 
to trace the connections between them to analyze two concerns Frost faces in gaining 
poetic authority—preoccupations over gender in what it means to assert “control” over 
one’s environment; and preoccupations over what it means to define a self through 
creative labor. These issues have clear correlations to the modern moment: as changing 
gender roles and forms of labor in relation to identity become more unstable, Frost’s own 
sense of poetic identity is distinguished by these concerns.  




 In a roughly six-month span from late-1912 to early-1913—his first winter in 
England following British publisher David Nutt’s acceptance of his first book—Frost had 
one of his most creative periods, resulting in a series of poems that would change 
American poetry. As Jay Parini recounts in Robert Frost: A Life (1999), “By late spring 
(1913), nearly a dozen finished poems lay on his desk, including ‘Mending Wall,’ ‘Home 
Burial,’ ‘After Apple-Picking,’ and ‘Birches’—four of the best-known poems in the 
whole of American literature” (123). Although Frost did not include “Birches” in his 
second collection, North of Boston (1914), withholding it for inclusion in Mountain 
Interval (1916), its development alongside several earlier poems suggests that “Birches” 
engages similar questions and themes. 21  
In an unpublished 1950 essay, Frost described “Birches” as “two fragments 
soldered together so long ago I have forgotten where the joint is” (CP 162). Indeed, two 
distinct impulses operate within “Birches,” which reveal important tensions about the 
subject’s relation to the object: Does the self exist in passive relation to his or her 
environment (and, as we will see, the gendered nature of this experience becomes 
prominent for Frost), or can the poet actively construct a sense of selfhood? Although one 
narrative within “Birches” points to the latter—with Frost relying upon metaphor to 
solidify this constructed self—the poem complicates such an interpretation. Despite every 
active assertion of poetic authority, Frost reveals the vulnerability inherent within these 
claims through his representation of the birches as conveying repressed anxieties. 
Nevertheless, the forward-sweeping birch trees become the vehicle through which Frost 
                                                 
21 The poem first appeared in the Atlantic Monthly in August 1915, along with “The Road Not Taken,” and 
“The Sound of the Trees.” It is not Frost’s act of withholding the poem that most interests me, since Frost 
had a habit of withholding poems for later publication. Rather, I am interested here in the intersections of 
“Birches” with themes found throughout the poems of North of Boston. 




can create a new poetic persona. By presenting multiple possibilities for the thing’s 
meaning, Frost illustrates how things can reflect complicated, and even conflicted, 
aspects of the subject’s experience—allowing Frost to overcome anxieties and project 
authority.  
 At a plot level, the poem offers two narrative explanations for how the birch trees 
became bent: the first half of the poem deals explicitly with the fact of the ice storms, 
while the second half imagines a young boy who swings the birches into submission. 
Although Frost begins the poem with his preference, “I like to think some boy’s been 
swinging them,” he immediately turns to the “truth” of the crushing ice storms that “bend 
them down to stay”:  
Ice storms do that. Often you must have seen them 
Loaded with ice a sunny winter morning 
After a rain. They click upon themselves 
As the breeze rises, and turn many-colored 
As the stir cracks and crazes their enamel. 
Soon the sun’s warmth makes them shed crystal shells 
Shattering and avalanching on the snowcrust— 
Such heaps of broken glass to sweep away 
You’d think the inner dome of heaven had fallen. (MI 37) 
Harsh external conditions are destructive forces upon the object: The weight of the ice 
bends the branches that prove unable to withstand such external pressure. In fact, the 
weight of Frost’s description is also on the ice, rather than on the bare branches. When he 
notes that “They click upon themselves,” the ambiguous antecedent refers to the same 
“them” of the previous line—the birch trees (“Often you must have seen them/ Loaded 
with ice”). Nevertheless, the “they” that clicks is not the bare branches, but some version 
of these branches in which the ice covering dominates the object’s identity. The ice clicks 
as the branches collide “and turn many-colored/ As the stir cracks and crazes their 




enamel.” The speaker views the object not as a tree that happens to be bent, but as a thing 
forced into submission by some external quality; he cannot see the branches as separate 
from their ice covering. The metaphor of “enamel” suggests the ice as something altering 
the branches’ external identity, changing their gloss to reflect a different exterior. Frost, 
then, presents the trees via a layer that transforms their very existence and purpose, for it 
is this “enamel” that forces the trees downward against the upward trajectory of their own 
growth.  
 Once the ice “shatters” and “avalanches,” the speaker presents a second metaphor 
for the ice, now as “broken glass,” suggestive of refractive shards that alter perspective. 
Frost links this glass to “the inner dome of heaven,” a realm the young swinger will also 
try to access in the poem’s second part. If we are reading this fragment as a metaphor of 
self, the glass represents some impenetrable layer through which the subject cannot 
proceed. Nonetheless, it is a layer that coats the self, limiting it by external threats and 
pressures, and transforms the object’s organic state with an artificial gloss that naturalizes 
these constrictions. These forces prove so severe that even freed from their ice encasing, 
the birches remain victimized and bent. At this point Frost genders this form of 
destruction, when he connects it to a simile of the trees “trailing their leaves on the 
ground/ Like girls on hands and knees that throw their hair/ Before them over their heads 
to dry them in the sun” (38). The simile is jarring, given that it connects the earlier 
violent destruction to girls bent in almost carefree flirtation. Nevertheless, the violence 
present in the poem’s opening lines threatens even within the simile, as the poem 
captures the girls in a pose evoking clear sexual playfulness or vulnerability. In the 
process, Frost genders female the passive self that accepts external forces of destruction. 




 The poem takes a sharp turn, with the speaker’s announcement, “But I was going 
to say when Truth broke in/ With all her matter-of-fact about the ice-storm/ (Now I am 
free to be poetical?)” Frost included this parenthetical line in the poem’s first 
presentations, both in the Atlantic Monthly and in Mountain Interval. However, in his 
first Selected Poems (1923), Frost removed the line and never restored it to later editions. 
Despite Frost’s reservations about the parenthetical line, it highlights a particular tension 
in his sense of selfhood between the “Truth” of real-world restrictions upon the subject 
and the opportunities available in one’s freedom to be “poetical.” Frost could not fully 
embark on his poetical representation of the birches—the narrative in which he has 
“some boy bend them/ As he went out and in to fetch the cows”—until he resolves, or in 
fact represses, particular anxieties that “Truth” poses. The poem must deal with the 
“Truth” before Frost can move into another realm. In that sense, the image of the girls 
becomes one encapsulating the threats upon and vulnerabilities within the subject; yet, it 
also serves as an image through which Frost can confront—and move past—these 
anxieties in his own poetic pursuits. He creates an alternative metaphor of identity in the 
figure of the boy, who embarks on just this very action. Alone among the trees, too far 
from town to play baseball, the boy gains creative control over the landscape: 
One by one he subdued his father’s trees 
By riding them down over and over again 
Until he took the stiffness out of them, 
And not one but hung limp, not one was left 
For him to conquer. 
 
The masculine elements of this form of “conquest” are significant: it is the father’s trees 
that the speaker aims to “subdue” and control, while he presents the act of “swinging” in 




sexualized imagery of “riding” the branches until “not one but hung limp.”22 Swinging 
upon birches becomes a metaphorical act of creation and domination, in what proves a 
particular model for writing the poem itself. To be a “swinger of birches” is to exert 
poetic control over the object by transforming it into metaphor.23 Frost acknowledges the 
power residing within metaphor in his well-known essay “Education by Poetry” (1931), 
where he states, “Poetry begins in trivial metaphors, pretty metaphors, ‘grace’ metaphors, 
and goes on to the profoundest thinking we have” (CP 104). Defending his stance that 
youth need an “education by poetry,” he warns that people lacking the ability to read 
metaphor “don’t know how to judge an editorial. . . . don’t know how to judge a political 
campaign. . . . don’t know when they are being fooled by a metaphor, an analogy, a 
parable” (103). Accordingly, one who creates metaphor has the capacity to shape and 
control meaning. Frost warns that larger metaphorical systems, including scientific 
metaphors, such as evolution, infiltrate all discourses and shape everyday thought, 
influencing the way humanity understands itself. Readers are under threat when they 
cannot analyze the forces at play within the metaphor and thus cannot recognize the 
abstract ideas exerting control over their lives. On the other hand, being able to assess 
where metaphor breaks down grants the opportunity to determine where the self can 
reclaim authority over meaning. Frost concludes: 
                                                 
22 Parini also notes the sexual undertones of the poem, observing that “the poem re-creates the curve of 
desire found in the sexual act, from anticipation, exhilaration, and fulfillment to the letting down at the 
end” (137). 
23 In a 1933 letter to his son Carol, who was then attempting to write his own poetry, Frost also 
characterizes poetic creation as asserting masculine control over the landscape. He writes his son, “You 
have hammered it close and hard and you have rammed it full of all sorts of things, observations both of 
nature and human nature—and humor and picturesqueness too. And best of all, as Marge says, it is no sissy 
poem such as I get from poetic boys generally…” (Barry 107). The hyper-masculine language of 
“hammering” the poem into form and “ramming” it with objects, suggests that poetic creation involves 
force, control, and rugged manual labor. The poem then becomes a labored act equivalent in value to other 
forms of masculine labor. The threat of the “sissy” poem is one that fails to grant the poet this degree of 
control and, in the process, fails to capture “human nature.” 




What I am pointing out is that unless you are at home in the metaphor, … 
you are not safe anywhere. Because you are not at ease with figurative 
values: you don’t know the metaphor in its strength and weakness. You 
don’t know how far you may expect to ride it and when it may break down 
with you. You are not safe in science. You are not safe in history. (106)  
 Frost confirms his gendered thinking about metaphor in “Home Burial,” in which 
a grieving wife and husband remain at odds about how each suffers over the loss of a 
child. Central to the poem is the couple’s inability to communicate, as the husband 
decries, “My words are nearly always an offence./ I don’t know how to speak of 
anything/ So as to please you” (NOB 47). He adds, “A man must partly give up being a 
man/ With women-folk.” To the wife, the husband’s most unforgiveable offense was his 
very action of burying the son, of digging up the earth in which he deposits the child and 
then returning to the house, where he “[talks] about [his] everyday concerns” (49). She 
recounts, “I can repeat the very words you were saying. ‘Three foggy mornings and one 
rainy day/ Will rot the best birch fence a man can build.’” She has overheard her husband 
working through his grief by transforming it into metaphor, but she cannot grasp the 
layered meaning. Instead, she concludes that her husband felt nothing about his loss: 
“Think of it, talk like that at such a time!/ What had how long it takes a birch to rot/ To 
do with what was in the darkened parlour./ You couldn’t care!” (50). The wife has failed 
to recognize metaphor as the very means through which her husband addresses his 
complicated feelings of grief; the metaphor exposes, represses, and sublimates them in a 
manner that allows him to function at this extreme moment. Here, Frost again places 
metaphor in the domain of masculinity, as a means of communication that allows things 




(again, here, a birch tree) to reflect difficult aspects of the subject’s experience. 
Connecting the lost child to a rotted birch fence links it to anxieties within the man’s 
identity, his sense of masculinity and his self-definition as a laborer. The metaphor 
contains an un-resolvable tension: What happens when the very product of a man’s labor, 
the fruit of his own creation, proves so vulnerable in the world? 
 Given the prominence of metaphor within Frost’s theory of poetics, it is worth 
considering how metaphor fosters the desired conquest Frost acknowledges in “Birches.” 
In “The Constant Symbol” (1946) he claims that metaphor contains the potential for 
deception and repression. Calling it “the chiefest” thing about poetry, Frost defines 
metaphor as “saying one thing and meaning another, saying one thing in terms of another, 
the pleasure of ulteriority” (CP 147). The first two aspects of this definition carry slightly 
different implications: to say one thing in terms of another is to draw an unexpected 
correlation between the objects united in the metaphor; on the other hand, to say one 
thing and mean another suggests a deceptive effort to recast “truth” in some less 
offensive or undesired form. The third aspect, “the pleasure of ulteriority,” also implies 
the presence of things intentionally concealed. In this sense, metaphor becomes a safe 
means to say things the speaker thinks must be hidden, repressed, or denied; it allows the 
speaker to sublimate repressed anxieties or desires by marrying them with objects that 
can both contain and refract the troubled aspects of self. When used in just this manner, 
the object becomes a thing through which the poet can assert some control over the 
process of solidifying a self.  
 Frost’s near-complete retreat into metaphor in the second half of “Birches,” then, 
reveals a great deal about how he views his poetic project: to reshape the self in 




metaphorical terms. Just as the boy reaches climactic triumph over the birches, “flung 
outward, feet first, with a swish,/ Kicking his way down through the air to the ground,” 
the speaker’s voice re-emerges, acknowledging a clear personal connection: “So was I 
once myself a swinger of birches./ And so I dream of going back to be” (39). The impulse 
underlying this poetic diversion into metaphor has been the desire to reclaim a previous 
sense of self, and one firmly established around masculine energy and values and a sense 
of purpose that have since come under threat, as well as a moment of childhood when the 
possibilities for power and pleasure remained endless. In contrast, the speaker is now 
“weary of considerations” when “life is too much like a pathless wood”—a line that 
hearkens back to “The Road Not Taken,” which was published with “Birches” in its first 
appearance in the Atlantic—with slashes across his face from intruding branches. When 
he admits, “I’d like to get way from earth awhile,” he comes the closest at any point in 
the poem to casting this metaphorical move as a deliberate retreat from real-world 
anxieties and concerns (nevertheless presented here in metaphorical terms). The speaker 
quickly qualifies that he does not want to be removed from life, for “Earth’s the right 
place for love:/ I don’t know where it’s likely to go better.” Yet, this platitude fails to 
resolve the tensions Frost’s speaker has revealed, as he ends the poem again by falling 
back into the figure of himself as a swinger of birches climbing toward heaven. In this 
second fragment, the dome of heaven does not shatter; instead, the tree “could bear no 
more,/ But dipped its top and set me down again,” with the speaker noting, “That would 
be both good going and coming back” (40). Frost has rewritten the anxious representation 
of a subject plagued by destructive external forces through the metaphor of a boy 
attaining harmony and control, and even potential access to heaven—a realm of wisdom 




that Frost can only nudge toward with the generic platitude he offers near the poem’s end. 
To “be a swinger of birches” is to enact a form of poetic authority that will allow the 
speaker to overcome the preoccupations marking his interaction with the material 
world.24 
 Frost’s impulse to represent poetic authority as a masculine pursuit is further 
displayed in “Wild Grapes,” a poem Frost includes in his fourth collection, New 
Hampshire (1923). He elsewhere describes the poem as connected to “Birches” through 
“an inner logic I don’t have to account for” (CP 194).25 Frost recounts the inspiration for 
the later poem: 
The birch of “Wild Grapes” was one a girl swung in when she didn’t 
weigh enough to bring it to earth. She told me about it eighty years later 
and asked me to write a poem about it for girls to match the other birch 
poem that she claimed was written for boys. She clenched her hands in 
memory of the pain of having had to hang on in the tree for too long. I had 
to write the poem for her because she was the first editor ever to publish 
me. Her name was Susan Hayes Ward. (194-195) 
The explicit connection of these poems to gendered experiences proves significant, but 
equally as interesting is Frost’s attention to his first editor, who as literary editor of The 
Independent, published several of Frost’s poems in the 1890s. Frost gives voice to this 
                                                 
24 It is interesting to note the contrast between Frost’s easy assertion of authority through metaphor and the 
more frustrated experience Williams displays in his own birches poem, “Portrait of the Author.” Both poets 
are, nevertheless, engaged in asserting meaning over the object in the very act of representation. 
25 Helen Bacon first explored the connection between these two poems, positioning “Wild Grapes” as the 
feminine response to “Birches.” Her reading, however, presents “Wild Grapes” as reflecting Frost’s debt to 
certain Western literary precursors, most significantly Euripides’ Bacchae. She reads the grapes as Biblical 
and mythological symbols evoking the Western canon. My own reading of the grapes as the self-projected 
thing allows for an interpretation beyond symbolic value, while acknowledging that the object can carry 
literal, symbolic, and metaphorical meaning all at once. 




figure—who, as Bacon points out, he credited with discovering him—as a female speaker 
recounting the traumatic moment at the age of five when she cannot let go of the birch 
branch from which she is hanging. Self-described as “a little boyish girl” who “my 
brother could not always leave at home” (PRF 196), the child follows the boy in pursuit 
of the wild grapes that dangle temptingly from the branches. The brother initially climbs 
the birches and throws the grapes down, but he quickly reaches for a higher branch, 
telling the girl to “take a treetop, I’ll get down another./ Hold on with all your might 
when I let go” (197). The child’s meager frame cannot bend the branches: “The minute it 
was left with me alone,/ It caught me up as if I were the fish/ And it the fishpole. So I was 
translated.” The metaphor of being “translated” into a fish under a pole’s pursuit—
another potentially violent image with threatening sexual undertones—has implications 
for the act of “translating” experience into a poem. This speaker lacks the active control 
of the swinging boy in “Birches”; she is not doing the translating, but is being translated 
by other forces. (This also corresponds with the fact that Frost is crafting the poem for his 
editor, translating her experience through his own poetic labor.)  
 An earlier comment echoes this sense of being hunted or caught, when the 
speaker characterizes the memory as “the day I swung suspended with the grapes,/ And 
was come after like Eurydice” (196). Her brother later likens the girl to the grapes in a 
move that further emphasizes this sense of vulnerability in the face of ravaging hunters: 
“Now you know how it feels,” my brother said, 
“To be a bunch of fox grapes, as they call them, 
That when it thinks it has escaped the fox 
By growing where it shouldn’t—on a birch, 
Where a fox wouldn’t think to look for it— 
And if he looked and found it, couldn’t reach it— 
Just then come you and I to gather it.” (198) 




The brother echoes a masculine position, presenting the girl as in a place she “shouldn’t” 
be; once there, she is rendered vulnerable to dangers she has no skills to overcome. The 
brother’s metaphor comparing the girl to the wild grapes—the objects highlighted in the 
title—provides for the same kind of self-reflective thing found in “Birches”: These grapes 
encapsulate the child’s feelings of anxiety and vulnerability, weakness and dependence 
(since they have grown around and upon the birch branches), as well as her sense of 
wildness in being an un-feminine girl. Yet, because the brother presents this metaphor, 
rather than the girl herself, Frost again suggests the limitations of experience that is 
gendered female. Instead, the male asserts control over meaning. This notion of male 
power corresponds to the poem’s plot: The child escapes the branches only through her 
brother’s rescue, with her brother admonishing her, “Don’t you weigh anything?” (199). 
The suggestion of weightlessness furthers the idea that the speaker possesses an empty 
sense of self. She is a victim caught in overwhelming conditions that threaten to take her 
“off … by birch trees into space.”  
 The key question of the poem becomes: Does this speaker gain any opportunity 
for a metaphorical rewriting of self? Although the wild grapes serve to encapsulate 
negative anxieties of self, does the speaker emerge from her interaction with these objects 
with a new consciousness of her identity? Does she project a new sense of self by 
transforming them into things? The final stanza becomes an interesting place to explore 
these questions because it shifts in both tone and content from a literal recounting of the 
day’s events to a philosophical consideration of what it means to “let go,” again putting 
focus on the speaker’s act of holding onto an object as she explores questions of identity. 
This metaphorical move invites questions about the implications of the very act of 




“letting go” the child has been attempting throughout the poem. Up until the final stanza, 
a simple reading of the poem’s “moral” might reveal an argument about the importance 
of letting go, particularly when confronted with one’s own limitations and inherent fears. 
Yet, the speaker complicates such a reading when she claims that her problem was less 
“not weighing anything” than it was “not knowing anything.” She is Eve before the fall. 
It is lack of knowledge that keeps the child clinging to the tree—lack of knowledge of the 
lasting consequences of either move, to cling or to let go. In contrast, the speaker now 
knows the painful effects of loss, and the final stanza conveys her regret about the fact 
that one must let things go:  
  I had not taken the first step in knowledge; 
   I had not learned to let go with the hands, 
   As still I have not learned to with the heart, 
  And have no wish to with the heart—nor need, 
  That I can see. The mind—is not the heart. 
  I may yet live, as I know others live, 
  To wish in vain to let go with the mind— 
  Of cares, at night, to sleep; but nothing tells me 
  That I need learn to let go with the heart. 
The speaker talks of “letting go of the mind” as a process one engages in before sleep, 
when clearing anxious clutter prepares the mind for unconscious renewal. Although she 
acknowledges that most people attempt this task “in vain,” the desire remains. Ideal 
existence would be one with a mind released from conscious pain and past loss. But the 
heart, a different matter, cannot let go. The poem’s final impulse seems to be at odds with 
the very theme the speaker has been developing throughout: If the story has been about a 
child who had to let go of the branch to fall safely back to earth, the speaker here resists 
her own moral. In fact, she has internalized the opposite response: she cannot let go, but 
holds on. The ability to move on from loss becomes the great anxious undertone of the 




poem, particularly for a speaker whose sense of self in the world is one of vulnerability 
and powerlessness; as in “Birches,” Frost has gendered female these more negative and 
weaker aspects of self. 
 This poem carries significance in relation to “Birches” not only because it extends 
certain issues of gender, but also because it suggests a familiar theme of poetic labor. 
What type of poetic voice is capable of translating experience into art? What personal 
preoccupations must be “let go” for the poet to project authority? While I have suggested 
that the poem’s objects underscore the speaker’s anxieties about “letting go”—thus 
becoming things encapsulating problematic aspects of her experience—they also become 
the vehicle through which Frost can “let go” of preoccupations to present an authoritative 
poetic identity. Here, the textual history of this poem’s inspiration proves significant, 
given Susan Hayes Ward’s place in launching Frost’s poetic career. When his early poem 
“My Butterfly: An Elegy” was accepted for publication in 1894 by William Hayes Ward 
of The Independent—his first ever poem published in a professional journal—Frost 
promptly began regular correspondence with the journal’s literary editor, William’s sister 
Susan. Beginning in April of 1894 and continuing for several years, Susan’s 
correspondence remained a source of encouragement and support. Yet, at this early—and 
highly vulnerable—stage of his career, when Frost’s burgeoning poetic identity was 
under considerable threat, his correspondence with both of the Hayes Wards reveals 
several insecurities. Writing to William in response to his poem’s acceptance, “If you 
mean what might be called the legitimate education I have received when you speak of 
‘training’ and ‘line of study,’ I hope that the quality of my poem would seem to account 




for far more of this than I have really had. I am only graduated of a public high school” 
(SL 19).26 In another early letter to Susan, he admits, 
I have never read Lanier’s poetry nor the volume of his you mention. I 
have read no technical works. The extent of my studying now is a little 
Greek and, for relaxation, French. . .  . Homer is very difficult for me as 
yet, though, and I am often entirely discouraged. But I assure you, in some 
time, money or no money, I shall prove myself able to do everything but 
spell. (21)   
The young Frost betrays a sense of anxiety about his deficiencies in what a professional 
literary audience might consider the requirements of any aspiring poet. Instead, Frost 
must recast these expectations to assert his own notions of a poetic self, shaped through 
his values and strengths. In a sense, Frost is both identifying with the young girl’s 
vulnerabilities and lack of knowledge, and working to assert a new sense of masculine 
authority in the act of crafting the poem. Thus, “Wild Grapes” encapsulates many of the 
same tensions over feminine passivity and masculine agency we have seen in “Birches.” 
Frost accomplishes a sense of authority by rewriting his relationship to Susan Hayes 
Ward—which began with him in a position of vulnerability at the mercy of editors who 
could validate or discourage his poetic aspirations—in his rendering of the girl child in 
“Wild Grapes.” By reversing the dynamic of power and authority, he becomes the figure 
“translating” the woman’s experience into poetic creation; through the brother’s 
metaphor connecting the girl to the wild grapes, Frost again asserts a masculine 
connection between identity and creation. While the girl clings to the branch, as well as 
                                                 
26 There is every reason to believe that Frost was speaking honestly about his academic deficiencies. At this 
point, he had attended Dartmouth College for less than one semester in 1892, but had dropped out, later 
explaining, “I wasn’t suited for the place” (Parini 37). 




to other heart-breaking losses, Frost fashions a poetic identity as one who can “let go”—
or reshape experience to diminish vulnerabilities of self. Creating a position of ironic 
distance from the poem’s speaker, Frost emphasizes the need to move beyond such 
underlying limitations in order to transcend toward this ideal. Tensions must be repressed 
and refracted; they must be buried within the “ulteriority” of the metaphor for the poet to 
assert and create a new, more stable sense of self. 
Voice as the Vehicle for Projecting a Self  
 I have thus far traced Frost’s use of the self-projected thing for the development 
of his poetic persona. His use of things, however, carries larger implications about how 
Frost viewed his function as a poet—to reflect the experiences of a subject and, in the 
process, express conditions that were common at his particular moment in history. To this 
end, my study extends the work of two Frost critics also examining the poet’s treatment 
of objects in relation to the self. In the recent The American Landscape in the Poetry of 
Frost, Bishop, and Ashbery: The House Abandoned (2008), Merit J. MacArthur examines 
Frost’s repeated attention to the abandoned farmhouse, concluding that for Frost this 
thing reflects biographical and national concerns over socio-cultural conditions. She 
notes, “The imaginative scene of the abandoned or ruined farmhouse in his poetry evokes 
at once Frost’s own family history and his dark romanticization of America’s rural past, 
as he transposed Wordsworth’s ‘The Ruined Cottage’ onto the cellar holes and 
abandoned farms of the American landscape” (34). Frost’s upbringing was notable for its 
lack of financial stability, structure, and geographic roots—as MacArthur points out, he 
moved more than 26 times by the age of 26 (40), enduring the hardships of his father’s 
gambling, drinking and early death, when Frost was 11, of tuberculosis. MacArthur 




suggests that Frost’s creation of the farmhouse allows him to resolve these personal 
tensions and overcome insecurities about his own biography: his longing for stability, his 
desire for connection with the landscape, and his nostalgia for rural forms of labor. 
 MacArthur’s reading supports my larger claim that the poetic medium provides 
Frost the opportunity for authority and control. His creative acts compensate for feelings 
of lack, as he cultivates a symbol of familial and financial security, despite the fact that 
his own attempts at farming were largely a failure. What Frost could not cultivate through 
the land, he seeks to do through his poems; through the thing, he can project a stable 
identity. In the figure of the farmhouse, Frost preserves a particular version of self 
associated with a landscape, the New England farm, to which he would forever be linked.  
Frank Lentricchia’s Robert Frost: Modern Poetics and the Landscapes of Self 
(1975) also links Frost’s uses of objects to his particular subjective experience, arguing 
that Frost’s poems present “landscapes”—rich textures of materiality from the poet’s 
surrounding environment—in order to reveal the experience of the speaking subject. 
Lentricchia draws clear links between Robert Frost and the pragmatism of William 
James, arguing that the poet’s rendering of his landscapes reflects a “sculpting act of 
consciousness” (11) that allows Frost to write a self into being: “Whether the object is 
mediated by the consciousness of the lyric ‘I,’ or whether the object is mediated by 
Frost’s more fully dramatized selves—the personae of his longer dialogues and 
monologues—the psychic life of Robert Frost himself is what is ultimately evoked by the 
fixed objects in his poetic landscape” (15). Lentricchia’s study, like that of MacArthur, 
provides intervention with psychological and phenomenological notions of selfhood, as 
he explores how certain recurrent symbols can be read as “acts of the mind.” I am also 




reading Lentricchia’s notion of the “landscape” in Frost’s use of things: his rendering of 
material objects such that the object can be both thing-unto-itself and a separate thing 
revealing significant meanings about the subject. Yet, I want to push the approach 
presented by Lentricchia and MacArthur beyond Frost’s own biography and persona, for 
his exploration of things reflects a more democratic impulse: to explore the experiences 
and conditions of rural people and to respond to broader conditions shaping modern 
subjectivity. Many of his poems throughout North of Boston take the form of dialogue 
poems and dramatic monologues presented in the voices of varied speakers. This 
attention to multiple experiences of subjectivity suggests that Frost was attuned to the 
universality of particular modern difficulties, specifically the aforementioned concerns 
over gender and labor. As Frost’s landscapes reveal subjects facing common and 
identifiable preoccupations, the poet can position himself and his representations as 
serving an essential cultural function.  
 To this end, voice becomes an important device for Frost in exploring human 
experience and transforming objects into things. In Robert Frost: The Work of Knowing 
(1977), Richard Poirier explores voice as one of the techniques adding complexity to the 
frequently simplistic, moralistic narratives Frost poems seem to produce. He points out, 
“A poetry often designed to ‘seem to the casual person altogether obvious’ is therefore, 
philosophically speaking, extraordinarily, purposefully evasive. Entailed in this process 
are disciplines and flexibilities of mind” (xii). Although metaphor, as articulated in the 
previous section, does allow for this kind of evasion, Frost is not engaged in a simple act 
of deception but rather a poetic process that proves enormously complicated. He often 
conveys the difficulty of expressing a subject’s experience through the speakers’ dialogue 




and vocal patterns. Close attention to voice reveals the speakers’ conflicts, as well as 
Frost’s own difficulties in asserting authoritative meaning through things.  
Poirier recognizes the complications and forms of “chaos” that evoke multiple 
possibilities of meaning, but he argues that Frost’s chaos cannot be reduced to the 
conditions of modernity: “The important difference between Frost and certified 
modernists like Eliot and Joyce is that his ‘chaos’ compared to theirs has no historical 
localizations” (40). Instead, he finds that any feelings of psychological alienation in a 
Frost poem precede the speaker’s broader encounters with history and culture (41). 
Poirier rests this facet of his argument on the formal dimensions of the poetics, 
specifically voice: since Frost’s speakers “usually help create the structurings that are to 
include them” (40)—in other words, reflect “human figures” participating vocally in the 
creation of the poem and thus exercising some control over formal elements that 
determine meaning—Poirier assumes a representation of subjectivity that precedes its 
interaction with materiality: the speaking subject exists before it engages the surrounding 
world. My study challenges this idea, showing how Frost’s speaking subjects are actually 
negotiating a sense of selfhood through their encounters with situations and material 
objects, and ones often historically localized. In the process, Frost frequently stands in a 
position of critical distance from his speakers, as we have seen in “Wild Grapes.”  
 To this end, Poirier’s discussion of the two poles of metaphor and voice proves 
useful. He argues that “voice” exists in dialectical play with metaphor and that a poem’s 
meaning emerges from this very tension (10): “The voice, when it gets anxious about the 
metaphor it is using, is, again, involved with what it has helped create or evoke, with 
versions of reality or of poetry or of the ‘other’ in which the self has chosen to find a 




‘reflection.’” (22). Of significance here is Poirier’s characterization of the speaking 
subject’s “anxiety” over his or her own speech act and the implications of creation.  This 
anxiety is also apparent in Frost’s own engagement with the poetic act. As demonstrated 
above, Frost’s writings on metaphor present this formal device as granting the poet 
authority and control, since metaphor creates a “version of reality” in which the speaker 
can assert a particular identity reflected through its environment. Poirier’s recognition of 
anxiety at precisely these moments suggests the way that voice can work against 
metaphor. Tension results when a particular version of identity can be called into 
question and the speaker acknowledges the difficulty of fixing meaning.  
 The poems, then, invite questions about the relationship of voice to self: Does the 
linguistic act solidify, through metaphor, a stable self, thus making the speech act a 
speaking subject’s empowered claim? Or is the subject still aware of its vulnerabilities to 
the socio-cultural and ideological structures that have determined its place? It comes 
down to a question of the possible contingency of the self: its actual constructedness by 
social and historical forces versus the poet’s Romantic longing to believe in himself as 
self-created and sovereign. In fact, although Frost remains engaged in a conscious act of 
poetic creation, his poems often suggest the very limitations of their own forms. In this 
sense, they underscore the tensions of a modern world in which metaphor can no longer 
guaranty relief from overwhelming anxieties about selfhood—when the metaphor of the 
“swinger of birches” cannot allow the speaker to overcome traveling through a “pathless 
wood.” This particular dialectic between metaphor and voice reminds readers about the 
limitations even of metaphor, as well as the difficulties of accessing some final meaning. 




Voice becomes another means through which Frost exposes the poet’s preoccupations 
with fixing things to stabilize the self.27 
 Frost’s ideas about voice, the vocal registers of a poem, and his theories on the 
“sound of sense” are well-known.  During the years of 1912-1915, while figures such as 
T.E. Hulme, F.S. Flint, and Ezra Pound were debating theories on modernist poetics, 
Frost was formulating his own ideas about applying regular speech rhythms in poetry.28 
Most of Frost’s discussions on sound take place in his letters to friends. Although he 
intended to write an essay encapsulating his theories,29 he never completed such a formal 
presentation of his ideas. Instead, as critics such as Karen Kilcup and Tyler Hoffman 
have pointed out, he appears to have moved beyond some of these early theories of sound 
(if he actually applied them at all), given that many of his later poems become less 
focused on dialogue and speech rhythms, and more attentive to metrical forms.30 Yet, 
                                                 
27 Jason Isaac Mauro finds that Frost actually works against the construction of a stable sense of self. He 
thus positions Frost as working against William James, for whom “the self must hold fort against the 
encroachments from a destructive and threatening world” (96). Instead, he argues, for Frost “the real drama 
of consciousness involves the self’s recognition that it is implicated in, and inextricably part of the 
confusion and chaos of the world, and that the self’s formulations and attempts to order this world have 
their own due quotient of destructive unintelligibility.” Although I find Frost more Jamesian that Mauro’s 
reading suggests, his work effectively illustrates the limits within Frost’s poetically-constructed notion of 
self. 
28 Tyler Hoffman argues that Frost’s development of a poetic “theory” at this moment was a self-conscious 
response to ideas about Imagism and modern art circulating on the London scene. In fact, it was through 
conversations with Hulme and Flint that Frost refined his ideas on the subject. However, as Hoffman 
argues, this was not an effort to compete with the principles of Imagism (which Frost, in his adamant 
position against free verse, largely rejected), but rather to bolster the kind of poetry he was writing. 
Hoffman finds Frost’s frequent defense of his theories to John Bartlett an effort “to show him in a new 
light, to disabuse critics of the idea that he is a rude regional poet and promote the view of himself as a 
careful craftsman—a sophisticated practitioner of verse” (18). 
29 Frost told John T. Bartlett, in a letter of February 22, 1914, “I write it partly for my own benefit, to 
clarify my ideas for an essay or two I am going to write some fine day (not far distant)” (Barry 66). 
30 Kilcup traces the move away from more feminized poetic forms in the books after New Hampshire, 
where Frost withdraws into lyric ambiguities and greater detachment of self. Of these later poems, she 
notes, “In many of Frost’s lyrics. . . the poet is simultaneously absent and present, elusive and rock-hard: 
absent, for the ‘sophisticated’ reader, and transparently present, for the popular, ‘naïve,’ mainstream 
reader” (192).In Hoffman’s formalist analysis of Frost’s poetry, he concludes that there were always 
inconsistencies between Frost’s theories and his practice, where even in early poems (such as “Birches”), 
he seems to favor “poetical” devices such as alliteration and assonance for conveying meaning, rather than 




voice remains of undeniable significance in both North of Boston and Mountain Interval, 
which feature numerous dialogue poems, as well as poems giving voice to working-class 
people speaking through and about their environments. 
 Frost describes his theory on sound in a July 4, 1913, letter: “I alone of English 
writers have consciously set myself to make music out of what I may call the sound of 
sense. . . . The best place to get the abstract sound of sense is from voices behind a door 
that cuts off the words” (Barry 59). This idea privileges voice as the carrier of meaning: 
even if an over-hearer cannot make out the words behind a door, he or she can, 
theoretically, still determine the conversation’s emotional meaning. Thus, Frost finds that 
the “abstract vitality of our speech” summons “pure sound—pure form”—and, by 
extension, pure meaning. Yet, he explains that natural speech rhythms alone are not 
sufficient for making poetry: 
If one is to be a poet he must learn to get cadences by skillfully breaking 
the sounds of sense with all their irregularity or accent across the regular 
beat of the metre. Verse in which there is nothing but the beat of the metre 
furnished by the accents of the polysyllabic words we call doggerel. Verse 
is not that. Neither is it the sound of sense alone. It is a resultant from 
these two. (60) 
Here, he again suggests a distinction between the speaking subject in a poem and the poet 
“skillfully breaking” the speaker’s language to tame it within the form. Elaine Barry 
argues that Frost’s commitment to craft and his effort to harness natural speech reflect his 
                                                                                                                                                 
the rhythms of actual speech (7). Thus, Hoffman finds Frost’s commitment to form to be dominant from the 
beginning.  




fear of insanity, which caused him “to fear the lack of such inner structure”(20).31 This 
idea corresponds to his often-cited idea in “The Figure a Poem Makes” that poetry 
represents “a momentary stay against confusion” (CP 132), as well as extends Poirier’s 
point about the anxiety that accompanies any speech act. Frost’s commitment to form 
reflects an underlying acknowledgment of instabilities within the speaker’s mind. It also 
recognizes the poet’s authority to gain formal control over a given speaker’s troubled 
condition.      
 Particular anxieties inherent within form become even more evident in the way 
Frost genders the dynamics of speech and writing: natural rhythms versus poetic craft. 
Kilcup reads Frost’s desire to marry these two distinct rhetorical forms—the feminine 
realm of speech and the masculine realm of writing—as his attempt to dismantle the 
binary nature of this opposition. Instead, by emphasizing the speaking voice in the poem, 
he presents democratic ideals and a commitment to multiplicity. Indeed, Frost’s move 
suggests a desire, at least initially, to grant the speaking subject significant authority over 
selfhood. He credits intonation as carrying “the living part of the poem . . .  entangled 
somehow in the syntax idiom and meaning of a sentence” (Barry 61), advancing the 
argument that voice carries the strongest clues to meaning. He also claims that the 
“sentence sound often says more than the word. It may even as in irony convey a 
meaning opposite of the words” (66). Sound becomes a device for forcing dominant 
themes to the front of a sentence, Frost’s primary unit of sense. Hoffman draws a similar 
conclusion about Frost’s emphasis on individualism when he states: 
                                                 
31 Frost endured a legacy of mental illness in his family, most notably with his sister Jeanie, who spent the 
final nine years of her life confined in a permanent state hospital. Frost saw traces of such insanity in 
himself in his severe bouts of depression, as well as in his own children, at least two of whom suffered 
mental illness: Frost’s son Carol committed suicide in 1940, and his daughter Irma was committed to a 
mental hospital in 1947. 




Frost’s concept of the “sound of sense” ought to be read as an element of 
opposition to culture at a time when, as Christopher Reed argues with 
respect to the Bloomsbury group, “a rhetoric of individualism could be 
conceived as a radical act.” We must understand Frost’s prosodic 
commitment as deeply moral and, therefore, as part of a revolution to 
restore human subjectivity to the center of aesthetic experience—a theory 
and practice that are explicitly inscribed as part of a broader leftist 
worldview in their inception. (27) 
Hoffman connects Frost’s attention to voice with his attention to subjective 
individualism; the way his speakers talk about and represent things offers important 
insights into their own experiences and minds. This emphasis on sound and voice, then, 
carries within it a particularly moral view about poetry’s purpose at the moment of 
modernity.    
 A survey of Frost’s speakers suggests he was a poet drawn to vulnerable subjects, 
many of whom reflect feminine characteristics as female, aging, lonely, and/or wounded 
members of the community. And yet, while Frost’s use of voice does represent an 
impulse toward democratic, individualistic ideals, a tension emerges between the 
objectives of his speakers and the objectives of Frost, the poet. Although the speakers 
frequently remain powerless and victimized within their circumstances—consider the 
doomed female speakers in “A Servant of Servants” or “The Hill Wife”—Frost, as poet, 
strives in representing them for aesthetic and artistic control. Hoffman identifies a similar 
tension. Just as he argues that Frost’s theories on sound reflect the influence of William 
James and Henri Bergson, affirming the presence of pragmatism and radical empiricism 




within Frost’s poetics, he suggests that they also provide a means to popularize his 
writing:  
Frost’s theory of tone in poetry reflects not only a culturally coded 
empiricism but also an ethics of personal and political sovereignty. . . . In 
this way, Frost is able to propound his political belief in the dignity and 
value of the individual that flows from an appreciation of the ‘rhythms of 
life at the centre of our minds’ and, at the same time, secure the scientific 
backing that will help him achieve literary success. (44)  
Underlying Frost’s emphasis on individual consciousness is a desire for poetic authority 
and achievement, wherein Frost can “achieve literary success.”  The “sound of sense” 
becomes the means to communicate modern experience to both middle-brow and more 
professional critical audiences. In this way, Frost’s theories of voice fit into a larger 
movement among American modernist poets to speak through American vocal rhythms. 
For Frost, voice serves two functions: to speak the individual experiences of his subjects 
and to advance the poet’s broader aim of securing poetic authority.  
Ultimately, Frost sought to be a poet solidly grounded in artistic control. As he 
writes a letter of October 26, 1930, to poet Kimball Flaccus:  
You wish the world better than it is, more poetical. I wouldn’t give a cent 
to see the world, the United States or even New York made better. I want 
them left just as they are for me to make poetical on paper. . . .I have no 
quarrel with the material. The grief will be simply if I can’t transmute it 
into poems. . . . My whole anxiety is for myself as a performer. (SL 289) 




While Kimball wants to see objects as inherently poetical, Frost finds it the poet’s task to 
make them so. He has no “quarrel with the material”; instead, his “anxiety” rests in how 
the poet uses such material to “make” himself. Voice, then, even from the mouths of 
Frost’s speaking subjects, reflects larger claims about the poet’s sense of self and the 
potential he finds in poetic creation. 
 The poem “The Generations of Men” demonstrates the anxiety over poetic 
authority inherent in Frost’s ideas about voice. It also illustrates the speaking subject’s 
potential to create elaborate versions of meaning that can be projected onto and through 
an actual object encountered in the landscape—in this case, an old cellar hole (itself a 
man-made object)—but also one that Frost can transform into a thing carrying multiple 
meanings for his speakers. In the poem, two descendents of the Stark family, a young 
man and woman, gather around the cellar hole following the governor’s invitation for a 
family reunion. From the opening lines, Frost presents the setting in language that 
acknowledges shifting economic conditions: it is a “rock-strewn town where farming has 
fallen off/ And sprout-lands flourish where the axe has gone” (NOB 87). The land’s 
natural resources have betrayed its residents: nature rebels against man’s efforts to farm 
and shape it.32 Likewise, the intricacies of speech, and the poem’s irregular blank verse, 
disrupt any clear poetic control. Patterns of sound dominate more than metrical 
variations, where sound repetitions yoke and carry meaning. Reflecting natural speech, 
the poet resists “poetical” juxtapositions of consonance or alliteration, but repeating 
sounds nevertheless create emphasis. The above quoted lines illustrate this technique, 
                                                 
32 The poem also reflects a particular anxiety about legacies of insanity running through families, when the 
young woman acknowledges that her ancestry runs through three separate branches of the Stark family. 
The man tells her, “D’you know a person so related to herself/ Is supposed to be mad,” to which she 
responds, “I may be mad” (92). The caesura in the line, running together his point and her response, 
emphasizes the anxious uncertainties of ancestry—despite the poem’s tone of flirtatious humor. 




where the land’s fallibility is emphasized with the “f” repetitions, and the hard “k” and 
“s” combination (of “rock-strewn” and “axe”) emphasize the setting’s very tensions. In 
fact, patterns of “s” sounds prove most dominant throughout the poem, corresponding to 
iambic rhythms by creating the heavier beat of vocal emphasis. The “Stark” family name 
also contains these hard sounds that propel the poem’s vocal rhythm.  
 In addition presenting speech rhythms, the poem displays Frost’s theories of the 
“sound of sense.” In it, his speakers model the process by which meaning can be made 
out of the encountered object as it is transformed into a thing. As we will see, it is notably 
through voice that the male speaker ultimately claims authoritative control. As the man 
and woman sit with their legs over the cellar hole, they imagine different possibilities for 
the object’s origin. First, the girl mythologizes the space, linking it to an Indian “myth of 
Chicamoztoc/ Which means The Seven Caves that We Came out of./ This is the pit from 
which we Starks were digged” (93). She imagines a center of origin that connects the 
family to the continent’s native peoples; yet, she also re-imagines this origin myth as one 
of a people being shaped and “digged” by some other force—an idea corresponding to a 
poet crafting a poem. This originary space can only be accessed through the work (and 
craft) of the imagination. 
 The man looks at the object first through its literal meaning, responding, “What 
do I see?/ First let me look. I see raspberry vines—” However, the girl promptly 
transforms this literal reading into a metaphorical vision when she sees “a little, little 
boy,/ As pale and dim as a match flame in the sun;/ He’s groping in the cellar after jam,/ 
He thinks it’s dark and it’s flooded with daylight” (94). Her image evokes Plato’s 
Allegory of the Cave, where the individual cannot gain a sense of self because he lives in 




mental darkness (despite the presence of a fire casting shadows upon a wall). Her vision 
is of an un-empowered individual, a vulnerable trapped child, unable to connect with 
surrounding objects because he cannot perceive them accurately. Significantly, Frost 
attributes this version of the family’s legacy to the young woman, who describes the pale 
boy as feminine. 
 In contrast, the young man responds with a vision that re-imagines the family’s 
origins through a powerful, vocal female force. He describes: 
  Listen. When I lean like this 
  I can make out old Grandsir Stark distinctly,—  
  With his pipe in his mouth and his brown jug— 
  Bless you, it isn’t Grandsir Stark, it’s Granny, 
  But the pipe’s there and the smoking and the jug. 
  She’s after cider, the old girl, and thirsty. (94) 
 
Although he traces the family’s ancestry to a woman, she is nonetheless gendered as 
masculine in her habits and demeanor, so much so that he initially mistakes her for a 
man. She is a wild, rebellious spirit who interacts with the world through the force of her 
appetite; her experience of place and existence comes through the senses. Given that 
Granny represents a figure connected to bodily desires and pleasures, it is significant that 
the man summons her vision through an embodied voice: “the noise/ That the brook 
raises in the empty valley” (95). At this point, he presents a description of sound 
reminiscent of Frost’s own claims about the pure meaning one can attain overhearing 
through a door: 
We have seen visions—now consult the voices. 
Something I must have learned riding in trains 
When I was young. I used the roar 
To set the voices speaking out of it, 
Speaking or singing, and the band-music playing. 
Perhaps you have the art of what I mean. 
I’ve never listened in among the sounds 




That a brook makes in such a wild descent. 
It ought to give a purer oracle. (95-96) 
The authentic inspiration of sound has brought the voices into his head; the act of 
overhearing has produced pure meanings, as if they have been transmitted through an 
oracle. Although these sounds come from nature through the running brook, they inspire 
human voices. Yet, the young woman responds, “It’s as you throw a picture on a screen:/ 
The meaning of it is all out of you;/ The voices give you what you wish to hear.” Her idea 
of a “picture on a screen” corresponds to Plato’s shadows upon the wall. These pictures 
bring pre-existing meanings—they are the same shadows the enchained cave-dwellers 
accept as having always seen—while sound carries the potential for new meanings. Her 
characterization of the man’s story as “what you wish to hear” suggests that he is merely 
reinforcing ideas he already has of himself; his version of Granny represents some 
reflected picture of himself.  
 However, as the man begins to mimic Granny’s voice (eventually taking on an 
imagined dialect when the girl reminds him that his oracle would speak from a certain 
classed position), he presents a different vision of voice’s potential. The voice says,  
  Call her Nausicaa, and take a timber 
  That you shall find lies in the cellar charred 
  Among the raspberries, and hew and shape it 
  For a door-sill or other corner piece 
  In a new cottage on the ancient spot. (98) 
Just as Nausicaa assisted a stranded Odysseus, helping him obtain the ships that would 
take him home, Granny informs the isolated listeners how to reconnect to home and 
ancestry; she instructs the girl to shape a new home from the burnt wood. Yet, timber also 
evokes its homophone “timbre,” the quality of sound a given instrument produces. In that 
sense, the quality of the voice can influence the wood’s reshaping. Granny continues, 




“You take the timber—/ It’s as sound as the day when it was cut—And begin over” 
(100). The story suggests that voice can rebuild the house, both literally and 
metaphorically, given the poem’s presentation of the burgeoning romance between the 
Stark descendents. Through the woman’s characterization of picture images and the 
man’s characterization of voice, Frost presents an argument about how meaning can be 
reflected and renewed through the thing. Again, he genders female the self-reflective 
version that focuses on vulnerabilities of self, while he genders male the more 
empowered version that emphasizes creative potential. Throughout, he makes a larger 
claim about how voice can shape a speaker’s surrounding material and thus “[transmute] 
it into poems.” Language can both acknowledge an object’s history and build something 
new. The Stark family serves as a metaphor for poetic identity, here represented as 
identity linked to a particular landscape, nation, and history. 
Labor and its Implications for the Poetic Self 
 At the turn of the century, Industrial forms of labor threatened to alienate workers 
from the objects of their labor, while technologies threatened to reduce the individual to a 
mechanized function. In poems such as “Out, Out—” and “The Self-Seeker,” machines 
become prominent things inflicting harm upon the body, killing or maiming the poem’s 
workers and suggesting the subject’s vulnerabilities to modern technology. Yet, Frost sets 
even these poems in rural communities rather than Industrial, urban settings.33 His 
attention to the people “north of Boston” can be read as a nostalgic desire to focus on pre-
Industrial economies and a time when manual labor offered the potential to achieve 
                                                 
33 In fact, Frost composed at least two poems between 1905 and 1907 presenting sympathetic depictions of 
New England mill workers enduring harsh conditions, although these remained unpublished during Frost’s 
lifetime. As Hoffman points out, such poems represent “Frost’s early antagonism to industrial capitalism 
and the injustices of that economic system” (26). 




selfhood through creative output. Nature becomes the most ideal place through which to 
chart this type of labor, for it represents a realm man can tame with his own hand. Indeed, 
Frost often focuses on farmers or farm laborers who are working the land for their own 
purposes. Frost’s un-modern landscapes suggest a larger aim to present labor as a 
dignifying force granting the laborer autonomy and control. However, Frost’s attention to 
labor is often a metaphor for the poetic labor that makes the poem; in exploring the 
conditions of rural laborers, Frost exposes preoccupations inherent in his own creative 
work.    
Poems such as “Mowing” and “The Code” support such a reading, in which labor 
regulates codes of behavior and, more important, provides a clear structure through which 
the subject can gain authority and control. In “The Code,” the speaker claims pride and 
accomplishment in his labor, forging an identity so empowered that he can bury his boss 
in hay for attempting to do his job. When the boss participates in rolling the hay to “get 
more work/ Out of his hired help,” he violates an unspoken code: he has suggested the 
worker is not a “man.” The speaker explains, “Never you say a thing like that to a man,/ 
Not if he values what he is” (NOB 84). Earlier, he tells his listener, “The hand that knows 
his business won’t be told/ To do work better or faster—those two things” (81). A man is 
a man through his labor and the sense of pride he takes in his work. To this end, despite 
being buried in his own hay, the farmer does not fire the worker, because “He knew I did 
just right” (86). The moral of the farmhand’s story suggests that the value of one’s labor 
overpowers even economic hierarchies that position a hired laborer beneath his boss.  
 Yet, a closer reading of the poem reveals anxieties within this idealized depiction 
of labor. For Frost labor always poses a threat to selfhood, largely because—as we have 




seen in Frost’s creative labor of crafting poems—labor is the very means through which 
one asserts gains an authoritative self. In “The Code,” the focus has turned less to the 
object of that labor—the thing that results—to the fact of the labor itself. This 
preoccupation with establishing creative authority becomes an effort to recast 
vulnerabilities as strengths. In fact, this speaker has launched his story because the 
“town-bred farmer” to whom he is talking has offended his workers by telling them to 
“take pains . … to cock the hay . . . because it’s going to shower” (80-81). The farmer’s 
comment has so offended one helper that he has suddenly “[thrust his] pitchfork in the 
ground,/ Marched himself off the field and home” (80). For all the confidence of this 
speaker’s voice and the bravado of his story, his impulse to tell this story reveals 
insecurities about class and labor: The presumably more educated and socially-mobile 
farmer from town threatens to invalidate his sense of self by not recognizing the man’s 
pride in his work.  
 Labor becomes the act through which these rural workers can resolve insecurities 
about class, as well as masculinity. In the story, the speaker becomes enraged after the 
boss takes the harder job in rolling the hay, sending the farmhand to the top of the barn: 
“You understand that meant the easy job/ For the man up on top of throwing down / The 
hay and rolling it off wholesale,/ Where on a mow it would have been slow lifting” (83). 
The boss’s ultimate offense is when he tells his worker, “Let her come.” The speaker 
recounts, “I asked out loud, so’s there’d be no mistake,/ ‘Did you say, Let her come?’  
‘Yes, let her come.’/ He said it over, but he said it softer” (84). The boss has threatened 
the worker’s very sense of masculinity in his implications that the farmhand is not good 
enough or fast enough at rolling hay. Yet, this moment must also be read metaphorically, 




where it connects the worker’s inadequate labor to impotent sexual performance. This 
insecurity proves too damaging to the worker’s sense of self. He retaliates by 
emasculating the boss to the point that the rescuing workers have to “keep his wife/ Out 
of the barn.” The speaker’s story serves to reinstate a competitive masculinity where he—
as in his physical positioning inside the barn—can come out on top, despite real anxieties 
underlying his actions. 
 By focusing on labor, Frost presents an argument about the kind of labor that can 
make things. As he states in the final lines of “Mowing,” “The fact is the sweetest dream 
that labor knows./ My long scythe whispered and left the hay to make” (PRF 17). What 
results from successful labor is the “fact” of an idealized thing that can be perfected 
precisely because it is made; for Frost, making poetic things (in the Brownian sense) 
remains the goal, although the creative labor proves a complicated process. In many of 
the early poems, Frost presents the things that result from labor as important markers of 
the subject—things with the potential to stabilize identity. This relationship between the 
laborer and his made thing proves consistent with the one I have been identifying 
between Frost’s poet-figure and his poems: the poem itself provides a space to gain 
authority and control, to present the “sweetest dream that labor knows.” The resulting 
thing—the poem—allows Frost to assert and stabilize a poetic self. In short, then, Frost’s 
attention to labor can be read as another means of addressing the thing’s construction, 
with Frost revealing certain preoccupations inherent in the poet’s creative act.    
The made things of Frost’s rural laborers are often simple objects, but ones that 
nonetheless reveal the laborer’s vulnerabilities. Just as the men of “The Code” are rolling 




hay, the dying farm laborer, Silas, in “The Death of the Hired Man” claims pride in his 
ability to “build a load of hay” (19). The farmer, Warren, acknowledges, 
  “I know, that’s Silas’ one accomplishment. 
  He bundles every forkful in its place,/ 
  And tags and numbers it for future reference, 
  So he can find and easily dislodge it 
  In the unloading. Silas does that well. 
  He takes it out in bunches like big birds’ nests. 
  You never see him standing on the hay 
  He’s trying to lift, straining to lift himself.” (19) 
Silas takes meticulous care in the thing he produces, carrying it carefully in piles “like big 
birds’ nests.” His labor produces something delicate and individual, a thing he creates 
with his own hands, taking pains not to disrupt the hay, in order to “lift himself” in the 
process. Even the mundane physical task of rolling hay becomes a creative, regenerative 
act, since, as the metaphor reminds us, nests are built for laying eggs. The poem puts 
Silas’s labor in direct conflict with that of Harold Wilson, an educated young man with 
whom Silas worked on the farm four years prior. Even as he lies dying, Silas is troubled 
by his recollections of Harold, who is now “finished school, and teaching in his college” 
(17). Mary recalls,  
  “Well, those days trouble Silas like a dream. 
  You wouldn’t think they would. How some things linger! 
  Harold’s young college boy’s assurance piqued him. 
  After so many years he still keeps finding 
  Good arguments he sees he might have used.” (18) 
While Harold is “associated in [Silas’s] mind with Latin,” Silas remains disappointed that 
he could not teach Harold how to build a load of hay, or convince him that academic 
experience is not the only means toward authority and knowledge. Harold represents a 
subject defined through classical education and knowledge handed down from sanctioned 
“masters.” Silas wants to educate him in another kind of experience that comes through 




tangible creation and physical work. This conflict haunts Silas “like a dream,” in the 
depths of his unconscious. In fact, the Silas/Harold conflict also reflects a conflict within 
Frost. His own biography, up to a certain age, sounds quite similar to that of Harold, in 
that Frost attended college (however briefly) and returned to Massachusetts to teach. Yet, 
Frost resisted academic notions of education, even his poetic education, as his spotty 
college record (as well as his above-quoted letters to William and Susan Hayes Ward) 
suggests. Instead, Frost’s claims for poetic authority correspond with Silas’s notion of 
creation.  
 Through Mary’s empathetic dialogue and perspective, Frost suggests sympathies 
with Silas; yet, Warren’s viewpoint challenges a simple reading of Frost’s position on 
creative labor. The poem’s form as a dialogue between Mary and Warren fosters tension, 
as the poem rhetorically positions Silas as an object being analyzed for his value. While 
Warren contemplates him for his use-value as a hired hand—with the aging and infirm 
Silas inevitably falling short—Mary defends him as possessing some other, unarticulated 
value. Her compassion encapsulates a feminized point of view, reflecting a nurturing 
voice of empathy that opposes Warren’s capitalistic bottom line. He ultimately utters the 
poem’s last word—“‘Dead,’ was all he answered” (23)—suggesting that Warren is 
concerned only with the material facts: where and when Silas will die, and whether he 
can perform any work as a farmhand.  
At times, the poem seems to invite the reader to identify with Mary’s point of 
view, opening with her sitting “musing on the lamp-flame at the table” (14) and ending 
with her sitting and gazing up at the clouds, “making a dim row,/ The moon, the little 
silver cloud, and she” (23). When Warren mocks the idea that Silas has returned “home,” 




telling Mary, “Home is the place where, when you have to go there,/ They have to take 
you in” (20), she responds, “I should have called it/ Something you somehow haven’t to 
deserve” (21). She affirms Silas’s right to die in this place, although her response is 
ambiguous and hesitant, framed in the negative. She cannot state what it is that makes 
one deserve a sense of home; nevertheless, she knows that Silas has greater value as a 
human being than that which can be measured economically. Through Mary, Frost 
feminizes Silas’s form of labor—labor that produces the creative thing—which he has 
pursued in his own poetic labor. Again, these anxieties of labor intersect with anxieties of 
masculinity. Despite, on the one hand, Frost’s support of Silas’s creative work, the poem 
enacts underlying anxieties about the worth of such labor: Can creative labor fit within 
society’s required masculine codes of behavior? Is the created thing valuable only if it 
can garner material worth? Is Silas a “man” in the end? The poem does not reach a 
resolution to these questions, but the dialogue between the husband and wife makes these 
preoccupations transparent, and in a gender-coded form.  
 In another poem, “After Apple-Picking,” Frost argues for the value of creative 
labor, while nevertheless underscoring the tensions it produces regarding the result of 
one’s labor. The objects of this poem, the apples, convey the speaker’s preoccupation 
with his own creative act precisely because they carry so many meanings as things—
literal, symbolic, and metaphorical; in a real sense, this speaker cannot assert authority 
over the thing. On the literal level, the speaker is tired from the work of harvesting 
apples, a common enough task for an apple farmer. As symbols, the apples evoke 
Biblical aspirations of knowledge, making the speaker a man haunted by the very 
knowledge he so desires. I am most interested in the third metaphorical level: the way the 




apples function as metaphor, as the products of the speaker’s labor but also as things 
reflecting the poet’s preoccupation about his role in the creative process. Exhausted after 
a full day picking apples, the speaker falls into a disturbed sleep: 
  But I was well 
  Upon my way to sleep before it fell, 
  And I could tell 
  What form my dreaming was about to take. 
  Magnified apples appear and disappear, 
  Stem end and blossom end, 
  And every fleck of russet showing clear. 
  My instep arch not only keeps the ache, 
  It keeps the pressure of a ladder-round. 
  I feel the ladder sway as the boughs bend. 
  And I keep hearing from the cellar bin 
  The rumbling sound  
  Of load on load of apples coming in. 
  For I have had too much 
  of apple-picking: I am overtired 
  Of the great harvest I myself desired. (77-78) 
Like the dream that troubles Silas, this speaker’s dream reflects disappointment about his 
role in apple picking, an act that can be read as a metaphor for poetic labor and creation.34 
The apples in the dream are magnified and bruised; they become markers of the anxiety 
that has gone into producing them. They are, in fact, over-sensualized things that have 
required too much toil, touch, care, and smell. The speaker is also conscious of their 
physical toll in his aching feet pressed upon a ladder that shifts among the swaying 
branches. The ladder image evokes the ladder in “Birches,” where the speaker imagines 
climbing the bent branches toward heaven. Here, even as the speaker’s “long two-pointed 
                                                 
34 Poirier also focuses on the implications of labor in poems such as “Mowing” and “After Apple-Picking,” 
drawing a connection between the satisfaction of physical labor and the satisfaction of poetic labor—as 
well as a third dimension of the satisfaction that comes through the “labor” of close reading (“the work of 
knowing”) (288-289). He describes, “it is ‘labor,’ not any meditation afterwards, that ‘knows.’ . . . And 
what ‘labor’ knows is no a fact but the fact.” Priscilla Paton extends Poirier’s point to consider “how and 
why … the union of fact, dream, and labor lead to such revelation” (44). She concludes, “Labor and 
metaphor and faith in their value bring the poet into an intimate relation with the earth—a relation practical 
and loving, therefore true and necessary to life itself” (55). 




ladder’s sticking through a tree/ Toward heaven still” (77), this ladder is weighted down 
with emotion. This speaker is tired of the very thing he has worked to produce.35  
 The poem presents the speaker’s growing awareness of his exhaustion as a turn 
that has resulted from altered perspective: “I cannot rub the strangeness from my sight/ I 
got from looking through a pane of glass/ I skimmed this morning from the drinking 
trough/ And held against the world of hoary grass” (77). The broken glass floating in the 
drinking trough, when picked up and looked through, tints the grass “hoary,” a gray-
white color hiding the grass’s green. (The connection through the end-rhymes of “glass” 
and “grass” emphasizes this link.) The glass alters the speaker’s perspective, removing 
color from the scene; an artist unable to see in color is one drained of creative connection 
to the world. (In “Birches,” we also saw glass as a vehicle altering perspective.) This very 
artistic alienation is what haunts his sleep as “It melted, and I let it fall and break.” When 
he notes that he was “well/ Upon my way to sleep before it fell,” the line’s enjambment 
emphasizes a double meaning of “well”: in the context of the sentence, the term is an 
adverb measuring the speaker’s relation to sleep when the glass shattered. Yet, the word 
also invokes the speaker’s “wellness,” prompting a careful reader to consider his mental 
condition at this moment in the poem. The shattered glass suggests a broken mirror, with 
the speaker now considering disturbed and repressed qualities that result from creative 
labor. He notes, “There were ten thousand thousand fruit to touch,/ Cherish in hand, lift 
down, and not let fall” (78). Too much has been expected of him. 
                                                 
35 In this sense, the textual history of “After Apple-Picking” and “Birches” becomes significant: Although 
these poems were composed during the same period, Frost withholds “Birches” until Mountain Interval, a 
collection in which he begins to more assertively transform anxieties into poetic creation. Likewise, 
“Birches” rewrites the anxieties of “After Apple-Picking” by emphasizing the potential of poetic authority 
to reshape the self. In his Selected Poems of 1923, Frost juxtaposes the poems, with “After Apple-Picking” 
and “Birches” opening the fourth section, again suggesting that Frost recognized a connection between the 
two poems.  
 




 Frost uses the poem’s form to underscore this tension between poetic labor and 
anxious exhaustion about the creative process. Formally, the poem presents repeating 
rhymes, although the rhyme scheme is highly irregular. At times, the coupled rhyme is 
broken by an interruption of two to seven lines. Although rhyme allows the poet to  
connect language and experience through the rhyming words, the moments of 
interruption underscore anxieties about such creative control. The rhymes often couple 
disturbed, un-resolvable moments of creative anxiety. One such example would be the 
lines, “It melted, and I let it fall and break” and “What form my dreaming was about to 
take,” interrupted by three lines. The link between “break” and “take” suggests an 
important connection about the reason for the speaker’s distorted dream. What falls in 
between these lines are the three rhyming lines, “But I was well/ Upon my way to sleep 
before it fell,/ And I could tell.” Here, the words “well,” “fell,” and “tell” suggest an 
expectation of emotional “wellness” in order for one to “tell” the required narrative. 
Given that the speaker is already aware of his disturbed state of mind (he has already 
fallen from wellness), this concern about creative output becomes more heightened. The 
longest delay in the rhyme repetition is the line “Went surely to the cider-apple heap” and 
the final line, “Or just some human sleep,” separated by seven lines. The rhyme pattern 
here connects an image of wasted apples to the speaker’s need for sleep: the desire for 
unconscious escape results from a sense of failed labor that has tarnished the fruit so 
severely the apples can only be discarded. In the poem’s final lines, the speaker reflects 
uncertainty as to whether “this sleep of mine” is “just some human sleep,” or is instead 
like the long hibernation of a woodchuck. In fact, he says, “Were he not gone,/ The 
woodchuck could say” (79). By granting the woodchuck more authority to determine the 




meaning and quality of his sleep, the speaker underscores his sense of creative 
uncertainty. While he can “describe its coming on,” he lacks the authoritative control to 
determine its condition. This is a speaker exhausted by his creative output and hesitant 
about his own authority as a poet figure.36 
 As Frost transitions from anxious self to poetic self, in the process committing 
himself to the construction of his poetic persona, one can chart object-focused poems in 
Mountain Interval that point the way toward resolving his preoccupations with poetic 
labor. One such poem is the sonnet “The Oven Bird,” in which he describes the bird as “a 
singer everyone has heard” (35) in language that evokes a poet-singer. This metaphorical 
bird-poet (phonetically similar to “bard”) asserts poetic control in its characterizations 
and judgments—he makes “the solid tree trunks sound again” and determines “that for 
flowers/ Mid-summer is to spring as one to ten.” Yet, in the final lines, Frost reveals that 
such acts of poetic authority actually compensate for uncertainties underlying the creative 
process: “The bird would cease and be as other birds/ But that he knows in singing not to 
sing./ The question that he frames in all but words/ Is what to make of a diminished 
thing.” The bird cannot “sing” of himself, or at least aspects of himself that he 
acknowledges to be “diminished.” In fact, this very concept of the “diminished thing,” of 
life after the Biblical fall, corresponds to the self-projected thing—the external object that 
contains and refracts diminished qualities of the self. In “The Oven Bird,” the poet’s 
response to such personal preoccupations is a tightly-crafted sonnet. (Frost modifies the 
                                                 
36 “The Woodpile” is another poem in which we see anxieties over the product of a man’s labor. When the 
speaker comes across an abandoned pile of wood, “a cord of maple, cut and split/ And piled—and 
measured, four by four by eight” (NOB 141), he ponders the very echoes of labor left behind with no use. 
For despite the “labour of his axe,” the worker has left the wood “far from a useful fireplace” (142). Such 
an image raises questions for the speaker about labor without a practical function—even meticulous 
creative labor reminiscent of Silas’s piles of hay. These preoccupations would plague a poet questioning 
the use-value of his poems. 




regular iambic pentameter only twice, but in two lines that include rhyming feminine 
endings, suggesting that even his disruption of the iambic form was highly crafted.) The 
poet transforms the diminished thing into a perfected poetic thing. In the process, he 
becomes the “singer everyone has heard,” who nonetheless explores these anxieties 
throughout his poems “in all but words.” Thus, Frost suggests that all his poems, and in 
particular the ones reflecting “poetical” transformations of the object world, contain 
ulterior anxieties, albeit repressed and refracted through the constructed thing. Such 
things allow him to project an authoritative voice of wisdom. 




Chapter Two: Marianne Moore’s Observations 
and Imaginary Possession of the Thing  
 
 Marianne Moore’s inclusion in a study examining the modernist fascination with 
objects may seem a natural fit, particularly given the title of her first collection, 
Observations (1924). Moore’s reputation as a descriptive poet of precision was cultivated 
early and intensely, most notably by T.S. Eliot in his introduction to her Selected Poems 
(1935), the volume he conceived and edited to canonize Moore as “part of the small body 
of durable poetry written in our time” (12). Focusing specifically on Moore’s attention to 
objects, Eliot cites her as a poet writing in the tradition of her contemporary Imagists. He 
highlights her practice of examining materials through their particular and minute details, 
crediting her “gift for detailed observation, for finding the exact words for some 
experience of the eye” (7). And while Eliot claims that “to those whose intellection 
moves more easily” the poems will reveal “emotional value,” he acknowledges that the 
“moderately intellectual” may find Moore’s object descriptions merely “intellectual 
exercises” (8). Here, Eliot establishes an opposition between emotion and intellect that, I 
will argue, Moore’s work clearly engages. Eliot frames this dichotomy in a way that 
proves particularly relevant for a study of Moore. Even as he upholds the distinction 
between intellect and reason, he suggests that the two concepts are, in fact, connected. A 
reader can comprehend a work’s “emotional value” only through application of the 
intellect, a tool aimed at acquiring knowledge and understanding. Eliot recognizes that a 
select few readers will achieve this privileged recognition; yet, it is the goal all readers 
should pursue (lest a poem remain a mere “intellectual exercise”). In this chapter I argue 
that Moore also desires a connection to the “emotional value” of the object, even as she 
pursues this end through intellectual means. Moore’s very process of observation 




involves employing intellect to acquire knowledge of the object, and, in that process, to 
recognize some larger value the object holds—value that ultimately exceeds the subject’s 
intellectual understanding of it. Thus, we find Moore complicating the opposition 
between intellect and emotion, and promoting a connection between them through the 
very application of her art’s aesthetic. As we will see, for Moore, both aspects are 
necessary for the subject’s engagement with the object. 
In the case of Eliot, even as he acknowledges some connection between intellect 
and emotion, his descriptions of Moore’s poetics dwell less on the emotional dimensions 
of her object study and more on the intellectual precision of her details:  
The detail has always its service to perform to the whole. The similes are 
there for use . . . . They make us see the object more clearly, though we 
may not understand immediately why our attention has been called to this 
object, and though we may not immediately grasp its association with a 
number of other objects. So . . . she succeeds at once in startling us into an 
unusual awareness of visual patterns, with something like the fascination 
of a high-powered microscope. (8)      
In his very categorization of Moore’s poetry as “descriptive,” Eliot portrays the work as 
the result of intellect, a scientific exercise aimed at examining objects with authenticity 
and accuracy: poetry that, like a “high-powered microscope,” applies an intense lens to 
the object, revealing the otherwise imperceptible minutia of its nature and allowing the 
reader to “see [it] more clearly.” This type of clarity also allows the reader to make 
connections between seemingly disparate and diverse objects by revealing patterns that 
order and connect things. Eliot finds the focus of Moore’s object study to be the objects 




themselves, and the relationships between them. He further suggests emotional and 
intellectual detachment when he claims the reader “may not understand immediately why 
our attention has been called to this object.” The reader, he acknowledges, may not 
recognize a clear reason as to why the particular object has engendered the subject’s 
interaction. Instead, Moore’s object study presents precise and impersonal description 
that obscures the human connection between subject and object. 
 Eliot succeeded in canonizing Moore as a particular kind of descriptive modernist 
working in the Imagist tradition of pared-down detail, reminiscent of H.D. and Ezra 
Pound. Andrew J. Kappel has summarized Eliot’s influence, calling his edition of 
Moore’s Selected Poems “an enormously important volume of her verse, generally 
considered the basis of her representation as a Modernist” (“Presenting Miss Moore” 
129). As Kappel points out, Moore herself based all subsequent collections of her work 
on Eliot’s edition, beginning her 1951 Collected Poems and 1967 Complete Poems with a 
full reprinting of the 1935 Selected Poems. He claims, “[Eliot’s] editorial work 
constituted a brilliant act of criticism that has served as the basis of our present 
understanding of Moore’s poetry.” In presenting Moore’s work in Selected Poems, Eliot 
altered Observations in ways that helped solidify her descriptive reputation: he placed 
first in the collection nine new poems, composed between 1932 and 1934, that apply 
scientific precision in their object representations, including “The Jerboa,” “The Plumet 
Basilisk,” “The Frigate Pelican,” “The Buffalo,” and “Nine Nectarines and Other 
Porcelain”37; and he rearranged selections from Observations to emphasize Moore’s 
object focus, foregrounding “The Fish,” “Poetry,” “Pedantic Literalist,” “Critics and 
                                                 
37 Moore did not publish any new poems between 1926 and 1931, dates that corresponded to her years as 
managing editor, and later editor-in-chief, for The Dial, from 1925 until the journal’s demise in 1929. 




Connoisseurs,” “The Monkeys,” “Roses Only,” and “In the Days of Prismatic Colour.” In 
consenting to Eliot’s reordering of her work (and eschewing the largely chronological 
ordering of Observations), Moore participated in recasting herself as part of a modernist 
trend: “The emphasis at the heart of the impersonal Modernist poetic on ‘things’ 
mitigated against a self-expressive poetic, of course, as well as against the extension of 
such a poetic into a conception of one’s verse as one’s poetic autobiography” (136). 
According to Kappel, Moore adopted changes that would minimize traces of her personal 
history. While we can never know the motivations underlying her revisions, it is clear 
that Moore supported Eliot’s editorial changes, thanking him in an October 23, 1934, 
letter for helping to clarify her poetic project: “To be elucidated is a spur both as regards 
rectitude and abandon and I begin to find myself on a better level by being even in the 
Barrie Dear Brutus sense, understood” (SLMM 329). Her decision, even decades later, to 
retain Eliot’s ordering and presentation in her Collected Poems and Complete Poems—
both volumes over which she exacted precise control, making many of her well-known 
excisions and omissions of poems—suggests the degree to which Moore credited Eliot 
with recognizing an essential aspect of her poetics. He “understood” her work in a way 
that others, to date, had not.38  
Given this textual history that helps elucidate Moore’s self-conscious packaging 
as a particular kind of modernist, it is little wonder that critics for much of the twentieth 
century accepted her as a poet examining “things” through an objective, impersonal 
                                                 
38 This question of the work’s packaging and presentation was particularly significant for Moore in her 
early career. Her work was first collected in book form when H.D. and Bryher released a volume, Poems 
(1921), without her involvement or approval. In addition, Moore’s relentless revisions in later editions of 
her poems suggest her awareness of the power associated with crafting a poetic image and project.   




lens.39 Certainly, aspects of Moore’s poetics support such a reading: her presentation of 
multiple vocal registers, effected through widespread use of quotations from a variety of 
non-literary sources, as well as her elevated, formal, and frequently Latinate vocabulary. 
These techniques distance the reader from an identifiable subject who stands in some 
relation to the object under consideration. And yet, this dissertation has been aimed at 
complicating the very idea of an “impersonal Modernist poetic on ‘things,’” as Kappel 
describes it, and instead locates moments where the subject preserves in things more 
personal experiences of interaction. The object is not something merely to be described 
with precision and accuracy, but to be used for the creation of a new, separate “thing” 
whose meanings reveal something of the subject’s experience in its formation. The 
terminology of thing theory is useful here for distinguishing between the physical object 
under study and the thing resulting from the poet’s creative act. The same process of 
transformation I have been exploring in other modernist poets is evident in Moore’s 
concept of “observation,” which ultimately is the process by which Moore looks at 
objects and makes them things. If Imagist poetry was aimed at “trying to record the 
precise instant when a thing outward and objective transforms itself, or darts into a thing 
inward and subjective,” as Pound describes it in “Vorticism” (Gaudier-Brzeska 89), we 
might say that Moore’s observations record the precise moment when the subject 
                                                 
39 This began to change in the 1970s and 1980s with the emergence of feminist readings of Moore’s work 
by such critics such as Suzanne Juhasz, Bonnie Costello, and Taffy Martin, who read more subversive and 
complex impulses in Moore’s poetics of looking. More recent Moore scholars have also examined ways in 
which Eliot’s prominent interpretation has obscured our understanding of Moore’s work. For example, 
Kappel exposes how Eliot’s ordering conceals shifts in Moore’s formal technique from syllabic verse to 
free verse and back to syllabic verse. Robin G. Schulze has proven integral in granting fuller access to 
Moore without the mediation of other poets or critics. In Becoming Marianne Moore: The Early Poems, 
1907-1924 (2002), she presents a facsimile of the poet’s early presentations of her work in literary journals 
and her first collection, Observations (1924). In this chapter I cite Schulze’s edition when I include 
references to Moore’s original Observations, because it is the most available means of accessing Moore’s 
first book.  




transforms a “thing inward and subjective” into a “thing outward,” a perfected exterior. 
As the subject looks at the object, she aims to gain its very possession through a process 
of subjective engagement, and, in turn, to preserve this act in the aesthetic achievement of 
the thing.  
Moore complicates Brown’s notion of thing theory by often looking at objects 
that are already “things”—artistically-rendered objects.  Her choice of objects in 
Observations illustrates her as a subject concerned with the artistic process itself and how 
things come to mean. Art objects abound throughout Observations: a fish transformed 
into a glass bottle; a seagull engraved in lapis lazuli; artifacts featured in museum 
displays; even natural objects, such as a chameleon or snail, that Moore portrays as 
artistic images embodying the polish and refinement of her poetics. By so prominently 
featuring constructed things, Moore elevates the artist as a figure of cultural power. Such 
attention echoes Frost’s exploration of rural objects that appear in domesticated versions: 
the woodpile, the stone wall, or the tree transformed into a telephone pole—things 
manifesting the labor that has reshaped wilderness into some other form. Yet, Moore’s 
objects are different from Frost’s in that she most often describes objects she found on 
display in the museums she frequently visited. Among the other poets in this study, 
Moore most resembles Robert Frost in her self-conscious attention to the poet’s function 
in creating things. It is clear that Moore, like Frost, sought mastery and authority over her 
material. Her hyper-constructed poems, employing traditional syllabic forms, rhyme, 
metaphor, and quotation, reveal her as a poet deeply conscious of the artifice of her 
medium.  Both poets employ formal devices to gain authority over otherwise unregulated 
materials—the “momentary stay against confusion” Frost describes in “The Figure a 




Poem Makes” (CPRF 132). Just as Frost’s poetic techniques prove the means by which 
he reveals his firm poetic hand (at times asserting a declarative voice of wisdom similar 
to the one we will see in Moore’s later version of “Poetry”), Moore also uses formal 
patterns to assert control over her materials. Like Frost, she often employs metaphor to 
transform the thing through a diverse range of discourses—applying the language of 
science, literary and Biblical tradition, philosophy, and history—to convey a polyphonic 
voice. In short, Moore’s multiple and varied forms of linguistic play become the means 
by which she demonstrates her possession of things. In Moore’s fascination with the 
created thing and the power inherent in the poetic imagination, her poetics proves 
consistent with ideas I have been employing from Bill Brown’s thing theory. For Moore, 
imaginary possession exposes objects—and, in particular, artistic objects—as capacious 
vessels of meaning. Unlike poets such as William Carlos Williams or George Oppen, 
whose poems (and prose, in the case of Williams’s Spring and All) reveal the messiness 
inherent in the object-thing transformation, Moore’s poems display the final thing 
through a carefully-constructed exterior that often obstructs access to the more personal 
preoccupations underlying its representation.  
One of the central claims of this dissertation is that such things, the final products 
of the poetic act, frequently evidence the process of their own creation. Embedded within 
things, therefore, we can find evidence of the poet’s preoccupations with poetic voice and 
function. Critics reading Moore’s observations as exercises in descriptive precision 
overlook this aspect of her work. By examining her things to identify glimpses of the 
poet, we can understand more fully what Moore sought to achieve in her observations. 




For early Moore, representing the thing comes through a performance of authority40 she 
was still self-consciously negotiating. Even as the speaking subject—who I recognize as 
Moore herself—claims the authority to create polished things, acknowledging power 
inherent in the poetic act, she remains conscious that the poem must not be mere polish; it 
must connect the reader to “the genuine,” as she states in “Poetry.” As such, is must 
convey authentic experience. In these early poems, we see Moore illustrating how the 
subject can access “genuine” experience by, first, getting close to the object via minute 
and precise description and, simultaneously, employing formal techniques that will allow 
her to gain distance and control. If description is the means by which the poet gets close 
to the observed thing, Moore’s descriptions often have the simultaneous effect of 
distancing the reader from the material and the maker of such materials. Her use of 
quotation de-centers the narrative voice from a single speaker; her commitment to 
syllabic forms denaturalizes the syntax of the lines; and her use of scientific diction 
obscures the subject’s personal responses to the thing. Quotation, in fact, embodies this 
                                                 
40 In Marianne Moore: Questions of Authority (1995), Cristanne Miller finds Moore engaging in questions 
of authority and power through the use of oppositional techniques that employ prevailing discourses of 
authority to reshape power structures from within. She concludes that Moore rejects traditional binary 
oppositions of between masculine/feminine, personal/ impersonal, and traditional/nontraditional (9). To this 
list, we can certainly add the binary of intellect and emotion I have been discussing. Miller’s attention to 
Moore’s “authority” provides an important precursor to my own study. She argues that Moore is engaged in 
“constructing a position of authority that is not inherited through the office of poet, does not stem from 
caste . . . , and does not depend upon the assertion of genius or other personal, exceptional abilities” (1). 
Instead, Moore asserts a different kind of authority, achieved through assertion, speculation, and 
questioning, that does not rely on binary notions of empowerment. She uses techniques that destabilize 
traditional ideas of “authority” by, for example, including quotations from a variety of highbrow and 
lowbrow sources to pluralize the poetic voice (179), and granting the reader significant authority to make 
meaning of the poem’s speech act (182). Thus, Moore reframes the very definition of authority.  In my 
reading of Moore’s pursuit of authority, I am indebted to Miller’s work. Like Miller, when I use 
“authority,” I am referring to a matter of voice. I employ Miller’s concept of an oppositional sense of 
authority, wherein Moore practices traditional discourses even as she works to reform them. The poet 
maintained deference to traditional male models of authority, as she told Donald Hall in 1961, “I disliked 
the term ‘poetry’ for any but Chaucer’s and Shakespeare’s or Dante’s. . . . What I write, as I have said 
before, could only be called poetry because there is no other category in which to put it.” Yet, even as 
Moore acknowledges the authority of these canonical male poets, she positions her own poetics as taking 
up different aims. As we will see in Moore’s object fascination, she promotes a more feminine model of 
imaginary possession. 




duality since the technique allows Moore to employ detailed description but nonetheless 
maintain subjective distance. Suzanne Juhasz similarly identifies in Moore’s techniques 
the impulse to conceal personal aspects of the self: 
The characteristic techniques of Moore’s art—the verbal tactics that create 
a poem—can be seen as devices that in the process protect the self. The 
accumulation of observed detail leading to ethical generalization, the 
profusion of direct quotation, the self-effacing role of the speaker, the 
famous reticence, a desire to present without interpretation that is 
frequently exaggerated to the point of a blurring or confusion of point of 
view, the irony and wit, the subtle systems of prosody, the choice of 
subject and theme, even the procedure of revision and edition, all work 
towards this end. (42) 
Ultimately, “imaginary possession” requires both closeness to the object and a sense of 
distance in its formation as an aesthetic thing. In this achievement, Moore removes any 
markers that would too clearly identify the speaker; the personal and subjective must be 
submerged and hidden.  My own methodology of close reading involves mining Moore’s 
things for glimpses of the subject. Through this process, we gain a picture of a subject 
who is more preoccupied with the efficacy of her aesthetic attempts than her polished 
exteriors might otherwise suggest.  
In this chapter I focus on Observations because it grants access to Moore before 
she begins reshaping her poetic image and reputation. Moore published this, her first 
volume, without the editorial input of other contemporary modernists; thus, it captures 
her at a moment of autonomy in presenting her poetic project. The collection’s very title 




suggests the centrality of observation to her poetics, which is a process that, for Moore, 
requires the poet’s agency and control. Observation is always more than a passive 
exercise in looking, or a form of reportage distinguished for its precision and detail. By 
studying Observations specifically through Moore’s use of objects, we can better 
understand her concerns over how the poet gains possession of the thing. Her object 
descriptions frequently instruct the reader about how this process takes place.  
One poem proves particularly instructive for outlining Moore’s poetic of things, 
because it describes—and in fact enacts—the particular process of imaginary possession 
through which Moore creates things: “When I Buy Pictures.” The poem presents a 
subject contemplating a set of images over which she desires possession. As we quickly 
see, possession here is not about material acquisition; the subject does not come to 
physically possess any of the images she describes. Instead, possession requires a 
different type of engagement—that of the imagination. Although it requires an act of 
authority and domination, perhaps similar to that associated with material possession, the 
poem calls for a type of interaction between subject and object that happens in the mind. 
This interaction does not yield an object one can purchase but a thing one can make. In 
“When I Buy Pictures,” Moore instructs her reader on this process, outlining a structure 
in which she gains possession of observed things. Further, she illustrates how a 
temporary experience can become permanent (and, in turn, material) through the 
aesthetic achievement of the poem. If the resulting poem provides the proof of the 
possession, then it must also provide the evidence of how such acquisition took place. As 
I have already suggested, description is the device by which Moore finds a way “in” to 




the object and achieves a subjective connection; it is also the means by which she pulls 
back to achieve aesthetic polish. Both aspects prove integral to her process of possession.  
Moore begins the poem by considering the very qualities that prompt her desire 
for these pictures. She tells us that when she “[buys] pictures,” she is engaged in a more 
complex act of observation:  
Or what is closer to the truth, 
when I look at that of which I may regard myself as the 
         imaginary possessor, 
I fix upon what would give me pleasure in my average mo- 
         ments: 
the satire upon curiosity in which no more is discernible than 
the intensity of the mood; 
or quite the opposite—  (Schulze 101) 
 
Moore defines looking as the means by which she becomes an “imaginary possessor”41: 
by identifying qualities of the picture that would give her “pleasure in my average mo-
/ments.” Whatever foolish or whimsical qualities might have prompted the subject’s 
curiosity need not be visible—at least any more so than the subject’s own intense 
feelings—and yet, these are the very aspects Moore suggests initiate desire. The impulse 
underlying the observation is subjective and individual. Further, it is everyday pleasure, 
rather than intellectual or objective critique, that propels the subject’s interest. Moore 
warns, “Too stern an intellectual emphasis upon this quality or that,/ detracts from one’s 
enjoyment.” Pleasure need not preclude the presence of the intellect; for some, pleasure 
                                                 
41 We also may better understand Moore’s concept of imaginary possession by exploring it against Richard 
Poirier’s idea of “visionary possession” as a means by which American artists, working in a lineage of 
Emerson, take “possession” of the vast American landscape through the eye/I’s perception. Poirier’s 
concept suggests an American romanticism that allows the artist to reclaim and “[preserve] imaginatively 
those dreams about the continent that were systematically betrayed by the possession of it for economic and 
political aggrandizement” (A World Elsewhere 51). I mention the connection between visionary possession 
and imaginary possession because it underscores the stakes for Moore’s poetics in contributing to an 
American poetic tradition. Although Poirier’s concept cannot be mapped cleanly onto Moore’s work—and 
I do not mean to suggest here that Moore is, ultimately, a romantic poet—his observation that the artist 
reclaims the material world through its imaginary renewal is applicable to Moore’s object poems.    




may involve “an intellectual emphasis” if that approach fosters the subject’s enjoyment. 
Yet, pleasure remains a largely sensuous experience that promotes gratification and 
delight. Implied here is a particular idea of the object’s aesthetics, which Moore suggests 
must be in some way “pleasing” to the subject; this accounts for Moore’s tendency to 
represent objects with refinement and polish, as well as her repeated fascination with 
artistic objects. All of the objects featured in “When I Buy Pictures” are common items 
transformed into art:    
     —the old thing, the medieval decorated 
hat-box, 
in which there are hounds with waists diminishing like the 
           waist of the hourglass 
and deer and birds and seated people; 
 The object, she claims, may be “no more than a square of parquetry”—a mosaic of wood 
flooring—or “an artichoke in six varieties of blue.” What distinguishes these every-day 
objects is their aesthetic transformation: the hat-box that invites pleasure because of its 
particularly decorative surface; the inlaid wood of the parquetry that boasts a unique 
geometric pattern; the artichoke whose dramatic color renders it something more than 
mere vegetable. Aesthetic fascination, Moore instructs us, prompts the subject’s desire to 
possess the object; it is also the quality that allows the poet to make objects into things, 
by illustrating them with aesthetic precision.  
 Beyond aesthetic value, the described objects also convey value to this speaker as 
things that evoke connections beyond the speaker’s own cultural moment. In the objects 
she examines, Moore illustrates how artistically-rendered things become timeless 
vehicles allowing the subject to connect across history. The medieval hat-box is an 
everyday historical object whose very ornamentation, with the hounds’ waists likened to 




an hourglass, illustrates the rushing force of time; art, in contrast, stands to forge a 
connection between subject and object that transcends the limitations of time and history. 
Moore’s description of “the snipe-legged hiero-/glyphic in three parts” (101), a reference 
to an Egyptian low relief at the Metropolitan Museum, provides another example of an 
object speaking from an early moment when human experience was translated into 
written form; the hieroglyphic grants access to a human voice speaking from the past. In 
other images, Moore focuses on intersections between object and language, as she 
describes “the literal/ biography perhaps,/ in letters standing well apart upon a 
parchment-like expanse.” She presents here the image of life transformed in its 
presentation on the page; through language individual experience becomes broadly 
accessible. Elsewhere, she considers Biblical references to Adam represented through art. 
First, Moore identifies a picture of “the silver fence protecting Adam’s grave,” an 
allusion, she tells us in the Notes to Observations, to a silver fence Constantine erected to 
enclose Adam’s grave; the image was described and photographed in a January 5, 1918, 
edition of Literary Digest (Schulze 140). In addition, Moore describes a drawing by 
William Blake of “Adam and Eve taken by Michael out of Eden.” Both pictures draw 
attention to Adam’s mortality following his expulsion from Eden and provide examples 
of men—Constantine and Blake—transforming the creation myth depicted in Genesis 
into some tangible form. If the speaker’s goal has been to locate objects granting access 
to human experience that predated her own, Moore depicts artists and art objects 
illustrating this process. Thus, the poem suggests that the object’s transformation into art 
allows it to transcend history and fosters a human connection between subject and object. 




The subject gains possession when he or she can take pleasure in the aesthetic 
representation of that experience.  
 There is a second aspect to imaginary possession beyond the subject’s connection 
and closeness to the object. Imaginary possession not only celebrates the object as 
something the subject can connect with, but also allows the poet to participate in its 
representation as a thing. Once the poet gains imaginary access, she pursues the 
appropriate formal means of transforming the object into an aesthetic thing. In the final 
lines of “When I Buy Pictures,” Moore reminds the reader what such an achievement 
must convey. She claims, “It comes to this: of whatever sort it is,/ it must be ‘lit with 
piercing glances into the life of things’;/ it must acknowledge the spiritual forces which 
have made it” (Schulze 101). It proves significant that Moore delivers this information 
via a quotation, which she credits to A.R. Gordon’s book of Hebrew translations, The 
Poets of the Old Testament. At this crucial moment, she relinquishes the voice to that of a 
prophetic Biblical poet, again emphasizing the timeless authority inherent in the poetic 
act. In her own poetic achievements, she strives for the same authoritative voice. The 
discussion of objects in this passage shifts from specific objects to a vague repetition of 
“it.” The speaker is now considering the stakes for all artistically-achieved things. She 
claims that the artist’s rendering must provide “piercing glances” into the object’s very 
life; it must grant access to the “spiritual forces”—spiritual or moral qualities—that were 
valued in its creation: in other words, the very qualities that make it transcendent. Such 
spiritual forces exist in contrast to bodily or corporeal aspects, those that would limit the 
object to its physical outline or the material details of the artist’s existence. It is not mere 
description that matters here, but some larger “spiritual” quality that will allow for 




timeless connection. Moore’s use of quotation here proves significant, as she removes the 
claim from any particular author and instead presents it as universal prophecy. 
Nevertheless, the very idea of “spirituality” as inherent in Moore’s things remains 
problematic; the introduction of spirituality at the poem’s close requires us to reconsider 
the particular qualities this speaker has valued in her creations.   
The final lines of the poem stage an abrupt shift into abstraction, particularly 
following the details the speaker has previously listed. Yet, looking at the poem again, we 
see that abstraction marked the speaker’s experience from the opening lines in Moore’s 
repetition of vague pronouns to describe the speaker’s process of getting close to the 
thing (“when I look at that of which I may regard myself as the imaginary possessor,” 
emphasis added). Moore’s linguistic abstraction regarding the objects that give her 
pleasure (“I fix upon what would give me pleasure”) suggests her resistance to claim any 
particular “spiritual force” that initiates the speaker’s possession. Instead, Moore’s 
“spirituality” is, ultimately, about an aesthetic experience of the object; it is a spirituality 
emptied of its spirit and instead addressing the form’s representation. As we have already 
seen, this speaker is interested in objects that invite pleasure through their ornate 
decoration.  And while the “makers” of the pictures include a variety of artists dating 
back to ancient Egypt, what makes these objects transcendent even centuries after their 
creation is their capacity to invoke the viewer’s imagination; such qualities frequently 
come through their particular aesthetic details. The viewer can imagine the human 
elements, whether it is the “literal biography” or the hand that guides Adam from Eden, 
and thus can sense the “genuine” within these well-crafted aesthetic exteriors. Through 
the process of description, Moore achieves a sense of connection to the object, which is 




essential for imaginary possession to take place. Yet, description is also the means by 
which she can more objectively represent the thing to foster a connection that will extend 
beyond the observing subject.  
Thus far, I have argued that “When I Buy Pictures” serves as a statement of 
Moore’s poetics on how she can claim imaginary possession of objects. Yet, this focus on 
the subject’s connection to the object through pleasure is something Moore addresses 
even outside of Observations. In her 1934 review of William Carlos Williams’s Collected 
Poems, 1921-1931, she recognizes emotional dimensions as central to observation. There, 
she says of Williams’s object illustrations:  
The poem often is about nothing that we wish to give our attention to, but 
if it is something he wishes our attention for, what is urgent for him 
becomes urgent for us. His uncompromising conscientiousness sometimes 
seems misplaced; he is at times almost insultingly specific, but there is in 
him—and this must be our consolation—that dissatisfied expanding 
energy, the emotion, the ergo of the medieval dialectician, the “therefore” 
which is the distinguishing mark of the artist. (“Things Others Never 
Notice” 327)  
Moore’s analysis of Williams is reminiscent of Eliot’s comments on her own work in his 
Introduction to Selected Poems. Yet, while Eliot acknowledges that the reader may never 
recognize the poet’s purpose in looking at a given object, Moore credits Williams’s 
descriptions with revealing the “therefore” of the encounter, so that what is “urgent for 
him becomes urgent for us.” For Moore the “service” of the given detail is that it prompts 
in the reader a particular connection, without which the poem would remain mere 




description. While the speaker’s neutral tone may convey a sense of emotional distancing 
and control—the voice of authority Moore strives toward in her own poetic—the object 
representations contain more complexity. Examining the thing can reveal glimpses of 
what propelled the subject’s observations, the emotional urgency. It is useful here to 
consider the relationship between “emotion” and “pleasure,” for although these concepts 
are not synonymous, Moore does seem to suggest that both can be pathways for 
imaginary possession. In her discussion of Williams’s poetry, Moore suggests that his 
object representations, in all their minute detail, grant insight into the poet’s emotional 
experience, which helps explain the urgency of the observation. Locating Williams’s 
“dissatisfied expanding energy” allows the reader to connect to something human in the 
poet’s representation. Such a step is necessary for both the poet’s imaginary possession of 
the object and the reader’s imaginary possession of the resulting thing. Thus, we find in 
Moore’s review further evidence of the goals she pursued in her poetic of things.   
Moore is awareness of the power relations at stake in the relationship between 
subject and object, observer and observed. She stages questions over authority and power 
in the poem “Those Various Scalpels,” in which she examines the concept of imaginary 
possession through the metaphor of dissection, suggesting that, like a surgeon, the 
observing speaker must execute the act with a skilled poetic hand. In this poem, Moore 
represents possession as an act of cultural power; therefore, the act carries certain 
responsibilities. Moore warns against ruthless possession—a form of dissection that 
would coldly scrutinize the object’s components, piece by piece—instead encouraging 
the subject’s connection to the object under examination. As in “When I Buy Pictures,” 




Moore advocates a model of imaginary possession that moves away from the traditional 
model of acquisition and domination.42  
The poem stages its own dissection as Moore presents a biologist whose 
overzealous techniques threaten “destiny/ itself” (104). Moore describes this woman with 
hair like “the tails of two/ fighting-cocks head to head in stone—like sculptured 
scimitars”; cheeks that are “rosettes/ of blood on the stone floors of French châteaux”; 
and a hand like “a bundle of lances all alike, partly hid by emeralds from/ Persia” (103). 
She uses metaphor and simile to evoke imagery of swords and weaponry, in particular, 
highly-ornamented Persian weaponry associated with the earliest civilizations, thus 
placing this biologist/poet in a certain lineage of warfare and cultural possession. Moore 
characterizes the poem’s subject as an agent of war, a Western figure engaging in ruthless 
acts of cultural superiority in her destruction and suppression of the Eastern body (a body 
that the poem, in fact, does not examine). “Are they weapons or scalpels?” (104), the 
speaker asks, casting the instruments as aggressive tools of destruction rather than 
objective instruments of science. The poem is highly conscious that the act of observation 
represents an assertion of cultural power. Elizabeth Bergmann Loizeaux also identifies in 
Moore such an awareness of observation; in fact, Loizeaux claims, Moore recognizes its 
dual nature. On the one hand, observation can represent a moral act: “Looking carefully, 
steadily, particularly was, for Moore, a way of practicing justice. Moral scrupulosity 
required disciplined observation” (82). Yet, Moore identifies other potentially “dark 
aspect[s]” that could accompany this process (83). According to Loizeaux, “She knew the 
                                                 
42 In this sense, “Those Various Scalpels” illustrates the oppositional sense of authority Cristanne Miller 
identifies in Marianne Moore: Questions of Authority, by presenting a typically masculine model of 
authority (albeit represented through the female figure of the biologist) and questioning its outcomes in its 
dissection of objects. 




relation of viewer to viewed could be one of power and the desire to dominate, and she 
understood that desire to be coded male. She also knew that women, too, could be 
predatory, inquisitive, and voracious, and that men were not so inevitably.” Thus, the 
cultural authority inherent in observation carries the potential for both positive and 
negative outcomes, which cannot always be predicted through tradition binaries of 
gender. In this poem, the voracious scientist is herself a woman who has adopted a 
particularly masculine model of authority; thus, Moore complicates any simple 
opposition or concept of authority one might assign according to gender. Instead, in the 
poem’s critique of one form of domination, it promotes a different kind of observation 
that encourages the subject’s connection to the object under dissection. 
Moore recognizes both the necessity and the risk of employing artificial means for 
presenting her material and, in turn, asserting a voice of authority that remains a 
performance. Even as the poem celebrates its own ornate visual imagery, its final lines 
warn against “dissecting destiny”—or examining personal or cultural history—with tools 
more specialized and artificial than the objects themselves. The poem extends a tension 
evident elsewhere in Observations, as Moore simultaneously employs and questions the 
artificiality of the imagination. She concludes by arguing for the need to expose real 
things (the actual “tissues of destiny”)—even as her own act of observation has avoided 
any such attempt. Instead, the poem celebrates its ornamentation and its status as a 
highly-constructed linguistic exercise. From the first line, Moore presents the poem as the 
product of an authoritative poetic hand, using such devices as internal rhyme, alliteration, 
and consonance, as well as explicit discussion of the instruments’ sound, to announce the 
particular tension the poem will address: “Those/ various sounds consistently indistinct, 




like intermingled/ echoes/ struck from thin glasses successively at random” (Schulze 
103). And yet, Moore’s linguistic control over these lines proves that her dissecting 
instruments are anything but random; they are the tools of a skilled master. Later, the 
poem lingers on the exquisite details of the instruments’ ornamentation, as well as the 
dress of the female figure exercising authority: 
…    —a collection of half a dozen little objects 
  made fine 
with enamel in gray, yellow, and dragon fly blue; a  
 lemon, a 
pear 
and three bunches of grapes, tied with silver: your dress, a 
 magnificent square 
    cathedral of uniform 
    and at the same time, diverse appearance—a species of 
 vertical vineyard rustling in the storm 




brilliance by the hard majesty of that sophistication which 
is su- 
     perior to opportunity, these things are rich 
     instruments with which to experiment but surgery is 
 not tentative. Why dissect destiny with instruments 
 which 
         are more highly specialized than the tissues of destiny 
              itself?  (103-104) 
 
These descriptions emphasize class implications to this form of superiority; it is a 
“sophistication which/ is su-/ perior to opportunity,” a product of wealth and privilege 
that further distances the subject from the materials over which she stands to dissect. This 
subject has not demonstrated any effort of imaginary possession that would allow for a 
mental connection to take place. This form of possession proves destructive, Moore 
warns, in part because the subject has been relying on artificial tools of dissection rather 
than a connection to the object. In her final lines, Moore draws attention to the 




artificiality of her own act of dissection and thus invites the reader to consider the 
dangers of this type of possession. It must not become merely an aggressive act of 
cultural superiority, despite Moore’s recognition that the assertion of the imagination is 
always an assertion of some form of cultural power.     
 I will now turn to a third poem, “Poetry,” to establish Moore’s ideas on imaginary 
possession and her poetic of things. This poem is significant as the one Moore would 
alter most dramatically in subsequent revisions of her work; her changes prove 
particularly relevant in that she removes from the poem the objects and retains only 
assertion.43 Thus, the poem provides greater evidence of Moore’s early poetic of things 
and her increasing shift toward an authoritative poetic hand. In its early presentation in 
Observations, “Poetry” presents a catalog of objects serving as poetic subjects to 
illustrate how poetry can communicate a “genuine” experience to the reader (Schulze 72). 
The things presented in “Poetry” reveal a poet working to negotiate two conflicting 
impulses: the need to capture the raw emotional force that marks the subject-object 
interaction—a form of imaginary possession that brings the subject closer to the object—
and the need to refine such raw experience into a more polished and constructed form via 
authoritative distancing. The poem embodies the very tension between closeness and 
distance I have identified as inherent in Moore’s process of imaginary possession. Thus, 
“Poetry” displays one of Moore’s central concerns in Observations, as she overtly raises 
                                                 
43 Moore ultimately cuts this 29-line poem (from its early presentation in Observations) to a mere four lines 
in its final version in her Complete Poems: 
 I, too, dislike it. 
    Reading it, however, with a perfect contempt for it, one dis- 
        covers in 
    it, after all, a place for the genuine. (36) 
Andrew Kappel has said of these changes, “The only revisions in modern poetry more famous than 
Moore’s revisions of ‘Poetry’ are Pound’s and Eliot’s revisions of The Waste Land manuscript” 
(“Complete with Omissions” 127). 




questions about the poet’s process of asserting meaning through artistically-rendered 
things.  
First, Moore argues that poetry should provoke intense emotion that will promote 
the reader’s connection. In the opening lines, she acknowledges an emotional reaction 
that is less than pleasurable, with the speaker admitting, “I too, dislike it: there are things 
that are important be-/ yond all this fiddle” (72). And yet, I have already discussed the 
connection between emotion and pleasure, suggesting that both allow Moore to identify a 
human response underlying the observation. In the case of “Poetry,” the emotional 
response of “dislike” becomes the means by which the reader can pursue a connection to 
the material by approaching it with “contempt.” I am reading “contempt” here as a form 
of intellectual scrutiny and critical distance one employs when they cannot immediately 
locate pleasure; in fact, one could argue Moore promotes such contempt in all her readers 
by making her poems so difficult to access. We are back, in a sense, to Eliot’s claim that 
only readers who approach Moore’s poems via the intellect will access their emotional 
value. In “Poetry,” Moore makes a similar claim about the process that can bring the 
reader (and the poet) close to the poetic material. Her use of the word “things” is also 
worth considering, since it suggests an abstract concept of value that exists in excess of 
the “fiddle” one finds recorded in a poem. Much like Bill Brown’s use of “thing” as 
encapsulating meanings and values in excess of the physical object, Moore employs the 
term here in a similar way, acknowledging meanings and values that prove important 
beyond the words recorded on the page (values that make the thing transcendent in a 
similar manner to the “spiritual forces” referenced in “When I Buy Pictures”). The 




“fiddle” of the poems—the written materials, with the words themselves representing a 
type of object—stands to guide the reader to the very “things” that prove important.   
In “Poetry,” Moore emphasizes importance and usefulness as qualities she strives 
toward in her object representations. She lists a range of objects that “are important not 
because a/ high sounding interpretation can be put upon them but be-/cause they are/ 
useful” (72). They are “useful” not for some intellectual purpose (the “high sounding 
interpretation”) but for what the reader can use them to do. Preceding these lines, Moore 
describes body parts that illustrate a human subject engaged in contact with an external 
object: “Hands that can grasp, eyes/ that can dilate, hair that can rise/ if it must.” Hands 
grasp external things, while pupils dilate and hair rises during moments of attraction or 
arousal. Moore provides here an image of a body engaging in tactile contact that induces 
pleasure; this image suggests a subject forging connection with an external thing. Art 
becomes useful when it can promote this type of connection, which is central to 
imaginary possession. It is less useful when description is used only as a form of 
mimesis, merely to copy the original object: “when they become so derivative as to 
become un-/ intelligible.” Moore continues, “the same thing may be said for all of us, that 
we/ do not admire what/ we cannot understand.”  Readers can achieve genuine 
connection to the poem’s things—with the reader achieving his or her own form of 
imaginary possession—when that material proves pleasurable in some way.  
As we have now seen in other object-focused poems in Observations, Moore’s 
choice of objects in “Poetry” illustrates a tension between closeness and distance.  Moore 
presents a diverse array of non-human objects, suggesting even further the need to 
employ descriptions that can promote the reader’s connection to foreign things: 




  the bat, 
   holding on upside down or in quest of something to 
 
eat, elephants pushing, a wild horse taking a roll, a tireless 
            wolf under 
   a tree, the immovable critic twitching his skin like a horse 
              that feels a flea, the base- 
   ball fan, the statistician— 
        nor is it valid 
            to discriminate against “business documents and 
 
school-books”; all these phenomena are important. One  
  must make a distinction 
   however: when dragged into prominence by half poets, 
          the result is not poetry  (72) 
 
Although this list initially seems randomly selected and inherently distant from any 
particular subject, a closer examination reveals certain qualities that may be promoting 
the speaker’s connection. The descriptions share a commonality in that the speaker 
captures these “phenomena”—observable facts—in the pursuit of sensual pleasure. She 
preserves the animals in moments of determination as they respond to raw needs. They 
are tireless, wild, and bold and cannot be contained or domesticated. The image of the 
critic, in contrast, is the only one represented through discomfort, with skin twitching in 
apparent irritation; the image is reminiscent of the contempt Moore describes in the 
opening lines. The list then reveals the familiar tension in Moore’s work between 
experience embraced with a wild sense of freedom and pleasure, and experience 
regulated through critical judgment, or the mathematical precision of a baseball fan who 
can filter the player’s raw force into cold, objective statistics. Poetry must always 
negotiate these two extremes—the wild and the tamed—and, as Moore argues, it 
becomes “genuine” when it both captures “the raw material of poetry in/ all its rawness” 
and allows the poet to “present// for inspection, imaginary gardens with real toads in 




them” (73). Poetry must allow for the poet’s precision and formal control (the “imaginary 
gardens” that can, in turn, be presented “for inspection” by others) but must also capture 
genuine experience and emotion (the “real toads”). Moore’s wild animals help us to 
understand her fascination with a raw and unregulated energy. And yet, the toads must be 
represented through precision to avoid being merely personal symbols of the poet’s 
experience. To be “real” is to be both a raw product of the poet’s imaginary possession 
and yet a thing distanced from any single possessor. Imaginary gardens must be pruned in 
preparation for the inevitable critical judgment of the readers invited to enter.     
This latter idea of critical assessment relates to another aspect of imaginary 
possession: Moore’s desire to project an authoritative voice. “Poetry” helps to illustrate 
this point, as well, given the extreme revisions Moore makes to the poem in later 
versions. As Robert Rehder has pointed out, it is objects that Moore excises from the 
final poem: she removes the catalog of things through which a reader can seek 
connection. Instead, the poem becomes a declaration of what poetry can offer, without 
providing proof in its illustrations. The final version of “Poetry” presents a speaker who 
has become too distanced from the material; this poetic voice makes assertions she wants 
accepted at face value. The pursuit of authority only, without the counter-balancing drive 
for imaginary connection, proves to be one potentially dangerous outcome of the tensions 
on display in Observations. 
In the remaining pages, I will discuss several object-focused poems in 
Observations by classifying them according to two categories. In the first, I will examine 
poems that represent Moore’s achievement of the aesthetic thing—poems that depict the 
final polished product of the poet’s object encounter and thus provide evidence of 




imaginary possession. Yet, even within these perfected exteriors, I occasionally point to 
cracks in the exterior that reveal glimpses of the subject enacting the observation. The 
second category of poems include those in which Moore acknowledges more explicitly 
certain limitations inherent in the poetic act; these are poems in which we can gain 
greater access, or “piercing glances” of the subject who has encountered the object and 
remains preoccupied with the efficacy of her representations.   
Moore’s Achieved Thing (and the Concealed Poetic Self)  
Moore’s pursuit of the perfected artistic thing provides a simultaneous 
opportunity to project an authoritative voice that can conceal the experiences of the 
encountering subject. Thus, we find the poet demonstrating techniques of distancing and 
authority. Her poems frequently present an objective, unidentifiable speaker that stands in 
some measure of distance from the object of observation. One poem embodying this 
vision of imaginary possession is “The Fish,” in which Moore employs sparse description 
to represent objects and to distance the speaking subject from the material. Moore’s 
support for the poem is evident in her elevation of it from the 33rd poem in Observations 
to the tenth in Selected Poems, where it also becomes the first Observations poem to 
follow Moore’s nine new compositions. The poem includes dynamic descriptions of the 
oceanic landscape (such as the mussel shell that opens and shuts “like// an/ injured fan”) 
without revealing any details of the speaker’s connection to it. These representations of 
things remain objectively precise and impersonal. Such details reveal a great deal about 
Moore’s ideals for her poetics. “The Fish” is notable for its abundance of both scientific 
and decorative details, which mark an intense observing gaze and a careful poetic hand 
that has crafted these details into a particular shape, evident in the poem’s specific 




syllabic stanza forms. The poem affirms the permanence and scope of poetry—“this/ 
defiant edifice”—that serves as the receptacle for all experience. The ocean, an all-
encompassing space absorbing life, destruction, mortality, and history, serves as a 
metaphor for poetry itself, a medium through which the poet can illustrate “All/ external/ 
marks of abuse” . . . “all the physical features of// ac-/ cident” (Schulze 86)—with this 
stanza and line break exposing the poem’s own physical features as anything but 
accidental (given the adherence to the patterned form). It is the poet that crafts “the 
stars,// pink/ rice grains, ink/ bespattered jelly-fish, crabs like/ green/ lilies and 
submarine/ toadstools” (85) and exercises authority in revealing “things [that] stand/ out 
on” (86) the poem’s structure. From the opening line, we learn that this landscape is 
actually one of art, another decorative canvas through which Moore can project a voice of 
authority. When the poem announces that the fish “Wade/ through black jade” (85), we 
know we are in an artistic space, in which the dark ornamental stone becomes a backdrop 
on which Moore can carve her elaborate scene.  
Moore makes an ambitious gesture of authority in the final stanza as she reaches 
toward a larger declaration about human experience: 




     evidence has proved that it can 
          live 
          on what cannot revive 
     its youth. The sea grows old in it. (86) 
 
Here, we see both the poet’s intent to capture authority and her recognition that this goal 
can only be achieved through art. As the speaker strives toward total possession of the 
space, pushing beyond the perspective of a single subject observing objects’ minute 




details, a rupture takes place: the poem plunges into a chasm, describing a fissure in the 
earth’s surface that breaches the very structure the speaker is gazing upon. Although the 
speaker tells us this cleft can hold no certain knowledge (or even, possibly, life), she 
nonetheless uses this particular vessel—a gap—to assert her claim about mortality and 
the long-standing permanence of art. When access to real objects becomes limited or 
removed, the poet responds via imaginary possession. The void itself becomes the thing 
encapsulating Moore’s desire for her own poetics: to create lasting structures through 
which art can “live,” independent of the experience of any single creator. In the 
ambiguity of the final lines, we find that the poet can project authority only through 
distance and detachment from the objects. Here, the speaker has achieved total possession 
of and distance from the thing. The problem, however, is that in achieving this form of 
possession, Moore has also removed the material to a point of abstraction, evident in the 
near incomprehensibility of the antecedent to “it” in the above passage. There is no clear 
way to read just what “can/ live/ on what cannot revive/its youth” or how we should 
resolve the paradox that something has repeatedly been proven to live on a dead 
structure. By moving toward an authoritative stance of distance, this speaker has shifted 
the reader’s experience from one of pleasure to, now, one of contempt; the reader must 
approach the material with scrutiny and intellectual rigor to access the thing’s meaning.      
Another poem reflecting Moore’s ideal aesthetic achievement is “An Egyptian 
Pulled Glass Bottle in the Shape of a Fish.” Focused explicitly on an art object, this poem 
allows Moore to showcase the ideal artistic thing without any consideration of the 
subject. The bottle represents an object transformed and perfected through its artistic 
representation. In her corresponding depiction of the phenomenon—an artistic 




representation Moore has transformed again in the space of the poem—she avoids 
acknowledging any preoccupations or experiences that may have accompanied the 
speaker’s process of imaginary possession: 
Here we have thirst 
     And patience from the first, 
And art, as in a wave held up for us to see 
 In its essential perpendicularity; 
 
Not brittle but 
Intense—the spectrum, that 
   Spectacular and nimble animal the fish, 
   Whose scales turn aside the sun’s sword with their polish.   
(Schulze 62) 
 
Unlike its actual counterpart, the glass bottle, held upright at this angle of 
perpendicularity provides the opportunity for scrutiny. Intense exposure reveals particular 
qualities: the object’s multi-colored brilliance, its impression of agility and speed, its 
scales like a layer of armor protecting against the sun’s glare. 44 In Moore’s 
transformation, she represents the fish’s nature as one of defensive power. In this way, 
the bottle proves reminiscent of the independent, self-protective rose we find in “Roses 
Only” that guards its internal nature from an observer’s potentially violent possession. 
The word “polish” in the final line affirms the constructed and refined nature of this 
                                                 
44 I am not the first critic to recognize Moore’s frequent attention to objects with layers of protective armor. 
In his well-known essay, “Her Shield,” Randall Jarrell notes Moore’s tendency to focus on plants and 
animals with elaborate defensive armor, although he also reads this interest in her frequent use of quotation 
and revision, as well as the difficulty, irony, and concision of her poetry: “Some of the changes in Miss 
Moore’s work can be considered in terms of Armour. Queer terms, you say? They are hers, not mine: a 
good deal of her poetry is specifically (and changingly) about armour, weapons, protection, places to hide; 
and she is not only conscious that this is so, but after a while writes poems about the fact that it is so” (199). 
In Stealing the Language, Alicia Ostriker links Moore’s depictions of armor to her need to protect gendered 
aspects of her own identity: “Moore’s proliferating bestiary of creatures in protective armor and 
camouflage are not only personal self-portraits in code, as many critics have observed. They imply over 
and over the necessary timidities and disguises of a brilliant woman in a world where literary authority is 
male” (52). Taffy Martin also identifies a group of Moore’s poems “whose subject is defensive armoring 
but whose speaker is as fearless a warrior as that of her own mythic dream, the dragon” (3). All of these 
critics acknowledge Moore’s desire to mark a clear distinction between her own biography and the material 
of her poems, as well as to allow for more complex meanings to emerge in the work.   




exterior, as does the deceptive slant rhyme distinguishing each couplet. Such external 
details invite us to consider the poetic ornamentation Moore employs in her own 
techniques. The bottle reflects the idealized poetic forms she strives to create: the 
spectacularly-ornamented and durable exterior that guards internal vulnerabilities while 
projecting a sense of its empowered strength. In this poem, imaginary possession is not 
merely an act of descriptive possession, but a process by which the poet showcases the 
qualities she most admires. 
Notably, several key words in “An Egyptian Pulled Glass Bottle”—“spectrum,” 
“polish,” and “perpendicular”—appear in two other prominent poems in the collection, in 
“To a Chameleon” and “In the Days of Prismatic Color.” Yet, in these poems, we begin 
to see cracks in the certainty of Moore’s possession. Instead, these poems expose tensions 
within Moore’s form of observation: between the poet’s desire to subsume personal 
iterations of voice within the poem’s polished landscape, and yet her recognition that 
linguistic ornamentation can only go so far. Nevertheless, “things” still remain 
illustrations through which Moore can project an empowered voice.  
In “To a Chameleon,” the speaker addresses a common lizard, focusing on two 
prominent features: its ability to hide within its surroundings, and its ability to transform 
its external shape into a decorative shell—both characteristics we could ascribe to 
Moore’s poetry. Here, we again see the poet characterizing the thing through values 
essential to her own poetics. As we see in other Observation poems, themes of self-
protection and self-determination emerge, with the chameleon representing an agent of 
transformative power. As the third poem in Observations, “To a Chameleon” helps 
establish themes thread throughout the book; yet, it also proves significant for its absence 




from subsequent collections of Moore’s work: she excises it from her Selected Poems and 
never includes it in later volumes. I am reading this particular textual history—the 
poem’s prominence in Observations and subsequent removal from Moore’s oeuvre—
against the issues it displays over poetic mastery and voice. The poem’s use of 
apostrophe deflects attention from the speaking subject and places it instead on the object 
under study; yet, in this case, Moore’s rendering of the chameleon reveals a great deal 
about the speaker’s own experience—and, specifically so as a creative agent engaged in 
the act of observation:    
Hid by the august foliage and fruit of the grape vine, 
     Twine 
   Your anatomy 
     Round the pruned and polished stem, 
          Chameleon. 
          Fire laid upon 
     An emerald as long as 
   The Dark King’s massy 
One, 
Could not snap the spectrum up for food as you have done.  
(Schulze 53) 
 
What carries “polish” is the vine’s stem, around which the chameleon encircles its body 
like twine. An external hand has pruned this landscape into its rich ripe form, which 
when lit by the “fire” of the intense sun, transforms leaves into emeralds, and natural 
objects into decorative gems. Moore illustrates her own decorative shaping in the poem’s 
opening lines, displaying consonance and rhyming couplets. Thus, poetry becomes the 
medium that creates “pruned and polished” materials; the chameleon’s job is to master 
this skill for itself—of transforming its own exterior—in the pursuit of a similar polish.   
The chameleon’s transformation is specifically for the purposes of disguise. 
Although Moore depicts the lizard as self-sustaining and courageous—for others, she 




notes, could not feed off the sunlight’s band of colors as the chameleon has done—there 
is reason to read more complexity into her explicit praise. The word “spectrum” carries 
connotations beyond its association with light waves as any array of overlapping ideas. 
Thus, the chameleon proves masterful because it can sustain itself by consuming 
contradictions and oppositions. This thing is malleable, flexible, and capable of 
transforming to fit among widely-changing conditions, in much the same way that, for 
Moore, poetic things must be capacious enough to carry a wide array of meanings. 
Survival requires a particular exterior performance that disguises the chameleon’s 
identity. We find the poet-speaker engaging in a similar process of disguise through her 
use of formal techniques: the rhyming couplets, the poem’s tone, and the use of 
apostrophe—techniques that create a polished thing while promoting the speaker’s 
impersonal distance. And yet, these very techniques also reveal the poet’s limitations in 
achieving linguistic authority: this speaker is arguably not as successful as her subject at 
hiding within the poetic landscape. For example, several couplets reveal awkward loose 
rhyme (anatomy/stem, and as/ massy) with no real urgency to the variation; the backward 
revelation of the syntax—another tactic of disguise—denies crisp access to the image; 
and, most prominently, the uneven syllable length of each couplet (in, for example, “Hid 
by the august foliage and fruit of the grape vine,/ Twine”) creates a sense of imbalance 
and disruption. For a poem about the chameleon’s impressive capacity for creative 
power, as well as its ability to hide within the decorative polish of its surfaces, we find a 
tension emerging in the skills of the poet-speaker. The resulting display of the speaker’s 
linguistic limitations may suggest why Moore removes the poem from later collections. 
But, more important for our understanding of imaginary possession, the imbalance 




suggests that a poem’s distancing techniques, the impersonal polish, cannot fully disguise 
the subject who has encountered and transformed the object. In this case, the thing 
reveals Moore’s drive to identify with the skilled chameleon—and to accomplish her own 
brilliant transformation—and, simultaneously, her recognition that no one, not even the 
poet, can “snap the spectrum up for food” with quite the perfection of this thing.       
Before I address the preoccupations exposed in “In the Days of Prismatic Color,” 
I will first examine two other poems that present achieved things, “A Talisman” and 
“Roses Only.” “A Talisman” follows “To a Chameleon” in Observations and depicts 
another image of a thing captured in precise poetic form. Just as she did with “To a 
Chameleon,” Moore removes “A Talisman” from her Selected Poems, again raising 
questions about the efficacy of this observation in relation to Moore’s larger oeuvre of 
poetic things. I argue that “A Talisman” reveals too explicitly the speaker’s own 
conditions in the act of observation, specifically as a female subject pondering questions 
of poetic authority against a particularly male poetic tradition. In other words, Moore 
does not recede to a space of critical distance from the thing. The gender issues that the 
poem lays bare also illustrate a further quality of Moore’s imaginary possession: that in 
crafting the perfected thing, Moore nonetheless celebrates its wild, unrestrained qualities, 
for her possession of the talisman comes through her connection with these very qualities.  
In its subject matter, the poem provides another example of Moore’s fascination 
with artistic objects. The speaker describes an ornamental talisman of brilliant blue lapis 
lazuli on which the image of a seagull has been engraved. This image captures the bird 
“With wings spread—// Curling its coral feet,/ Parting its beak to greet/ Men long dead” 
(Schulze 54), preserved, notably, just at the moment of interaction with human (male) 




subjects.  Again, Moore represents a common object—an un-regal seagull depicted on 
material strewn around a wrecked ship—transformed into magnificence through art. The 
poem transforms the ornamental talisman again into Moore’s own polished creation. In 
all of these layers of representation, Moore depicts the talisman as an empowered female 
figure whose wild energy defines the experience of encounter. Just as the talisman 
preserves the seagull at a specific moment of interaction with “men long dead,” the poem 
also captures the subject interacting with an artifact embodying a particular cultural 
history.45 The gull confronts the seafarers, just as Moore confronts a literary tradition that 
she genders distinctly male. Moore’s representation of the talisman illustrates her 
identification with particular qualities of authority and strength: the bird is poised to soar 
on outstretched wings and to speak through its parting beak. As a creative agent, the 
speaker aspires to gain the talisman’s power, the seagull’s independent voice, and the 
lapis lazuli’s ornamental beauty.  
In illustrating the product of imaginary possession, the poem also reveals Moore’s 
commitment to gaining an authoritative voice and distance from the thing. We can 
identify such authority in the poem’s strict form, which follows a pattern of three-line 
syllabic stanzas (6, 6, 3) with a clear rhyme scheme. Despite her achievement, Moore 
drops the piece from Selected Poems. Nevertheless, Eliot cites “A Talisman” in full in his 
Introduction with the following commentary: “The sentiment is commonplace, and I 
cannot see what a bird carved of lapis-lazuli should be doing with coral feet; but even 
here the cadence, the use of rhyme, and a certain authoritativeness of manner distinguish 
                                                 
45 In fact, Bonnie Costello suggests that the poem’s “acceptance of conventional symbolism” may be 
precisely why Moore later rejects the poem (Imaginary Possessions 40). I argue that Moore is deeply aware 
of the literary traditions she is working in—and yet working to transform (the “oppositional authority” 
Cristanne Miller identifies). 




the poem” (Eliot 7). Eliot’s comment recognizes the authoritative voice that was central 
to Observations. What causes Moore to remove the poem from later collections? One 
probable cause is the lack of precision in the details Eliot highlights, given her 
commitment to authenticity and accuracy in her descriptions. Yet, another reason may lie 
in the explicitly gendered dimensions of the poem, which reveal personal concerns and an 
explicitly female approach to poetic authority, both ideas from which Moore would later 
distance herself. If Moore seeks a poetics in which she can disguise the subject’s more 
personal conditions among the poem’s landscape, “A Talisman” all too clearly marks her 
as a woman poised to challenge a specifically male tradition.46 Moore’s construction of 
this thing, then, even with her own accomplished distancing, too easily reveals the 
urgency underlying the observation.              
 The final three poems I will discuss, “Roses Only,” “In the Days of Prismatic 
Color,” and “Critics and Connoisseurs,” are all examples in which Moore wrestles more 
explicitly with the poet’s challenges in gaining imaginary possession. These poems 
therefore embody the second category of Moore’s object poems: ones in which we can 
see greater evidence of the poet’s preoccupation with her own authority. In these poems, 
Moore reveals uncertainty about whether her poetic of things can live up to her own 
critical (and intellectual) aspirations. Of these poems, “Roses Only” may be read most 
obviously as illustrating another perfected “thing.” Yet, Moore tells us from the poem’s 
opening lines that the object’s “beauty is a liability/ rather than/ an asset” (Schulze 83). 
The thing’s perfected exterior is not necessarily the positive achievement one might 
                                                 
46 Suzanne Juhasz also identifies in Moore a tendency to remove from her poetics any traces of her gender 
in order to present an objective, authoritative voice: “Moore . . . can safely use only those elements of 
subjective personal experience that are not specifically sex-linked, and for even these she must find 
acceptable objective correlatives. She must, in other words, translate her experience into the masculine 
forms and symbols that are current and correct” (36). 




imagine; instead, Moore celebrates the thorns, which she tells the rose are “the best part 
of you.” The poem displays the tension I have been discussing over how the artist can 
gain possession of the thing while maintaining critical distance in the representation. The 
poem, and particularly its title, initially suggests that Moore’s observation promotes the 
object’s autonomy and preserves accurate descriptions; in this reading, the perfected 
creation, the beautiful rose, would stand alone as sufficient evidence of imaginary 
possession. Nevertheless, Moore suggests that a more complex process is at play, as the 
poet claims a connection to the object through its thorns rather than its beauty. Imaginary 
possession comes by recognizing qualities the eye may not be conditioned to observe. 
The poet acknowledges the object’s self-protective impulse but must nonetheless find the 
means of gaining possession of an otherwise inaccessible object.   
Just as we have seen in Frost’s poetry, Moore’s poems often support more than 
one reading, with complex arguments emerging in tension with a poem’s more simplistic 
surface narrative. In “Roses Only,” the simplistic narrative supports the object’s 
autonomous distance from the subject, with Moore urging the object’s resistance to the 
artist’s “predatory hand.” Directly addressing the rose, the speaker ponders the nature of 
its qualities, its beauty versus its thorns. She ultimately celebrates the thorns because they 
protect against the object’s violent possession, while beauty invites the possessor’s gaze:  
          . . . .They are not proof against a worm, the ele- 
                ments, or mildew 
   but what about the predatory hand? What is brilliance 
               without co-ordination? Guarding the  
       infinitesimal pieces of your mind, compelling audi- 
               ence to 
  the remark that it is better to be forgotten than to be re- 
                membered too violently, 
your thorns are the best part of you.     
 




To be forgotten is more desirable than to be handled “too violently,” or represented in a 
fashion counter to the object’s nature. While beauty draws attention to the rose’s exterior 
rather than its “brains,” it leaves the object unable to respond to potentially severe and 
unwarranted conclusions (“to confute presumptions resulting from observa-/ tion”). The 
thorns, on the other hand, guard the “infinitesimal pieces of [the object’s] mind.” In these 
lines, Moore seems to favor the rose’s resistance to the encountering subject, the 
“predatory hand” that may want to pluck the object, or, in the case of the poet, ascribe its 
nature.  
Yet, as Taffy Martin argues in Marianne Moore, Subversive Modernist (1986), 
Moore’s poems often prove more subversive than an initial reading may suggest. Martin 
encourages critical attention to “the subversive side of her work” where “Moore emerges 
as a poet who responded to the twentieth century with humorous irony and aggressive 
optimism” (x). In “Roses Only,” interrogation of such irony reveals a vastly different 
reading. Even as Moore bemoans the problem of being misread by an aggressive eye, she 
is unwilling to reveal the guarded aspects of this thing: the minute details in its mind, the 
personal and individual experiences that must remain hidden (and, she reminds us, that 
audiences would rather forget). The thorny exterior proves “best” because it allows the 
poet to maintain authority over the aspects of the object’s nature she reveals. The 
beautiful petals, “the without-which-nothing/ of pre-eminence” (Schulze 83) are not the 
cause of the rose’s brilliance. In contrast, it is the thorns that control access to any such 
brilliance and require potential possessors to exercise precision in their interaction. 
Thorns keep the would-be possessor looking at the object from the outside and thus 
enforce a form of distancing between subject and object. Here, Moore recognizes some 




measure of distance as inevitable in the process of imaginary possession; boundaries exist 
that even the individual poetic imagination cannot overcome.  
Nevertheless, the speaker’s personification of the rose suggests that subjective 
possession has already taken place. Moore acknowledges, “What is brilliance/ without 
co-ordination?”: any representation of the thing’s brilliance requires meticulous 
composition. Moore is less interested in preserving the rose through its own nature and 
identity, since, as she points out, the object’s very nature remains inaccessible even to the 
most inquisitive eye. Instead, the poem acknowledges the challenges for the artist when 
certain qualities—in this case, the protective thorns—guard the object’s core.  The roses 
here are, ironically, not “Roses Only,” but self-consciously created things whose 
brilliance depends, to a large extent, on the linguistic possession of the poet. The poem 
thus confirms that these objects have become things transformed through the process of 
imaginary possession. Further, Moore recognizes the cultural power imbued in this act of 
imaginary possession. In the rose’s status as a polished thing, it becomes  
                        …  a symbol of the 
unit, stiff and sharp, 
 conscious of surpassing by dint of native superiority and 
liking for everything 
         self-dependent, anything an 
 
         ambitious civilization might produce. (83) 
The rose emerges as the product of an “ambitious civilization”—or, at least, an 
ambitiously civilizing agent in the form of the poet. We are back, in a sense, to the 
problem Moore warns about in “Those Various Scalpels,” in which the act of possession 
is always an assertion of cultural power and superiority. Here, the act of transformation is 
a form of possession the poet can claim only through the force of superiority. The roses 




thus reflect the concerns of a poet seeking authority over representation. Ironically, it is 
the thorns themselves, the object’s very defensive characteristics, which allow such 
possession to take place. Although they guard the object’s interiority, they also prompt 
the subject’s imaginative connection. Without the rose’s “membered” exterior—a 
particularly evocative image through Moore’s syllabic line break—the object would be a 
“what-is-this, a mere// peculiarity”; it would not invite the poet’s curiosity or concern. 
Instead, Moore presents the thorns in an image of reaching limbs, which invite the poet’s 
imaginary possession specifically because they are protective qualities to which she can 
relate. Moore’s fascination with armor proves a common theme throughout her work and 
must be read in relation to the defensive strategies she employs in her own poetics. Even 
as she admires the rose’s inclination to protect itself—an impulse she understands—
Moore pursues a voice of authority and superiority through which she can transform the 
rose into a thing. In a sense, these qualities are the very “thorns” the poem celebrates: 
techniques of distancing that complete the process of imaginary possession.  
In other poems, Moore reveals more explicit anxieties about the poet’s ability to 
claim certain authority of things, thus highlighting the challenges inherent in imaginary 
possession. Although “In the Days of Prismatic Color” is less object-focused in its 
rhetorical presentation, the poem highlights such preoccupations as it exposes 
observation as an act of limited perception. Recognizing the modern moment as 
exemplifying an Edenic fall, Moore laments the loss of a time when light granted the 
observing eye a gifted form of insight, and even indirect access to things resulted in 
complete vision: “with nothing to modify it but the/ mist that went up, obliqueness was a 
varia-/tion of the perpendicular, plain to see and/ to account for” (Schulze 91). As we 




have seen in “An Egyptian Pulled Glass Bottle in the Shape of a Fish,” perpendicularity 
for Moore is an artistic lens granting the reader a new form of access: “And art, as in a 
wave held up for us to see/ In its essential perpendicularity” (62). The poetic medium 
allows for enhanced perception.  Moore often presents the made thing by drawing 
attention to the bright spectral surfaces the artist applies in its creation. As we saw in the 
glass bottle of a fish, its brilliant array of color was, in fact, the quality distinguishing it 
from its corresponding real-world object and prompting the subject’s imaginary 
possession. However, “In the Days of Prismatic Color” conveys greater ambivalence 
about whether modern artists can achieve pure perception in the rendering of things. The 
speaker laments the loss of a time  
Not in the days of Adam and Eve, but when Adam 
     was alone; when there was no smoke and color was 
fine, not with the fineness of 
 
     early civilization art but by virtue 
of its originality. (91) 
Moore mourns this state of ideal observation when colors retained their crispness and the 
subject could access the landscape with total clarity. Notably, she marks this time as one 
preceding gendered experience, since “the days of prismatic color” are those before the 
creation of Eve. Such observation is no longer an option for modern artists since the 
world “is no/ longer that.” Brilliant color has been dulled; what was once simply “Truth” 
is now recognized as complexity where “complexity is not a crime but carry/ it to the 
point of murki-/ ness and nothing is plain.” In the face of such murkiness, the modern 
artist must find other means of gaining perception. One can extrapolate that the impulse 
to locate connection inherent in imaginary possession—the more feminine form of 
observation—would be necessary in the days following the creation of Eve. Her attention 




here to the perfection of an Edenic state—and the artist’s inability now to represent such 
an ideal, aesthetic experience—adds a dimension to Moore’s focus on Adam’s story in 
“When I Buy Pictures.” The images Moore presents in that poem of artistic 
representation of Adam’s fall suggests even further her interest in using art to gain access 
to a time before the fall, “in the days of prismatic color.” The opportunity to perfect 
exteriors in the creation of things grants the poet a new form of power, and one gained 
specifically through an aesthetic achievement.  
Moore acknowledges this problem of modern art as one facing her own poetics: 
   In the short legged, fit- 
ful advance, the gurgling and all the minutiae—we have the 
 classic 
multitude of feet. To what purpose! Truth is no Apollo 
      Belvedere, no formal thing. The wave may go over it 
     if it likes. 
Know that it will be there when it says: 
      “I shall be there when the wave has gone by.” (91-92) 
 
Art is an “advance” that proves “fitful” as the artist can only focus on the minute details 
of a landscape rather than its full horizon. Poetry, “the/ classic/ multitude of feet,” still 
grants the opportunity for creation, but the resulting art form lacks the clarity or 
permanence of “Truth” apparent in such classical art as the Apollo Belvedere, a sculpture 
long epitomizing aesthetic perfection. Poetry, even in a refined and sculpted form, can no 
longer embody such ideals and instead must find authentic ways of representing 
murkiness. The stakes for the poet’s act of observation are clear: observation may still 
involve the construction of “formal things,” but these things no longer carry singular, 
authoritative meaning. If we read this “wave” as the same one featured in “An Egyptian 
Pulled Glass Bottle in the Shape of a Fish,” it is the very wave of art—of observation—
that the object must withstand. This metaphor further destabilizes the idea of poetic 




authority by suggesting that the artist’s representation remains only a temporary surge 
that will “go by”; the abstraction of Moore’s repetition of “it” in the above passage also 
illustrates the poet’s inability to, ultimately, gain true clarity through art. The object will 
withstand the observation, while the thing preserved in the wave will only approximate 
complexities, communicate the speaker’s own temporary imaginary possession, and 
convey no permanent truth. “In the Days of Prismatic Color” reveals limitations inherent 
in the act of observation that stand to thwart any singular possession. In a world where 
truths are inherently uncertain, possession remains an inherently unstable act.  
 The poem “Critics and Connoisseurs” also proves significant for revealing 
anxieties about imaginary possession. In this poem, Moore characterizes observation as 
an act undertaken with the poet’s fear of imperfection, and poetic technique as a device of 
self-defense. The poem’s very title suggests concerns over the opinion of some ideal 
critical reader—a figure reminiscent of Eliot himself—the kind of discerning reader 
looking to elevate only the best of his field. Moore showcases the word “fastidious” three 
times in the poem, highlighting the demanding nature of this critic, the figure with an 
impossible set of expectations. Yet, the examples she uses to illustrate such 
fastidiousness—the “unconscious fastidiousness” she claims is present in poetry, the 
“conscious fastidiousness” that has stalled a swan from swimming, and the “fastidious 
ant” determined in his effort to carry a stick (Schulze 77)—suggest that such a critical 
voice does not always impose judgment from the outside. Just as often it comes from the 
artist him or herself: the swan whose “Disbelief and conscious fastidiousness were the/ 
staple/ ingredients in its/ disinclination to move”; or the ant whose fastidiousness prompts 
him to carry the stick in all directions, only to “[abandon] the stick as/ useless and 




overtaxing its/ jaws with a particle of whitewash pill-like but/ heavy” go “through the 
same course of procedure” (78). Such representations illustrate the animal/insect figure as 
one with high expectations and a determined set of standards for its own performance. 
These characteristics are the ones with which Moore identifies—and through which she 
begins to imaginatively possess these things. These qualities, for Moore, define ambition: 
“I have seen this swan and/ I have seen you; I have seen ambition without/ understanding 
in a variety of forms” (77).  Moore links fastidiousness to ambition. Despite the speaker’s 
effort to formally distance herself from such qualities by projecting them onto the 
animals, the poem’s repetition and personification suggest these are ones she recognizes 
in herself. Moore admits this point in the poem’s opening line: “There is a great amount 
of poetry in unconscious/ fastidiousness.” She has seen such ambition without fully 
understanding it as part of her own nature.  
In “Critics and Connoisseurs,” Moore presents poetry as an effort in striving for 
goals one will prove unable to meet, of reaching for perfection while knowing one will 
fall short. She makes a point to explain that such an attempt is admirable and even 
preferable to other forms of art:  
 Certain Ming 
     products, imperial floor coverings of coach 
wheel yellow, are well enough in their way but I have 
      seen something 
         that I like better—a 
               mere childish attempt to make an imperfectly 
       ballasted animal stand up, 
    similar determination to make a pup 
                   eat his meat on the plate.  
 
While certain ancient artifacts boast their own beauty and perfection—the Ming dynasty 
was known for its restoration and development of the arts—Moore turns her attention to 




real-life moments of imperfection, when the attempt to bolster the unstable object comes 
across as “childish” and yet intriguing and admirable. The poet’s possession through such 
moments, as well as her move to make such “imperfectly/ ballasted animal[s] stand up” 
via the medium of the poem—bolstering them through her own representation—suggests 
Moore’s recognition of both the vulnerabilities and limitations of the animals, as well as 
their determination. These are qualities underlying her own poetic fastidiousness: the 
sense that her high standards may be difficult to attain and yet her determination to 
repeat, as she observed in the ant, “the same course of procedure” (78). In the final lines, 
Moore admits: 
     What is  
there in being able 
    to say that one has dominated the stream in an  
     attitude of self defense, 
    in proving that one has had the experience 
        of carrying a stick? 
 
She acknowledges the assertion of authority as an act of self-defense, an attempt to claim 
dominance in moments of vulnerability, exhaustion, and potential failure. The act of 
imaginary possession must also be read in this light, particularly given the speaker’s 
connection to the things (the swan, the ant, and the pup) she has created. Moore exposes 
the poetic authority she often claims through observation as a postured “attitude of self 
defense.” 
 In Observations Moore showcases a form of observation that complicates such 
concepts as emotion, intellect, and personality in the subject’s interaction with the object. 
She also complicates the opposition of “pleasure” and “contempt” by revealing that both 
experiences of the object are necessary for the poet’s creation of things. Moore’s polished 
poetic of exteriors most frequently presents things that serve as proof of the poet’s 




imaginary possession. We find objects perfected in their precision of detail, form, and 
description. And yet, the object’s transformation into an achieved thing is not the only 
objective of Moore’s poetics. Instead, her things illustrate the subject’s response to the 
object and aim to evoke a corresponding response in the viewer. Moore’s focus on art 
objects allows her to demonstrate how a particular response—in this case, pleasure—can 
lead to the artist’s imaginary possession. In the subject’s encounter, pleasure guides her 
effort of transforming the object into a thing. Thus, Moore’s things not only serve as 
proof of imaginary possession, but also as proof of the subject’s response in the 
interaction. Evidence of such pleasure is preserved within the thing, if we can locate the 
“piercing glances” that will grant us access. Pleasure comes in various forms, including 
emotional, intellectual, and sensual responses; in all such manifestations, however, it 
suggests an engaged connection between the subject and object that we cannot entirely 
remove from the subject herself. To divorce the thing from its creator is to ignore the 
aspects of pleasure that have distinguished the encounter.  
Nevertheless, in Moore’s poetics, “pleasure” can also not be removed from its 
natural opposition, “contempt.” As we have now seen Moore complicate other binaries, it 
is important to understand the way, in her poetics, these oppositions are actually 
connected. Reading with contempt and critical distance can promote pleasure, because it 
fosters new experiences and understandings of the object. However, in her emphasis on 
contempt, Moore also risks alienating the reader from the material entirely by employing 
techniques that too heavily promote a disconnection from the human elements of the 
subject-object connection. By recognizing the value Moore places on “contempt,” we can 
better understand the speaker’s retreat to a place of critical distance within poem’s 




rhetorical act, as well as Moore’s use of distancing techniques such as her elevated, 
scientific and Latinate diction, unattributed quotations, vague pronouns, syllabic forms 
that denaturalize syntax, and frequent concluding lines and revisions that shift into 
abstraction. Contempt allows the poet to resolve her own preoccupations about the 
authority she aims to demonstrate. If “pleasure” provides a way into the object, 
“contempt” allows the poet to gain the distance required for her to claim a voice of 
authority. Moore’s poetics thus illustrates a tension between closeness and distance, 
between pleasure and contempt, as the poet negotiates what it means to assert possession 
over the thing. Among the modernist poets in this study, Moore provides another 
example of a poet using things to negotiate her own preoccupations with poetic authority 
as she transform the subject’s individual, temporary, experience of the object into a more 
polished, and permanent, structure. 




Chapter Three: “THE WORLD IS NEW”: William Carlos Williams’s  
Imagination and the Renewal of Things 
 
 XXII  
 
 so much depends  
 upon 
 
 a red wheel 
 barrow 
 
 glazed with rain 
 water 
 
 beside the white 
 chickens   (I 138) 
 William Carlos Williams’s well-known poem has helped solidify the idea of a 
modernist fascination with objects wherein the poet’s description captures some essence 
of the object’s form while maintaining its separation from the gazing subject. This 
reading is best encapsulated in J. Hillis Miller’s seminal 1969 reading of Williams as a 
“poet of reality” whose central obligation to the object lies in his dual tasks of seeing and 
naming. “His attitude toward things,” Miller writes of Williams, “like Ezra Pound’s, is 
nominalist. Each object is itself and nothing more should be said about it” (307). Of the 
poem cited above, perhaps the most widely-anthologized from Williams’s 1923 
collection Spring and All, Miller claims, “The wheelbarrow, in a famous poem, does not 
stand for anything or mean anything. It is an object in space dissociated from the objects 
around it, without reference beyond itself. It is what it is. The aim of the poem is to make 
it stand there for the reader in its separateness, as the words of the poem stand on the 
page” (307).   
 Yet, the poem itself complicates such a reading, given Williams’s assertion, from 
the first line, that “so much depends/ upon” the wheelbarrow. Through the object’s 




relation to other objects and to the speaker’s reading of the scene, it becomes a “thing,” in 
Bill Brown’s terms: an object containing ideas, associations, and meanings that exceed its 
use value as an object. Poetic devices demonstrate Williams’s firm hand in this 
representation: radical enjambment breaking apart the compound words “wheelbarrow” 
and “rainwater” controls which aspects of the object gather focus, momentum, and 
distinction. Phonetic repetitions, such as the long-‘a’ sound in “glazed with rain” and 
long-‘i’ sound in “beside the white,” demonstrate the poet’s authority to shape the colors 
and textures that gain emphasis. The utilitarian function of the wheelbarrow diminishes 
against the visual nature of the image, despite the fact that the opening line affirms the 
wheelbarrow’s essential function in that “so much depends/ upon” it (for example, 
cleaning a chicken coup). Yet, the descriptions do more than paint a linguistic picture. 
The poetic techniques emphasize an object transformed by a moment: a wheel rendered 
distinct from the barrow it carries, a glaze of rain that has altered the object’s very nature 
(in the subject’s perceiving eye), a relation to the chickens that has been abstracted into 
the contrast of red and white. The object has been metamorphosed from a utilitarian tool 
into an artistic representation highlighting color, texture, and sound; from an object 
experienced in the world to a thing that remains wholly relational, “dependent upon,” 
some individual experience of the poet’s gaze. Even the word “depends” carries poetic 
implications in its definition of hanging down or being suspended, as a line break; each 
line of the poem hangs on the precision of the one before it. This object does not remain 
“separate,” as Miller suggests, “without reference beyond itself,” but instead proves a 
poetic thing wholly dependent upon the subjective agent of its creation.  




Despite more than four decades of responses to Miller’s work, his interpretation 
remains arguably the most dominant reading of Williams’s approach to objects.47 He 
defines Williams’s poetics as one wherein the poet has resigned the ego and the private 
consciousness of his personal history, and no longer seeks to define a self against the 
external world. Williams “gives himself up in despair and establishes a self beyond 
personality, a self coextensive with the universe. Words, things, people, and God vanish 
as separate entities and everything becomes a unit” (291).48 In turn, Williams moves 
“beyond romanticism” (287) and no longer strives to overcome the self’s distance from 
outside objects; instead, all things can exist simultaneously:  
Romantic poetry, like idealist philosophy, had been based on an 
opposition between the inner world of the subject and the outer world of 
things. Since the world is other than the self, that self can ground itself on 
something external. . . . In Williams [this tradition] disappears. . . . Gone 
are both the profound abysses of subjectivity, so important in earlier 
poetry, and the limitless dimensions of the external world. . . . In 
Williams’s mature work, if something exists at all, it dwells in the only 
realm there is, a space both subjective and objective, a region of 
                                                 
47 In elevating Williams as the culmination of a modern “poetics of reality,” Miller initiated the prominent 
scholarly attention to Williams over the last several decades. His study cannot be underestimated for its 
significance in promoting Williams as a central figure in 20th-century American poetry, a notion supported 
by the number of post-modern poets (across a range of aesthetic styles) who have claimed Williams as a 
predecessor. As Paul Mariani has written, “However we view his approach and strategy, J. Hillis Miller’s is 
one of the most important and seminal encounters in the [then] sixty-years of Williams criticism. Miller can 
be argued with and perhaps substantially qualified; he cannot be dismissed” (Poet and Critics 198).  
48 Miller dates this change to an episode of despair in Williams’s early twenties. He cites a letter from 
Williams to Marianne Moore, in which the poet claims an “inner security” resulting from “something 
which occurred once when I was about twenty, a sudden resignation to existence, a despair—if you wish to 
call it that, but a despair which made everything a unit and at the same time a part of myself. I suppose it 
might be called a sort of nameless religious experience. I resigned, I gave up” (SL 147; qtd. in Miller 287).  




copresence in which anywhere is everywhere, and all times are one time. 
(288)  
In the poet’s approach to objects, Miller finds that “Williams can look straight at the 
object because it offers no threat. There is nothing alien or distant about it. It proposes no 
invitation to the poet’s violence. The objectivity of his descriptions affirms his security. . 
. . Poetry of this kind is a way of letting things be” (306). In the case of the red 
wheelbarrow, according to Miller’s reading, the object reflects nothing of the subject’s 
experience of interaction; the poet’s descriptions allow the object to exist “within the 
universal realm made of the poet’s coextension with the world.” 
 Miller identifies three aspects of the object that get expressed as Williams works 
to bring them into balance: the “formless ground, origin of all things; the formed thing, 
defined and limited; [and] a nameless presence, the ‘beautiful thing’, there in every form 
but hidden by it” (328). The formless origin is a place beyond language from which 
creation is initiated, the pre-material state from which, we might say, spring approaches 
in the opening poem of Spring and All:  
They enter the new world naked, 
cold, uncertain of all 
save that they enter. All about them 
the cold, familiar wind— 
 
Now the grass, tomorrow 
the stiff curl of wildcarrot leaf  
One by one objects are defined— 
It quickens: clarity, outline of leaf 
 
But now the stark dignity of  
entrance—Still, the profound change 
 
has come upon them: rooted they 
grip down and begin to awaken   (I 95-96)   
 




The formless origin is the space from which objects emerge with the “stark dignity of 
entrance,” knowing nothing except that they enter. Miller describes it as “what was 
already there, chaotic, senseless, absurd, but fecund, holding within itself the possibility 
of all forms” (328). It is also the space of creative potential out of which the artist brings 
the object into existence (“One by one objects are defined”). The object emerges to 
become the “formed thing” Miller cites above, now defined and limited by particular 
planes of existence. The formed thing proves that which we can see and categorize 
through the object’s material qualities, function, or value. Finally, the “beautiful thing” 
represents the object’s universal essence, some element that has remained unnamed 
because it is hidden. It is the aspect marked, as Williams describes above, by some 
“profound change” that has “[begun] to awaken” (I 96) and becomes the part Williams 
pursues most in his object representation.  
Miller’s description of these three aspects suggests a poet striving to capture some 
unarticulated essence of beauty within the object that was “covered up as soon as the 
form [was] fixed in a shape” (332). Miller describes, “Every birth is an uncovering of the 
secret, but as soon as the child is assimilated into the already existing human community, 
the flame is shaded, the unique is reduced to common measure.” He posits that 
Williams’s focus on birth presents the opportunity to recognize the beautiful thing’s 
authentic presence before it is masked by ideologies or associations. He also finds 
Williams’s repeated use of flower imagery related to the beautiful thing: “As objects rise 
from the ground and blossom, the delicate perfume of beauty is released” (333). Through 
the poem, Williams liberates from the object some intangible presence, making it 
concrete and lasting. When Miller speaks of Williams’s resignation of ego, he suggests 




some ideal achievement wherein the poet has set aside all personal and cultural 
associations and can now access a pre-social concept of the object in some pure form. 
Through enhanced perception, the poet translates this vision into the “beautiful thing” 
existing in copresence with all other “beautiful things.”  
In applying to Miller’s reading the terminology of Bill Brown’s “thing theory”—
wherein object and thing are two separate entities—it becomes clear that Miller’s theory 
focuses on the object at the expense of the thing. His “formed thing” addresses the 
object’s material shape as it exists in the world. Even his “beautiful thing”—the pure 
essence pursued by the poet—represents a version stripped of ideas and meanings that 
have been projected onto and carried within the object. Miller’s focus on Williams as a 
“self beyond personality,” devoid of all ego, defines him as a poet writing outside of any 
subjective experience that may inform his rendering of things. In a sense, Miller invites 
us to consider the object purified from any aspects of “thingness.” Thus, Miller’s 
“beautiful thing,” despite employing the same terminology, differs sharply from Brown’s 
concept of the “thing”: an entity that encapsulates multiple meanings beyond the object 
itself—most significantly, meanings that subjects project onto objects through individual 
linguistic, cultural, and personal histories. In contrast to my study, Miller’s theory of 
Williams as a “poet of reality” focuses on the “object” at the expense of understanding 
how his poetics, in fact, addresses the creation of “things”—and, specifically, “things” 
through which we can gain glimpses of the subject’s personal experience in the 
encounter. As Williams claims in his 1928 essay “French Painting: The Embodiment of 
Knowledge,” all art involves a process of transformation that elevates the object to a 
creation: “How shall the multiplicity of a natural object, impossible to detail or 




completely encircle, be presented by pigment on canvas? . . . . For this is the flat of it: all 
painting is representation and cannot be anything else” (69). The artist views the object 
from a particular perspective and determines its form through his choice of 
representation.49 Thus, Williams’s poetics addresses more than the object alone, as 
Williams reminds us in the opening of the red wheelbarrow: “so much depends/ upon” 
that object based on the artist’s perspective.50   
Let me clarify that Williams himself does not employ the terminology of thing 
theory I have been using thus far, although he does make frequent references in the prose 
of Spring and All to both objects and things. More precisely, when he uses such words as 
“object” and “thing,” he does not distinguish objects as physical materials in the world 
and things as their poetic transformation. Nevertheless, he experiences the material world 
as made anew by the imagination. For consistency, I will maintain the distinction I have 
been applying throughout this project in referring to objects as the actual materials in the 
world and things as their resulting poetic creations. In the case of Williams, however, it is 
clear that he conceives of two separate forms of the object: the original object the poet 
encounters in the world and a separate thing the artist creates through his representation. 
As he declares in Spring and All, “The only realism in art is of the imagination. It is only 
thus that the work escapes plagiarism after nature and becomes a creation” (I 111). To 
describe a mere physical object would be to render a “plagiarism after nature”; however, 
                                                 
49 In this essay, Williams makes little distinction between painters and writers, both of whom he notes are 
obligated “to represent” (Dijkstra, RI 70). Thus, he outlines a philosophy with direct application to his own 
poetry: “French painting from this viewpoint escaping the cliché of the predominant ism of the moment can 
be highly instructive to the writer—and has been for me.” For both painters and writers, pursuit of the 
object comes down to representation via “the same question of words and technique in their arrangement.”  
50 Geoffrey Galt Harpham discusses the thing, what he calls “an externalized version of identity, absorbing 
vague longings, momentary reflections, and fugitive impulses,” using Williams’s language of dependence 
as also a form of dependence upon the subject: “Much depends, of course, on the thing. And the very best 
things are products of human agency” (136). 




to capture the object through the imagination produces a new thing altogether—“a 
creation.”   
Thus, like the other poets in this dissertation, Williams does in fact transform 
objects into things, and, in the process, reveals a subject exploring his own conditions. In 
Williams’s poetics, the distinction between object and thing can be mapped onto his 
terminology of “local” and “universal,” since Williams advocates a form of local contact 
that will grant access to some universal realm. It may be useful to reconsider Miller’s 
notion of the “beautiful thing” here, for although Miller sees the object as separate from 
the subject, he does recognize within it an original, purified essence that the achieved act 
of naming can put on display. I agree that Williams remains conscious of the authority 
inherent in naming; nevertheless, I see his concept of the universal as one that depends 
upon the subject’s experience. The universal represents those experiences of humanity 
that the subject has a responsibility to convey. As we have seen in the work of Robert 
Frost and Marianne Moore, Williams’s creation of the thing marks a particular 
achievement of poetic authority, with the poet employing techniques that allow him to 
move from the local to the universal. Nevertheless, this process is neither easy nor 
certain, and Williams’s object poems often acknowledge the difficulties the poet faces in 
enacting this transformation. For Williams, the thing must be authentic to the subject’s 
local experience of contact but nonetheless provide proof of the object’s renewal, via the 
imagination, into the universal. As we will see in the work itself, Williams’s application 
of both concepts incorporates the subject’s individual experience of interaction. Thus, the 
local object, even in its universalized transformation, preserves the feelings, questions, 
desires, and anxieties generated through the subject’s contact. Further, Williams’s 




concept of the universal allows him to forge connections between the individual subject 
and broader humanity; in the process, he elevates the poet-figure as an essential cultural 
voice at this moment of modernity. At stake is the culture’s very transformation as 
Williams privileges the subject’s local experience to gain greater knowledge of the 
conditions in which he lives. At a moment distinguished by the subject’s isolation and 
fragmentation, Williams aims to inspire within his readers a communal sense that human 
experience can be universalized and shared. 
Spring and All (1923) is the book in which Williams most clearly demonstrates a 
concentration on objects, with the intent of renewing materials through their creative 
transformation. Composed in an early phase of his career, when Williams was still 
establishing his place among modern artists and poets, this book raises questions of 
epistemology and representation specifically through the artist’s interaction with the 
local—an approach Williams would maintain throughout his career and advocate most 
explicitly in Book I of his epic poem, Paterson (1946), in which he calls for “no ideas but 
in things” (6). Throughout Spring and All, Williams argues for the essential function of 
the imagination in the process of creating things. He sees his project as dedicated not only 
to outlining the imagination but also to demonstrating its potential: “To refine, to clarify, 
to intensify that eternal moment in which we alone live there is but a single force—the 
imagination. This is its book” (89). Williams praises the imagination as a means of 
transforming the object into art: “The imagination, drunk with prohibitions, has destroyed 
and recreated everything afresh in the likeness of that which it was. Now indeed men 
look about in amazement at each other with a full realization of the meaning of ‘art’” (I 
93). The imagination prompts the object’s change, although the resulting thing maintains 




its form as the “likeness of that which it was.” Yet, when the imagination is allowed to 
thrive, Williams states, “THE WORLD IS NEW” (95), because the imagination alters the 
subject’s recognition of the world. To put this in Brown’s terms, Williams’s language of 
destruction suggests that the poet must first strip the object of its “thingness”—all 
outdated meanings and associations—in order to reinvest it with meanings more 
authentic to the poet’s actual experience.51  
Spring and All also represents an important collection because of its unique 
structure as a book. In addition to the 27 sparse poems the work is most known for, it 
contains 18 sections of prose. One cannot fully read the poems without reading them 
against, or often through, ideas punctuated in the prose. The textual history of Spring and 
All sheds light on the relationship between its poetry and prose. Although the pieces were 
originally published together, this initial French publication in 1923 had a run of only 300 
copies—many of which, as Paul Mariani notes, were confiscated by customs en route to 
the U.S. The two parts were not reprinted together until the 1970 New Directions 
Imaginations.52 Thus, given that Spring and All did not exist in its current (and original) 
textual form throughout most of the twentieth century, it is little surprise that critics have 
often failed to read the poetry against the prose. Critics initially dismissed the value of the 
prose, most prominently Marjorie Perloff, who has called Williams’s prose accounts of 
                                                 
51 Miller identifies a similar process of object purification; yet, he does not read the created thing as 
revealing the subject’s investment of new ideas, associations, or meanings.  
52 When I cite from Spring and All throughout this chapter, I use the 1970 version in Imaginations, since it 
is the most widely-available replica of the 1923 text. Further, the 1970 version is remarkably consistent 
with the original version, incorporating all of the typographical variations that Williams included in his 
original text. As Williams described in I Wanted to Write a Poem: 
It was written when all the world was going crazy about typographical form and is really a 
travesty on the idea. Chapter headings are printed upside down on purpose, the chapters are 
numbered all out of order, sometimes with a Roman numeral, sometimes with an Arabic, anything 
that came in handy . . . But the poems were kept pure—no typographical tricks when they 
appear—set off in prose. They are numbered consistently; none had titles though they were to 
have titles later… (36-37)    




his prosodic technique “confusing and contradictory” (160). Yet, more recently critics 
have begun to look at what Linda Welshimer Wagner calls the text’s “unity of design” in 
arguing for the importance of the prose in any final assessment of the book. I pick up on 
this very concept of the book’s unity in arguing that the poetry and prose are dependent 
upon one another for a complete assessment of Williams’s goals.  For while Williams 
intends the poems to demonstrate the full potential of the imagination—to render the 
thing in a manner that makes it a universally-accessible experience for poet and reader 
alike—the surrounding prose often delineates the poet’s thoughts about this process; the 
prose helps reveal both his goals for the imagination, as well as the poems’ potential 
failures in achieving them. Thus, the prose becomes a means to evaluate the ideas 
Williams invests in things as he elevates objects from their particular conditions to their 
universal essence.  
It is on this very point, of the local object transformed into some universal quality, 
that Williams reveals his particular preoccupation with the poet’s function. As Williams 
enacts the object’s change, he promotes a form of contact with the material world that can 
elevate the local object to some realm of more universally-shared knowledge. While 
throughout his career he frequently affirms his commitment to the local,53 Williams also 
aspires to grant the reader access to a universal realm of experience—a place he describes 
in Spring and All, rather abstractly, as “the fourth dimension . . . the endlessness of 
knowledge” (I 139). The very difficulty of this task—of representing the object in a 
                                                 
53 Paterson (1946) represents the culmination of this philosophy, about which Williams noted in a 1951 
“Statement by William Carlos Williams About the Poem Paterson”: “The thing was to use the multiple 
facets which a city presented as representatives for comparable facets of contemporary thought thus to be 
able to objectify the man himself as we know him and love him and hate him. . . . Thus the city I wanted as 
my object had to be one that I knew in its most intimate details” (xiii). 




manner that is both local and universal—marks a tension over poetic function, which, for 
Williams, has a great deal at stake.  
The pursuit of the universal allows the poet to forge connections that may alter the 
culture’s knowledge of itself. Although Williams undoubtedly invests multiple meanings 
in his creation of things, I am most interested in those that render the thing a marker of 
actual human experience, a record of individual human contact. As Williams promotes a 
more conscious subject-object connection, he pursues similar relations with the reader, 
with whom, he claims, “in the imagination, we are henceforth (so long as you read) 
locked in a fraternal embrace, the classic caress of author and reader. We are one. 
Whenever I say, ‘I’ I mean also, ‘you’” (I 88). Even as Williams attends to local 
experience, he is working to transcend this realm and connect the subject with things 
beyond itself. At this particular moment in the early-twentieth century, Williams’s 
concepts of the local and universal reflect a desire to acknowledge human experience and 
promote human contact, and thus reduce the sense of isolation facing the modern subject.   
The Spring and All poem numbered “XXIV” encapsulates the ideas of human 
contact that are at stake for Williams. The poem begins: 
The leaves embrace 
in the trees 
 




I do not  
 
seek a path 
I am still with 
 
Gipsy lips pressed  
to my own—   (142-143) 





Williams acknowledges the world as separate from any individual’s personality; in its 
“wordless” state, the world exists without the limitations of any single meaning imposed 
through the act of naming. Attaching words to things—and presenting poems that 
translate objects via language—is itself an act asserting individual personality and 
ownership. The first half of the poem suggests the “I” existing in the very “copresence” 
Miller describes: the “I” is “still” and blazes no individual path of its own, content merely 
to record the subject’s coexistence with objects along its path. Comparing subject-object 
contact to pressing “Gipsy lips” suggests that such contact has proven transient, 
impermanent, and unstable; subjects and objects intersect but find no permanent 
placement in each other.  
A shift occurs in the second half of the poem as the experience of the “I” becomes 
more prominent, and in a manner that illustrates the speaker’s individual experience of 
the object: 





or nettle, the kiss 
of oak leaves— 
 
He who has kissed 
a leaf 
 




a canopy of leaves 
 
and at the same time 
I descend 





for I do nothing  
unusual— 
 
I ride in my car 
I think about 
 
prehistoric caves 
in the Pyrenees— 
 
the cave of  
Les Trois Fréres  
     
Williams presents the interaction as an intense personal exchange, a “kiss” that does not 
irritate in the manner of poison ivy, but instead brings the subject into closer 
understanding of the leaves. He mentions that “he who has kissed/ a leaf,” or experienced 
a similar moment of exchange, may understand this feeling of “ascension,” of reaching 
some universal knowledge, though Williams refrains from making explicit what this 
knowledge actually is. But Williams does not dwell in act of ascension, promptly turning 
to the fact that the speaker “descends” (in much the same way Robert Frost does in 
“Birches”) and returns to his “usual” acts of driving about in his car. The poem has 
moved from the subject’s local experience of the object to universal knowledge of 
contact, and then back again to the subject’s experience in the local. We can see further 
evidence in the poem’s transition from third person to first person, from the general 
experience of “he” to that of the particular experience of “I.” Despite this shift, even in 
the final lines, the speaker is most concerned with achieving a universal realm that can 
communicate human experience well beyond the subject’s particular moment of 
existence. In the final image of the Cave of the Trois-Frères, whose prehistoric cave art 
dates back to 13,000 B.C., Williams compares his own effort to preserve and universalize 
the subject’s experience with that of prehistoric artists who undertook a similar project. 




Art, he reminds us, forges human connections because it serves as a record of human 
existence.54 Williams uses the leaves, then, both to mark the speaker’s individual 
interaction and to achieve some transformed universal knowledge. As things, the leaves 
convey meanings beyond their natural forms as objects and instead carry meanings about 
the subject’s experience.  
The Imagination: The Force of Renewal 
In the poems of Spring and All, Williams illustrates the process by which the 
subject’s local experience prompts his creation of a universal experience. For Williams, 
objects become things through the process of the imagination. His invocation of the 
“imagination” as integral for promoting access to “universal” realms certainly carries the 
sound of a neo-Romantic philosophy.55 And yet, my reading of Williams’s use of objects 
places him firmly in a modernist tradition, largely because, even as he aspires for contact, 
he is not interested in attaining some spiritual realm; instead, his very concept of the 
universal focuses on expanding the subject’s knowledge of its own experience. Further, 
Williams’s concept of the universal does not move into a realm of abstraction, but 
remains grounded in the concrete material details of things.  
  Williams’s imagination diverges from what Samuel Coleridge describes as “a 
power which when employed on the works of the Creator elevates and by the variety of 
its pleasures almost monopolizes the soul. We see our God everywhere—the Universe in 
                                                 
54 We saw Marianne Moore make a similar gesture toward the universal potential of art in “When I Buy 
Pictures,” in which she locates objects that grant access to human experience predating her own. The poem 
suggests that the object’s transformation into art allows it to transcend history and thus fosters a human 
connection between subject and object.    
55 A large body of scholarship reads Williams as descending from a Romantic tradition in the line of 
Emerson and Whitman, including Carl Rapp’s William Carlos Williams and Romantic Idealism (1984), 
Albert Gelpi’s A Coherent Splendor (1987), and Donald Markos’s Ideas in Things (1994). Both Rapp and 
Markos engage the question of how Williams’s engagement with objects, specifically, promotes the 
imagination, with Rapp concluding that Williams’s objects become traditional receptacles for the poet’s 
emotional life, and Markos observing a view of organic harmony with the object world.  




the most literal Sense is his written language” (338-339). Coleridge’s imagination allows 
the artist to see God’s “written language” reflected in the physical world; poetry inspired 
by the imagination captures some divine essence of the object embedded by the Creator. 
Likewise, American Romantic Ralph Waldo Emerson defines the imagination as a higher 
form of perception that can recognize the spirituality residing in all things: 
This insight, which expresses itself by what is called Imagination, is a very 
high sort of seeing, which does not come by study, but by the intellect 
being where and what it sees, by sharing the path, or circuit of things 
through forms, and so making them translucid to others. The path of things 
is silent. Will they suffer a speaker to go with them? A spy they will not 
suffer; a lover, a poet, is the transcendency of their own nature, —him 
they will suffer. The condition of true naming, on the poet’s part, is his 
resigning himself to the divine aura which breathes through forms, and 
accompanying that. (“The Poet” 331-332) 
Like Coleridge, Emerson places the imagination as a cognitive power that can access 
some “divine aura” within the object. Emerson also describes the kind of the subject-
object interaction that allows such perception to gain force. The subject must “share the 
path” and “accompany” the object; he must transcend the boundaries of his own physical 
body and subjective mind to connect to the object’s “nature,” “path,” or “aura.” Naming 
in this type of contact—the subject’s complete merging with the object—involves the 
poet speaking not about the object as a form of external study but from some place within 
it. The subject must find a means of actually “being where and what it sees.” For one to 
classify Williams’s notion of the imagination as Romantic, we would expect it to reflect 




particular Romantic concepts, for example that the poet proves prophetic by naming the 
object’s divine qualities; or that the poet pursues complete submersion within the object, 
shedding intellectual, emotional, or physical experiences that would otherwise bind him 
to personal conditions. In the Romantic imagination, the poet transcends subjective 
limitations to achieve what Emerson calls “the condition of true naming” (“The Poet” 
332), whereby he can fully merge with and know the object’s divine essence.      
Williams’s imagination clearly differs from that of the Romantics. In Spring and 
All, he describes the imagination as a force that can reawaken man’s consciousness and 
inspire greater knowledge of the object world, and he specifies from the opening prose 
that such an experience will not “divorce” the poet “from life” but instead will “refine . . . 
clarify . . . and intensify that eternal moment in which we alone live” (I 89). Williams is 
aimed at expanding man’s intellect by illuminating the very conditions in which he lives. 
His reader, he states, “never knows and never dares to know what he is at the exact 
moment that he is. And this moment is the only thing in which I am at all interested” 
(89). Williams wants to enhance the subject’s awareness of its own conditions. As such, 
he eschews the language of religion, spirituality, or divinity, except to say that the 
imagination can be a “practical corrective” to help the poet “rediscover or replace 
demoded meanings to the religious terms” (100). Instead, he employs scientific 
metaphors, describing a force “comparable to electricity or steam”: “The imagination 
uses the phraseology of science. It attacks, stirs, animates, is radio-active in all that can 
be touched by action. Words occur in liberation by virtue of its processes” (149). The 
imagination generates activity through its reanimation of language—imbuing words with 
new life by liberating them from inherited associations and, in a sense, stripping them of 




stale aspects of “thingness.” As in science, this force pursues the creation of concrete 
facts, observable through their distinct conditions. Only then can Williams recreate the 
thing through the actual conditions of the subject’s contact. 
The poem titled “V” reveals Williams’s theory of the imagination as aimed at 
renewing objects into things; in this case, the object of the poem is the black wind he 
describes in the opening lines:  
Black winds from the north  
enter black hearts. Barred from 
 seclusion in lilies they strike 
 to destroy— 
Beastly humanity 
 where the wind breaks it— 
 
      Strident voices, that 
quickened, built of waves 
 
Drunk with goats or pavements 
 
Hate is of the night and the day 
 of flowers and rocks. (I 102) 
 
The poem presents several associations a reader may have of “black winds” that “strike to 
destroy” a dark, beastly vision of humanity—representations of destructive impulses. 
Yet, it is Williams that aims to destroy the stale associations, the “thingness” that has 
preceded the winds and given readers preexisting notions of what this symbol may 
represent. He claims, “Nothing/ is gained by saying the night breeds/ murder—It is the 
classical mistake.” Rejecting existing associations, he focuses instead on the subject’s 
sensual and physical contact with the wind: “There is nothing in the twist/ of the wind 
but—dashes of cold rain” (103). The poet must not rely on the “crude symbolism” 
Williams has warned against in the preceding prose section; he turns to actual experience. 
Yet, the linguistic play on “dashes of cold rain” following an actual dash suggests that 




Williams is also aware of the deeply constructed nature of the representation. And, in 
fact, after he describes the winds alongside “submarine vistas/ purple and black fish 
turning/ among undulant seaweed—”, he shifts into consideration of the subject’s 
emotional experience:  
Black wind, I have poured my heart out 
to you until I am sick of it— 
 
Now I run my hand over you feeling 
 the play of your body—the quiver 
 of its strength— 
 
The grief of the bowmen of Shu 
 moves nearer—There is 
 an approach with difficulty from 
 the dead—the winter casing of grief 
 
Here, the subject observing the wind reveals himself as anything but emotionally-
detached. We learn that the previous outpouring has been deeply personal; even his 
feelings towards “black hearts,” “beastly humanity,” and “hate” reflect the subject’s 
emotional state.  As the speaker acknowledges emotional aspects of his experience, he 
again describes his physical engagement with the object—a hand touching the wind and 
feeling its shuddering strength. This description, in turn, sparks another personal 
association: the image of quivering wind generates an allusion to Pound’s “Song of the 
Bowmen of Shu,” in which the speaker there describes the weapons of war: “the generals 
have ivory arrows/ and quivers ornamented with fish-skin” (Pound, SP 50). Williams has 
likened the sharp force of the wind to arrows of war. The speaker of Pound’s poem is a 
Chinese army commander vocalizing his grief and longing over the displacement of war: 
“When we set out, the willows were drooping with spring,/ We come back in snow,/ We 
go slowly, we are hungry and thirsty,/ Our mind is full of sorrow, who will know of our 




grief?” We find that through Williams’s study of the wind, his poem has been focused on 
a similar exploration of grief as Pound’s “Song.” The emotional undercurrent of “V,” we 
come to realize, has been the subject’s own experience of grief—the destructive anger it 
produces, the sense of despair over the conditions of humanity, the inevitability of hate 
that, only with the passage of time, tempers into acceptance of grief’s costs. The 
imagination has renewed the object by stripping it of previous associations and then 
investing in it the personal emotions marking the subject’s encounter. In the final lines, 
Williams admits, “How easy to slip/ into the old mode, how hard to/ cling firmly to the 
advance—.” Here, he acknowledges a preoccupation with his ability to generate a truly 
transformative poetics. Although the “advance” is a purely poetic experience—since 
poems “advance” from one line to the next—the concluding dash suggests that Williams 
remains hesitant and uncertain about this very poetic function. Can the poem advance in 
the way the poet intends? Even as he has sought to strip the object of associations and to 
privilege the subject’s actual experience, Williams finds himself relying upon certain 
common—and universalizing—ideas and techniques. Even as the poet “clings” to his 
advance, his task of reinvigorating language proves to be anything but simple.        
Williams’s form of object study stands to grant the subject a higher vision of his 
relations to the surrounding world: 
Imagination is not to avoid reality, nor is it description nor an evocation of 
objects or situations, it is to say that poetry does not tamper with the world 
but moves it—It affirms reality most powerfully and therefore, since 
reality needs no personal support but exists free from human action as 




proven by science in the indestructibility of matter and of force, it creates 
a new object, a play, a dance which is not a mirror up to nature but— 
 As birds’ wings beat the solid air without which none could fly so 
words freed by the imagination affirm reality by their flight  
(149-150) 
Language is “freed by the imagination” so the subject can reinvest in it new meanings; 
the renewed object becomes a new universalized thing that can soar like a bird taking 
flight, no longer tethered to the subject’s local point of contact. Williams speaks of this 
turn, from local object to universal thing, as a form of “cleavage”: “the jump from prose 
to the process of the imagination” (133). The word “cleavage” here proves significant, for 
while a cleavage is a division, the word “cleave” also means to cling. Williams represents 
this move from the local to the universal as a form of division, but also one attained by 
remaining close to the local experience. Tellingly, he cites Edgar Allan Poe as a model of 
“the first American poet [who] had to be a man of great separation—with close identity 
to life” (111). Although this description may initially seem contradictory—a poet who is 
both separated from worldly conditions and yet closely identified with them—it reflects 
the conflicting impulse I have identified in Spring and All as Williams seeks to represent 
individual experience and render it universal. He wants a poetry that can take flight, but 
nonetheless resonate with readers through its close “identity to life.”  
In fact, Williams pursues a poetics that can accomplish both tasks. This apparent 
contradiction relates back to the very criticism scholars such as Douglas Mao and Lori 
Merish raised in their critique of Brown’s “thing theory.” Like Brown, Williams seems to 
believe the thing can grant access to some transnational and transcultural form of 




knowledge, un-tethered from the particular subject’s experience. And yet, for Williams, 
as we have seen, local objects cannot be stripped of subjective meanings in their 
transformation into universal things; such a move would rid things of the very humanity 
Williams wants them to communicate. Instead, Williams seeks trans-historical 
knowledge of the universal through culturally-and-historically specific details of the 
local. In this move, he suggests that the emotional experiences binding humanity are 
more common than one might think. Thus, his poetics strives to communicate human 
knowledge and emotion, thereby promoting a more conscious recognition of human 
experience.   
“The local is the only universal”56: Transforming the local object into a  
universal thing  
I have thus far examined what is at stake for Williams in his concept of the 
universal, but it is also critical to understand why he advocates local contact as the best 
means of achieving the universal. In various writings, including letters, essays and his 
Autobiography, Williams discusses art focused on the “local” as that which represents the 
artist’s conscious interaction with his environment. Thus, Williams’s advocacy of the 
“local” is not about focusing on objects one finds in a local landscape (although this does 
tend to occur in the process), but is rather about exploring the artist’s experience within 
this landscape. Louis Simpson affirms this point in focusing on the human aspects of 
experience that get invested in Williams’s concept: “The word ‘local’ may be misleading. 
It doesn’t mean Rutherford, nor even America—it means experience, of which sensory 
experience is primary—. . . . This is how locality comes in, but the emphasis isn’t on the 
                                                 
56 Williams cites this quote from John Dewey in his Autobiography: “John Dewey had said (I discovered it 
quite by chance), ‘The local is the only universal, upon that all art builds’” (391).  




locality; it is on the experience” (257). The local is not a form of regionalism advocating 
the artist’s connection to a particular place; instead, it represents the need to “ground” 
any experience in a given place.57 Simpson expounds, “Therefore it appears that when 
Williams argues for the local he means the artist’s sensory experience rooted in place—
not merely staying in one place” (259). Simpson cites Williams’s own claims in the essay 
“The Work of Gertrude Stein,” in which he defines the local as “the sense of being 
attached with integrity to actual experience” (Williams, SE 118). For Williams, the 
“local” represents a mode of interaction with outside objects that is less about the objects 
themselves than the artist’s experience of them—the questions they raise for him in a 
moment in time, the mental or sensual responses he ponders in determining his 
relationship to them.  
As Williams states in Spring and All, the poet can “be there to enjoy, to taste, to 
engage the free world . . .  with which he has bitter and delicious relations and from 
which he is independent—moving at will from one thing to another—as he please, 
unbound—complete” (121). This experience of contact allows the subject to remain 
distinct from the object, free to engage and withdraw, and responsible only to his own 
enhanced understanding of the experience. The resulting thing records his exploration of 
                                                 
57 Williams uses the word “ground” in In the American Grain (1925) as he argues for greater understanding 
of the fundamental values that have shaped the nation’s character from the beginning. He promotes his 
reader’s awareness of this history, claiming “That unless everything that is, proclaim a ground on which it 
stand, it has no worth; and that what has been morally, aesthetically worth while in America has rested 
upon peculiar and discoverable ground” (109). The implications of this effort, for Williams, have to do with 
the subject’s awareness of its own moral and cultural inheritance: 
It is an extraordinary phenomenon that Americans have lost the sense, being made up as 
we are, that what we are has its origin in what the nation in the past has been; that there is 
a source in AMERICA for everything we think or do; that morals affect the food and 
food the bone, and that, in fine, we have no conception at all of what is meant by moral, 
since we recognize no ground our own—and that rudeness rests all upon the unstudied 
character of our beginnings.  
“Ground” in the above passages represents, both, the foundational moral qualities that have determined the 
nation’s progress and the very process by which Williams will locate such characteristics: by mining the 
physical ground of the New World.    




questions, anxieties, desires, and other conditions distinguishing his interaction with the 
“ground.” The diminished importance of the object itself becomes significant when you 
consider the kinds of objects Williams frequently addresses in Spring and All: non-
distinct natural objects such as leaves, trees, wind, moonlight, or flowers; or seemingly 
insignificant objects such as a piece of candy, a paper box, apartment furniture, a 
wheelbarrow—materials he describes in one well-known poem as strewn “about the edge 
of refuse” that nonetheless allow him to strive toward “the universality of things” (I 117-
118). What matters about the object, for Williams, is not the kind of object with which 
the subject interacts, but rather its representation of actual local contact. 
In “French Painting,” Williams affirms his support of the artist’s individual, 
concrete and local experience of the object: 
What does exist, and in heightened intensity for the artist is the impression 
created by the shape and color of an object before him in his sensual 
being—his whole body (not his eyes) his body, his mind, his memory, his 
place: himself—that is what he sees—And in America—escape it he 
cannot—it is an American tree. 
 Render that in pigment and he asserts his own existence and that of 
men about him—he becomes prophet and seer—so far as he is wholly 
worthy to be so. (72) 
Williams echoes here his by-now-familiar sentiments about the importance of local 
contact that allows the poet to define a uniquely “American tree.”58 Significant here, as 
                                                 
58 For Williams, the national implications of this type of contact were paramount for advancing an 
American artistic tradition. In starting the magazine Contact with Robert McAlmon in 1920, he promoted 
native artists who could give voice to multiple experiences of contact with the American landscape. 
Although Contact had irregular publications from December 1920 through July 1923, Williams’s work as 




well, is his emphasis on a larger form of contact, which can inspire connection to the 
“men about him,” or the broader culture in which the artist lives. The resulting thing 
expresses universal experiences of a culture. These notions certainly carry Romantic 
implications regarding the poet’s function as a prophet who can benefit his peer’s 
perception of themselves, their landscapes, and nation. But the “universal” aspects with 
which readers can identify are the human experiences of interaction. For this reason, 
Williams warns readers not to discount the local as too provincial or parochial: 
It is because we confuse the narrow sense of parochialism in its limiting 
implication, that we fail to see the complement of the same: that the local 
in a full sense is the freeing agency to all thought, in that it is everywhere 
accessible to all: not in the temple, of a class, but for every place where 
men have eyes, brains, vigor and the desire to partake with others of that 
same variant in other places which unites us all—if we are able. (71)  
Focusing on local experience as a process of object interaction can provide access to 
universal forms of experience, the “eyes, brains, vigor” Williams cites above, across 
cultures and even generations. As he states in his essay on “Kenneth Burke,” “One has to 
learn what the meaning of the local is, for universal purposes. The local is the only thing 
that is universal. . . . The classic is the local fully realized, words marked by a place” (SE 
132). By “fully realizing” one’s experience in the localities of place, one can gain a form 
of knowledge that is universal. In Spring and All, Williams describes this experience as 
                                                                                                                                                 
editor overlapped, for at least some periods, with his composition of Spring and All. In the hieroglyphics of 
a new speech: Cubism, Stieglitz, and the Early Poetry of William Carlos Williams (1969), Bram Dijkstra 
posits that Williams’s ideas on contact were inspired by American visual artists, in particular photographer 
Alfred Stieglitz who presented a focus on objects in Camera Work and 291, as well as the short-lived The 
Seven Arts. Stieglitz promoted the object as thing-unto-itself—and a uniquely American thing at that—as 
well as a thing through which the artist could capture his emotional experience. This dual focus on the 
object through both an objective and subjective lens is something we find in Williams’s work, as well. 
 




“an enlargement before great or good [art] work, an expansion” that “gives the feeling of 
completion by revealing the oneness of experience” (I 107). A reader may recognize his 
own emotions reflected in the work of art; but more so, representation can inspire a 
reader to recognize even previously-unconscious aspects of existence. The thing becomes 
a reflection of emotion, as well as a catalyst for emotional recognition. As Bram Dijkstra 
points out, “Objects, in this manner, became a link between the person and universal 
states of being, the means whereby the person, through the mediating work of the artist, 
came to recognize the nature and universality of his own emotions” (RI 7).  
Williams’s concept of the local elevates the poet’s individual experience and thus 
seems to demand less of the “continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of 
personality” (53) T.S. Eliot advocates in “Tradition and the Individual Talent.” There, 
Eliot claims that poetry “is not the expression of personality, but an escape from 
personality,” although he acknowledges that “of course, only those who have personality 
and emotions know what it means to want to escape from these things” (58). The poem 
must present what he calls “significant emotion, emotion which has its life in the poem 
and not in the history of the poet” (59). He continues, “The emotion of art is impersonal. 
And the poet cannot reach this impersonality without surrendering himself wholly to the 
work to be done.” The poet’s representation must universalize experience in order to 
make it “impersonal” and “significant”; by surrendering personal experience to the larger 
experience of the poem, he elevates that work to a place in “tradition.” For Williams, on 
the other hand, the local begins with the artist’s connection to his environment; to explore 
the local is to incorporate the emotional and sensual experiences that push the poem 
beyond mere observation. Williams requires a different kind of surrender in which the 




poet commits to articulating his unique experience of the object world. Yet, Williams, 
too, aspires for this more personal representation to prompt connection to universal 
realms or, perhaps more precisely, emotional experiences with which all readers can 
identify.  
Developing a clear distinction between the poetic theories of Williams and Eliot is 
important not only for outlining modernist trends, but also for understanding how 
Williams consciously positions himself against Eliot in pursuing a new notion of 
“culture.” In a May 5, 1944, letter to Horace Gregory, Williams frames his poetics as a 
direct response to Eliot’s notion of high culture as removed from the poet’s locality and 
rooted instead in intellectual institutions of literary tradition or Christianity: 
It is the poet who lives locally, and whose senses are applied no way else 
than locally to particulars, who is the agent and the maker of all culture. It 
is the poet’s job and the poet lives on the job, on the location. But if the 
head, the intellect, on which he rightfully calls for direction, contemns 
him, fails to leave a friendly channel open for him but blocks him off—
then dynamite is the only thing that will open that channel again. (SL 225-
226) 
Williams privileges the artist writing out of his local experience and particulars as the 
kind that will present a new form of “culture.” He distinguishes this more physically-
engaged experience from intellectual experience that disconnects the artist from actual 
contact with the world. The “dynamite” he calls for to reopen the channels of perception 
is the imagination—experience gained through consciousness, sensuous engagement, and 
emotional intensity. Williams further counters Eliot: “There has to be a recognition by the 




intellectual heads (Eliot among them) of the work-a-day local culture of the United 
States. In fact, there can be no general culture unless it is bedded, as he says, in a 
locality—something I have been saying for a generation: there is no universal except in 
the local” (224). Williams argues for a notion of culture that springs from the “work-a-
day” experiences of subjects. He makes a similar point in his Autobiography, again 
emphasizing the “particulars” of one’s experience as the catalyst for the universal: “That 
is the poet’s business. Not to talk in vague categories but to write particularly, as a 
physician works, upon a patient, upon the thing before him, in the particular to discover 
the universal” (391). Williams’s analogy of the doctor working intensely on a patient 
illustrates the physicality of this exchange, orchestrated through contact with an 
individual body and requiring the physician’s complete surrender to that interaction. This 
form of attentive care allows the poet to discover, and accordingly reveal, humanity; the 
poet-physician (two jobs held by Williams himself) offers the patient healing by 
providing access to universal knowledge of human existence. 
In a sense, then, Williams’s concept of the universal positions him more closely to 
Eliot’s philosophy than perhaps he might have thought. He outlines a use of objects that 
is similar to Eliot’s objective correlative, as Eliot defines that term: “a set of objects, a 
situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such 
that when external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the 
emotion is immediately evoked” (“Hamlet and His Problems” 101).59 As I described in 
                                                 
59 Admittedly, I am reading this connection between Williams and Eliot against Williams himself, who was 
vigorously outspoken in his disdain for Eliot’s poetics. His unfavorable opinion of Eliot’s The Waste Land 
(1922) is well known, a poem he describes in his Autobiography as “the great catastrophe to our letters” 
(146). With its emphasis on allusion and European tradition, Eliot’s poetics undermined the very essence of 
Williams’s focus on the local. Williams describes, “Critically Eliot returned us to the classroom just at the 
moment when I felt that we were on the point of an escape to matters much closer to the essence of a new 
art form itself—rooted in the locality which should give it fruit. I knew at once I was defeated” (174). 




my Introduction, Eliot’s goal is to universalize the poet’s emotion by shifting it away 
from the author’s personality and experience, and employing a more “objective” means 
of prompting the intended emotion within the reader. The objective correlative can 
represent the poet’s emotion, thus allowing the poet to resist expounding on feelings in 
the manner of the high Romantics. Yet, the poem must attain the realm of 
“universality”—for both Eliot and Williams—in order for the reader to forge a genuine 
connection. The universal becomes a means of accessing experiences that are common to 
poet and reader alike. So while Williams does not offer a precise definition of the 
universal—classifying it rather vaguely in Spring and All and “French Painting” as 
knowledge—it is clear that he intends this concept to incorporate aspects of human 
knowledge and emotion that can engender the reader’s identification and contact.      
Just as I pointed out in my earlier critique of Eliot, this process of choosing an 
objective correlative, or, in Williams’s case, of using the local object to access universal 
knowledge or emotion, is by no means an automatic process. It is Williams’s 
acknowledgment of this point, his struggle to create sparse poems that can meet these 
ambitious standards, that provide the locus point of preoccupation about his poetic 
function. The objects themselves, via the poet’s directed and self-conscious technical 
choices, become the best means through which to locate and explore such feelings. 
For example, in the poem numbered “IX” in Spring and All, objects become 
projections of the poet’s emotional state in a manner similar to objective correlatives. In 
this case, the poem details the subject’s experience of his affair with “O ‘Kiki’/ O Miss 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nevertheless, while Williams may have responded to Eliot’s scholarly turn by asserting an alternative 
poetics—and, indeed, published Spring and All the following year as the embodiment of that poetics—it 
does not preclude the possibility of similarities between both poets’ use of the object/objective correlative 
for granting the reader access to some embedded emotion.    




Margaret Jarvis” (I 113)—a disguised name for a nurse Williams worked with in 1907 at 
the New York French Hospital. The objects with which the lovers interact during the 
affair become witnesses to the experience: 
In my life the furniture eats me 
 
the chairs, the floor 
the walls 
which heard your sobs 
drank up my emotion— 
they which alone know everything 
 
and snitched on us in the morning— (113-114) 
Objects in the poem literally consume the subject; the furniture and walls soak up his 
emotional condition and stand to “snitch” details the poet otherwise leaves unarticulated. 
While Williams resists explaining his precise emotional experience, the objects reveal a 
tumultuous, passionate, and yet destructive relationship in which “windows, chairs” 
become “obscenely drunk, spinning—white, blue, orange—hot with our passion” (114). 
Even stable objects are destabilized amidst overwhelming emotions. The subject records 
“broken/ stockings, shoes, hairpins/ your bed, I wrapped myself round you”: he is just 
another damaged or strewn physical object his lover can display or discard, as one would 
an item of clothes. In another metaphor he claims, “I was your nightgown/ I watched!” as 
“you sobbed, you beat your pillow/ you tore your hair/ you dug your nails into your 
sides” (115). Despite the couple’s physical closeness, the speaker remains emotionally 
distant from Kiki; he can neither console her nor stop her anger and pain. Rather, he is 
left to watch “the broken pieces of the city—flying apart at his approaches// but I merely/ 
caress you curiously// fifteen years ago…” In a poem in which the speaker expresses a 
sense of alienation and powerlessness amidst such intense emotions, in which he himself 




has been likened to a mere object (the nightgown) with little human agency, it proves 
significant that Williams begins the poem with the question, “What about all this 
writing?” What can the writing accomplish fifteen years later when the poet can merely 
“caress [the experience] curiously”? Kiki remains a mystery, a lover the subject could 
never emotionally penetrate or understand.  Exploring this intense experience, in 
hindsight, through a catalog of physical objects allows the subject, with some measure of 
critical distance, to communicate emotions he himself seems not to have yet resolved. 
Throughout, Kiki remains intangible, both to Williams and the reader, even as the poem 
reveals the couple’s intense emotional history. The objects remain limited in how much 
of the speaker’s feelings they can communicate, but a universal experience is nonetheless 
on display: the speaker’s confusion, nostalgia, isolation and curiosity in the aftermath of a 
tumultuous affair now stilled—in all its destabilized and dizzying details—into memory.       
In other writings Williams seems to recognize, as we saw in “O Kiki,” that poetry 
may be limited in the knowledge it can convey; nevertheless, he still considers it the 
optimal medium to pursue contact with the local and, in turn, the universal. As he wrote 
in an April 12, 1950, letter, “The poem … is an attempt, an experiment, a failing 
experiment, toward assertion with broken means but an assertion, always, of a new and 
total culture, the lifting of an environment to expression . . . . The poem … is the 
assertion that we are alive as ourselves—as much of the environment as it can grasp” (SL 
286). The poet can assert “a new a total culture” by elevating the subject’s individual 
existence (“we are alive as ourselves”) and granting humanity greater self-knowledge. 
But Williams is also aware of the subject’s potential limitations in expressing knowledge, 
for there may only be so much “of the environment as [the subject] can grasp.” Here, we 




find the roots of a tension manifested in the juxtaposing poetry and prose of Spring and 
All between what the poem aspires to do in forging universal communication and what it 
can actually deliver. This preoccupation explains Williams’s need in the prose to assert a 
clear agenda for the imagination and thus for poetry itself, which he claims “has to do 
with … the perfection of new forms as additions to nature” (140).  
In fact, Williams establishes clear goals for both the poetry and prose: 
prose has to do with the fact of an emotion; poetry has to do with the 
dynamization of emotion into a separate form. This is the force of the 
imagination.  
prose: statement of facts concerning emotions, intellectual states, data of 
all sorts—technical expositions, jargon, of all sorts—fictional and other— 
poetry: new form dealt with as reality itself   (I 133) 
While Williams’s language often falls into abstractions in the prose—accounting for the 
difficulty one may have in reconciling his commitment to renew language with his use of 
abstractions such as “local,” “universal,” “reality,” and “science”—he reserves poetry as 
a space in which to reanimate language and, in the process, renew the reader’s 
perception. This process creates a “new form” altogether; the resulting thing becomes a 
new “fact” that supersedes its existence as an actual object: “It is the jump from prose to 
the process of the imagination that is the next great leap of intelligence—from 
simulations of present experience to the facts of the imagination” (133-134). Certainly, 
these claims seem to support J. Hillis Miller’s idea of the poem as elevated to its own 
existence, residing in some realm that is “a space both subjective and objective, a region 
of copresence in which anywhere is everywhere, and all times are one” (Miller 288). If 




poetry, via the imagination, fosters the creation of things so they become new forms of 
reality, this realm may appear to exist beyond the life of the poet who has enacted the 
creations. However, in the case of Spring and All, the poems spring from the same 
subject advocating in the prose a relationship to objects that can capture authentic human 
experience. It is helpful to recall that Williams’s concept of the universal differs from 
Miller’s notion of the “beautiful thing” precisely because he does not pursue some 
essence of the object that is pre-social, pre-linguistic, or pre-human. Instead, what the 
poems often reveal is a poet struggling to reconcile divergent impulses: to capture the 
particular, local experiences of a subject, but also to reveal some universal essence of 
knowledge that can inspire human contact beyond that individual subject.  
 The poems of Spring and All reflect this tension over precisely when, and how, 
the local becomes the universal, in part, because Williams’s treatment of objects 
emphasizes less the process of the object’s transformation than it does the result—the 
thing. If we compare this focus to that in Robert Frost’s “The Generations of Men,” 
discussed in Chapter One, it becomes clear why readers such as Miller have identified 
Williams’s objects as residing in a realm unto themselves, disconnected from the speaker. 
In Frost’s poem, a man and woman sit around a cellar hole, and through their dialogue, 
model the very process by which subjects project versions of meaning onto encountered 
objects. The poem stages a metanarrative illustrating the object transformation and 
involving the exploration of imagination, myth, allusion, description, metaphor, and 
phonetic linguistic play. Williams, however, tends to elide the process by which his 
speakers jump into the imagination; instead, he often renders the object in some 
descriptive form (as we saw in the red wheelbarrow poem), but in a manner that leaves 




out an explicit narrative of the subject’s encounter.  Rather, the way the object comes into 
being as a thing—or takes on particular ideas and meanings for the speaker—is 
documented through more subtle techniques in form of the poem itself, such as the poet’s 
word choice, syntax, enjambment, and other technical arrangements. Less intent on 
capturing the speaker’s personality, Williams’s poems nonetheless record the subject’s 
experience of interaction, illustrating how the subject invests particular meanings in the 
object’s transformation. 
 A useful poem to illustrate Williams’s approach to this transformation is the 
untitled poem beginning, “The rose is obsolete” (later titled “The Rose”) (I 107). Based 
on the Juan Gris painting Flowers (1914), the poem does not explore contact with an 
actual rose, but rather with another artist’s rendering of that object. Although we have 
seen Marianne Moore make a regular practice of examining objects that are, in fact, art 
objects already representing transformed “things,” this is not a common technique in 
Spring and All. Williams’s explicit consideration of the act of representation proves 
significant here, as he explores how the artist makes meaning through the artistic process. 
Williams examines the rose, in part, for its preexisting value as a thing he must renew. 
Thus, he must first deconstruct the object’s “thingness”—and the associations it carries in 
existing art—in order to explore more actual experiences of meaning. In the prose section 
preceding the poem, Williams explains his fondness for Gris as an artist who 
encapsulates a “modern trend”: “the attempt is being made to separate things of the 
imagination from life, and obviously, by using the forms common to experience so as not 
to frighten the onlooker away but to invite him” (107). Like Gris, Williams wants his 
universal thing to transcend local experience, but to do so in a way that promotes the 




reader’s connection. He later credits Gris with focusing on “Things with which he is 
familiar, simple things—at the same time [detaching] them from ordinary experience to 
the imagination” (110).  
This attention to detaching the object from its local or “ordinary” experience helps 
explain Williams’s habit of defamiliarizing the reader’s contact by examining the object 
through fragmentation and irregular syntax. Through such techniques he pushes the 
reader to find new meanings beyond the object’s preexisting associations of symbolic or 
use value. Williams announces this aim in the opening lines:           
The rose is obsolete 
but each petal ends in 
an edge, the double facet 
cementing the grooved 
columns of air—The edge 
cuts without cutting 
meets—nothing—renews 
itself in metal and porcelain— 
 
Whither? It ends— (107) 
 
Describing the rose, first, as “obsolete,” Williams acknowledges it as an outmoded 
symbol containing pre-existing “illusions”—a term he defines in the prose as resulting 
“where ignorance of the bystander confuses imagination and its works with cruder 
processes.” Instead, Williams presents the rose through the actual conditions in which he 
finds it; through this more authentic depiction the object “renews/ itself.” Thus, Williams 
suggests that objects can be re-examined to find new qualities of meaning: 
But if it ends 
the start is begun 
so that to engage roses 
becomes a geometry— 
 
Sharper, neater, more cutting 
figured in majolica— 




the broken plate 
glazed with a rose 
 
Somewhere the sense  
makes copper roses 
steel roses— (108)     
     
Williams’s mention here of geometry is significant, since geometry is a branch of 
mathematics dealing with relationships between bodies in space. It seeks to gather the 
measurements and forms of objects through the deduction of certain assumed properties. 
But geometry of any space, whether finite or indefinite, remains about point of view and 
perspective point. Here, Williams suggests a process of studying the object’s form, its 
relation in space, in order to gain fuller understanding of its properties; the artist can only 
embark on such a question from the particular vantage point of his contact. Thus, 
Williams records the relation of the rose to the other objects in the painting, the 
earthenware plate that appears “glazed with a rose” because of the placement that blurs 
the objects together.  
At this point, the description becomes less about the actual rose (as depicted in 
Gris’s painting) than what the poet’s “sense/ makes” of the object: a rose that appears as 
copper, only to be transformed into steel. Williams then embarks on an exploration of the 
main association the object carries:  
The rose carried weight of love 
but love is at an end—of roses 
 
If is at the edge of the 
petal that love waits 
 
Crisp, worked to defeat 
laboredness—fragile 
plucked, moist, half-raised 
cold, precise, touching  (108) 
   




The rose as a symbol often carries ideas of love, but here Williams announces that love 
“is at an end—of roses”—in other words, his thing does not inherently contain love, 
although love may exist “at the edge of the/ petal,” or may still be projected onto the rose 
from the outside. The dash in this line suggests that any association between love and 
roses has been unnaturally—though intentionally—conjoined; Williams has now 
separated this idea through the visual break. Having stripped the object of its “thingness,” 
Williams goes on to explore its actual conditions, as depicted by Gris. In doing so, he 
acknowledges the “laboredness” of the thing, the rose as a construction that has been 
“plucked” and “half-raised.” Williams studies intersections between Gris’s rose and the 
surrounding objects in the painting and finds the rose “precise” and “cold” in its relation.  
However, in the final stanzas Williams moves beyond geometric description of 
the object’s physical properties and relations and begins to consider more metaphysical 
values. In particular, he focuses on the object’s permanence and strength, revealing the 
qualities this speaking subject is most concerned about: 
The place between the petal’s 
edge and the  
 
From the petal’s edge a line starts 
that being of steel 
infinitely fine, infinitely 
rigid penetrates 
the Milky Way 
without contact—lifting 
from it—neither hanging 
nor pushing—  (108-109) 
 
Williams reaches an impasse in his exploration of the rose’s geometry; he cannot 
articulate what exists between the petal’s edge and the surrounding landscape, in part 
because the painting’s representation does not extend there. As we saw in “Portrait of the 




Artist,” he preserves the poet’s frustrations in the poetic space, revealing the challenge of 
authoritatively delineating the rose’s relation to other things. Beyond the object’s status 
as a painted image, Williams seems to be asking, how does it inspire contact with the 
larger universe? How does it forge connections beyond itself? What is “hanging”—or 
“depending”—on it? The description conveys an interest in the rose’s permanence and 
strength: the external form of the rose, the lines that mark its boundaries, become lines of 
steel penetrating into space. It again proves significant that Williams considers such ideas 
about the larger uses of art through an object already made permanent in Gris’s painting. 
Nevertheless, although Williams celebrates the potential of art, qualities of strength and 
permanence are not certainties of the artist’s process. Williams ends the poem 
commenting on the rose’s vulnerability, rather than its power or force: “The fragility of 
the flower/ unbruised/ penetrates space.” He recognizes the rose as fragile and fleeting; in 
classifying it as unbruised, Williams suggests awareness of an inevitable, forthcoming 
state of bruising and decay. These fragilities evoke the rose in Moore’s “Roses Only,” 
whose self-protective thorns serve as the catalyst for the object’s transformation. In 
Moore’s poem, the poet gains possession by recognizing the thorns as a form of armor 
that can mask vulnerabilities and allow the poet to gain a stance of authoritative distance. 
In Williams’s poem, even as he recognizes human concerns over vulnerability and 
impermanence (conditions over which the rose itself would not be preoccupied), the 
fleeting object becomes a complete and permanent thing through which others can now 
access to its potential universality. Here, we see Williams, like Moore, taking up issues of 
poetic authority in the achieved thing.  




Ultimately, the poem demonstrates the very process by which Williams has 
enacted the object’s transformation: by engaging in geometric study and consideration; 
by stripping the object of previous associations and attending to its actual conditions; and 
by resolving certain poetic preoccupations inherent in the representation. Although the 
rose, for some, may still be about love, the speaker’s engagement reveals his concerns 
over its impermanence and fragility, even as he uses language to categorize it as copper, 
steel, metal, and porcelain. This concentration relates back to Williams’s sense of his 
poetic function and his concern with transforming the fleeting local encounter into 
something permanent and universal. In fact, we find, he has staged this very conflict in 
his consideration of the rose. The universal emotion conveyed in the final lines is an 
elegiac impulse that recognizes vulnerability and decline, particularly in the face of a 
vast, overwhelming universe, and yet pursues art as the means of overcoming these 
conditions. In the end, even the speaker’s “cold” geometric gaze upon the object has 
brought him to invest a deeply human response in the thing.     
Another poem illustrating a tension between objectivity and subjectivity in the 
subject’s transition between local and universal experience, is the poem numbered “X” 
(later titled “The Eyeglasses”), which addresses more directly the act of perception. 
Williams begins by informing the reader that the “universality of things” has propelled 
the speaker’s act of observation:  
The universality of things 
draws me toward the candy 
with melon flowers that open 
 
about the edge of refuse 
proclaiming without accent 
the quality of the farmer’s  
 




shoulders and his daughter’s 
accidental skin, so sweet 
with clover and the small 
 
yellow cinquefoil in the  
parched places. It is  
this that engages the favorable 
 
distortion of eyeglasses  
that see everything and remain 
related to mathematics— (117-118) 
 
Just as Williams described in his praise of Juan Gris, this speaker focuses on simple, 
ordinary objects encountered in the landscape—a piece of candy thrown upon the ground, 
a humble farmer and his daughter, a small yellow flower growing in a dried patch of dirt. 
These are objects made beautiful only in the artist’s representation, what Williams calls 
“the favorable/ distortion of eyeglasses” that sees all and yet “remain[s]/ related to 
mathematics.” His attention again to mathematics suggests his desire to achieve an 
objective gaze that can recognize in local objects their optimal redemptive (and 
universalizing) potential. Engaging objects through a mathematical perspective becomes 
closely related to the act of writing, given Williams’s abrupt interruption of a description 
of the eyeglass frames (the “practical frame/ of brown celluloid”) with the mention of “A 
letter from the man who/ wants to start a new magazine/ made of linen// and he owns a 
typewriter—/ July 1, 1922.” Although the existence of an actual letter cannot be known, 
this date corresponds with Williams’s own work as editor of Contact, the journal in 
which he was promoting the type of engaged local contact depicted in the poem. 
Williams goes on to remind readers that the poet’s enlightened perspective can promote 
enhanced vision of the landscape: “All this is for eyeglasses/ to discover.”  




Yet, the final lines of the poem have proven puzzling for readers and, in their 
opacity, illustrating the limitations—and even undesirability—of objectivity in the 
speaker’s presentation. Williams now describes the glasses, which he claimed above 
embody the ideal mathematical perspective, through a seemingly private and somewhat 
illogical metaphor alluding to Peru’s Lake Titicaca, a specific local ground: “But/ they lie 
there with the gold/ earpieces folded down// tranquilly Titicaca—.” After presenting a set 
of images at the poem’s start reflecting “the universality of things”—plain objects made 
dazzling in the poet’s thoughtful consideration—he now turns to an image that is notable 
not for what it reveals about the glasses, but for the way it thwarts the readers’ access to 
any kind of clear meaning. Instead, we get a set of lines distinguished by their internal 
rhyme and alliteration, and a final image that betrays little more than, perhaps, the 
speaker’s personal associations with the locality of one of South America’s largest lakes 
or his affinity for a certain phonetic pattern of sounds in this “jump” into the imagination 
(“tranquilly Titicaca”). The poem embodies, once again, the tension between the poet’s 
individual experience of, and response to, the local, versus his goals for achieving some 
realm of the universal. The reader is left, ultimately, with a chance to consider the impact 
of both concepts. The mathematical precision of the poem’s early descriptions allows the 
reader to recognize significant qualities of beauty and vulnerability within what may 
otherwise be forgettable objects. But the poem also succeeds by making the reader aware 
of the poet’s individual experience as he wrestles with language, memory, and 
perspective in his enormous task of “universalizing” local experience and transforming 
objects into things. 




 Ultimately, the poetics of Spring and All serve as an important example of a 
modernist poet exploring the subject’s relationship to the object to gain greater 
recognition of human experience. In the process, Williams exposes certain tensions over 
how the poet can render things to create universal forms of experience through which all 
readers can gain access. Whether Williams always succeeds in creating things that 
transcend local experience is something, as we have seen, even he would acknowledge 
can be debated. Certainly, his abstract concept of a “universal” makes it difficult to 
particularize about the universalizing values or “ideas” that come out of his specific 
localities. Nevertheless, Williams promotes this form of object contact—via the 
imagination—to alter the very priorities of his culture: to elevate human experience and 
inspire a communal sense that human emotions and conditions can be universalized and 
shared. Williams presents the poet as serving a vital function in this moment of the early 
twentieth century. Much like his American poetic Emerson and Walt Whitman, who both 
envision the poet as an essential national figure, Williams positions the poet as a “seer” 
whose enhanced perception can restore isolated modern subjects to a place of shared 
values; in the process, the poet can “[assert] his own existence and that of men about 
him” (“French Painting” 72). 





Chapter Four: “The Sequence of Disclosure”: The Truth Hidden in Things 
in George Oppen’s Discrete Series 
 
In his most-extensive essay on prosody, “The Mind’s Own Place” (1963), George 
Oppen reflects on “Modern American poetry” as a movement defined by its 
“determination to find the image, the thing encountered, the thing seen each day whose 
meaning has become the meaning and color of our lives” (30). Oppen acknowledges the 
power of “things” to shape the subject’s knowledge of itself and of modern existence. For 
Oppen, this trend reflects a new model of prosody: unlike previous generations of poets, 
for whom verse “had become a rhetoric of exaggeration, of inflation,” modern poetry was 
“to the modernists a skill of accuracy, or precision, a test of truth”—a movement 
eschewing false rhetorical devices in favor of concrete description: “The data was and is 
the core of what ‘modernism’ restored to poetry, the sense of the poet’s self among 
things. So much depends upon the red wheelbarrow” (32). Living “among things” 
demands an exploration of the subject’s relations to modern objects; in terms of poetics, 
this requires the poet to find new techniques that will grant access to the “truth” at the 
center of the “thing.” In depicting encounters with objects, the modern poet can test 
perception to gain what Oppen calls “that rare poetic quality of truthfulness.”   
While William Carlos Williams focuses on a poetics of things that can reveal 
some transcultural and transhistorical form of “universal” knowledge, Oppen explores 
things to expose a subject testing his relations to materials—relations he historicizes by 
evaluating the object through particular social and political conditions. And while 
Williams also uses the local particulars of contact to pursue universal truths, asserting the 
poet’s authority, via the imagination, to renew objects into things, Oppen proves more 




hesitant about the gains his form of object study can achieve. His technical 
experimentations with syntax frequently underscore the challenges of achieving some 
final “truth” over meaning. In contrast to Williams’s confidence in the universal, Oppen 
proves to be more pragmatic, recognizing that issues of language and perception, as well 
as certain modern conditions, may prevent the poet from transforming the object into a 
universal “thing” (in Bill Brown’s sense of that term) through which all readers can 
access some meaning. Oppen’s hesitations manifest his own preoccupation with poetic 
authority and the efficacy of poetry in a particular moment of modernity. Where a 
Williams poem may present the thing defined, foregoing a representation of the subject’s 
process of interaction and creation, Oppen instead addresses this very process, using the 
poem to test the subject’s relations to surrounding materials and thus examining the 
process by which subjects can come to know objects—and themselves. Oppen focuses 
less on the results of this process, the created “thing,” and more on the test itself. 
In this chapter, I focus on Oppen’s first book, Discrete Series (1934), a sequence 
of experimental poems featuring largely urban landscapes of San Francisco and New 
York. Oppen titled early drafts of the book “The 1930s,” suggesting his interest in 
recording the conditions of these landscapes in the midst of the Great Depression. After 
completing Discrete Series, he joined the Communist party and put down his pen for the 
next 24 years, investing instead in political activities. His extended silence suggests a 
sense of disillusionment over the value of art in the face of such extreme conditions. As 
he later wrote, “The catastrophe of human lives in the thirties…seemed to me to put 
poetry and the purposes of poetry in question” (SL 186). In 1968 Oppen elaborated in an 
interview with L.S. Dembo:  




I think it was fifteen million families that were faced with the threat of 
immediate starvation. It wasn’t a business one simply read about in the 
newspaper. You stepped out your door and found men who had nothing to 
eat. I’m not moralizing now—and I’ve been through this before—but for 
some people it was simply impossible not to do something. I’ve written an 
essay that appeared in Kulchur 1060 in which I explained that I didn’t 
believe in political poetry or poetry as being politically efficacious. I don’t 
even believe in the honesty of a man saying, “Well, I’m a poet and I will 
make my contribution to the cause by writing poems about it.” I don’t 
believe that’s any more honest than to make wooden nutmegs because you 
happen to be a woodworker. If you decide to do something politically, you 
do something that has political efficacy. And if you decide to write poetry, 
then you write poetry, not something that you hope, or deceive yourself 
into believing, can save people who are suffering. That was the dilemma 
of the ‘thirties. In a way I gave up poetry because of the pressures of what 
for the moment I’ll call conscience. (CL 174) 
Peter Nicholls has called Oppen’s crisis in the 1930s one over “the fundamental 
incompatibility between the aesthetic and the political” (“The New or the Avant-Garde?” 
3), with Oppen concluding he could not satisfy his poetic and political aims through the 
same course of action. He spent the remainder of the decade working for the Communist 
                                                 
60 Oppen is referring here to “The Mind’s Own Place,” from which I have quoted above. This essay was 
first published in Kulchur 3, no. 10, in the Summer 1963 issue. Oppen writes: 
There are situations which cannot honorably be met by art, and surely no one need fiddle 
precisely at the moment that the house next door is burning. If one goes on to imagine a 
direct call for help, then surely to refuse it would be a kind of treason to one’s neighbors. 
Or so I think. But the bad fiddling could hardly help, and similarly the question can only 
be whether one intends, at a given time, to write poetry or not. (36) 




party and, later, serving as an infantryman in World War II. In the face of McCarthyism 
and the House Un-American Activities Committee, he spent eight years in Mexico and 
did not begin another poem until 1958. 
Any decision Oppen made over the value and necessity of his varying forms of 
labor came after completion of Discrete Series. Thus, this early book becomes essential 
to consider, because it records a moment of the poet’s unresolved concerns over issues of 
poetic function, efficacy, and authority, precisely as he meditates on the subject’s 
relationship to worldly materials. In Discrete Series, Oppen deconstructs objects that 
have come to define modern existence and, in that process, exposes the belief systems 
lurking within them that shape—and too often limit—the subject’s knowledge of its own 
conditions. Thus, Oppen takes apart the object to reveal what gets hidden within it—or, 
as he describes this material in an unnamed car poem, to find the “obscured/ origin” 
(NCP 8) concealed within the thing.  
Through his particular form of object study, Oppen mines for “truth” within the 
materials, modeling a stance of inquiry readers must also employ as they look for 
meaning within the poems—and interact with their own object world. When Oppen calls 
for “truthfulness” at the center of things, he demands a more conscious understanding of 
the subject’s relations to external objects. Admittedly, this concept of “truth” poses a 
problem, particularly for a poet so committed to concrete materials, as the title of his next 
book, The Materials (1962), suggests. An examination of things within Discrete Series 
reveals a particular kind of “truth” Oppen seeks to expose: the poems continually return 
to the truth in objects that gets hidden before our eyes, most frequently through 
interaction with objects of modern technology, such as a car, an elevator shaft, or a 




refrigerator. In the process, Oppen reveals the subject’s diminished sense of agency in 
relation to these technologies, as well as his alienation from natural objects that have 
become unreal and strange. The things of Discrete Series help expose conditions of labor, 
sexual power relations, and social ideologies that have limited the subject’s knowledge of 
its own conditions. Overwhelmed by the way modern technological materials have 
shaped experience—with the speaking subject in several poems recording existence from 
inside these objects—Oppen pursues a poetics that can more authentically represent the 
subject’s experience of interaction. In “The Mind’s Own Place,” he emphasizes the 
importance of pushing beyond “political generalizations”: “It is not to say that the poet is 
immune to the ‘real’ world to say that he is not likely to find the moment, the image, in 
which a political generalization or any other generalization will prove its truth” (32). 
Perception via “that rare poetic quality of truthfulness” must see beyond the ideologies 
limiting the subject’s interpretation. Through experimental syntax that frequently 
defamiliarizes everyday objects, Oppen unsettles the reader’s relationship to the materials 
under study and thus forces a reexamination. 
In this chapter, I consider “things” in relation to ideas of Marxist materialism 
because these ideas informed Oppen’s understanding of the material world, as well as his 
approach to objects in Discrete Series. 61 Although Marxism can be criticized as a form of 
ideology that reveals its own version of “truth,” it proves useful for analyzing Oppen’s 
object focus because it provides a method of reading objects. Further, Oppen was explicit 
                                                 
61 This is not to suggest that Oppen’s writing reflects the aims of the Communist Party. In fact, as Eric 
Homberger notes, the Left had little patience with Objectivist poetics because of its resistance to make class 
struggle its single rhetorical aim. Homberger writes, “the term ‘Objectivism’ was a damaging confession of 
neutrality” (114). Further, as we have already heard from Oppen, the poet was hesitant to use art to advance 
overtly political arguments. He told Dembo, “I didn’t believe in political poetry or poetry as being 
politically efficacious. . . . If you decide to do something politically, you do something that has political 
efficacy. And if you decide to write poetry, then you write poetry, not something that you hope, or you 
deceive yourself into believing, can save people who are suffering” (Dembo, CL 174). 




about the book’s connection to Marxist ideas. In a 1973 letter, he described the book as 
Marxist in its aims, explaining, “The ‘Marxism’ of Discrete Series is, was felt as, the 
struggle against the loss of the commonplace” (SL 254).62 This “loss of the 
commonplace” corresponds to the modern subject’s sense of estrangement from external 
objects. Lyn Hejinian describes this experience as “the loss of the materialist attention to 
the practice of everyday life, ‘the real individuals,’ as Marx says, ‘their activity, and the 
material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing 
and those produced by their activity’” (53).63 By emphasizing real-world conditions of 
workers, Hejinian identifies the source of Oppen’s loss as modernity’s diminished focus 
on the subject and its corresponding elevation of materials.  
On this point Marx proves useful to consider through his own theories on the 
object. The ultimate object for Marx—the commodity—carries within it what in Capital 
he calls a “secret”: “A commodity appears at first sight an extremely obvious, trivial 
thing. But its analysis brings out that it is a very strange thing, abounding in metaphysical 
subtleties and theological niceties” (163). Marx’s concept of the “fetishism of the 
commodity” reveals tremendous depths of what remains hidden within the object: the 
whole system of production that created the commodity, including the structures and 
relations of power, the social characteristics of labor, and the value relations of that 
                                                 
62 In this same letter, Oppen focuses on the political pragmatism of Marxism, telling his correspondent, 
John Crawford, “John: your marxism is too ‘scholarly’ Marx’s books are Marx’s books, but the 
Marxist political parties are ways to relieve the suffering, and simple ways they are, or they are 
abominations---      are or will become so - - IF they are not, to get the dams built, to save the people---” 
(255). He goes on to credit Crawford for recognizing the political pragmatism evident even in Discrete 
Series: “BUT JOHN, DESPITE THE TESTINESS ABOVE, I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR THE 
RECOGNITION THAT FROM DISCRETE SERIES TO THE MARXISM WAS NOT A ‘BREAK’-----
BY ANY MEANS.” Here Oppen seems to confirm, as I have been suggesting, that Discrete Series 
promotes pragmatic aims in modeling how readers can apply this form of inquiry to their own encounters 
with materials.  
63 Hejinian takes this quote from Marx’s “Thesis on Feuerbach,” in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. 
David McLellan. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977: 160. 




commodity. The commodity’s material structure is perceived as “a physical relation 
between physical things”—merely a physical object among others—yet within this form, 
Marx asserts, lays a more complicated story: 
As against this, the commodity-form, and the value-relation of the 
products of labour within which it appears, have absolutely no connection 
with the physical nature of the commodity and the material [dinglich] 
relations arising out of this. It is nothing but the definite social relation 
between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form 
of a relation between things. (165) 
As complex social relations remain concealed in the commodity, the object becomes little 
more than a physical exterior with no connection to the human relations of labor that 
contributed to its production. To view the commodity through such a limited—and 
false—perception proves a form of fetishism that Marx compares to “[taking] flight into 
the misty realm of religion.” Instead, Marx invites us to reconsider the social 
characteristics of labor that contributed to the commodity’s creation. In effect, Marx 
provides a poetic take on objects in his characterization of the commodity as a type of 
metonymy, albeit one in which the object’s form hides the larger systems embedded in its 
parts. 
Oppen, as well, is interested in seeing beyond false relations to objects that have 
limited the subject’s perception. And Oppen, like Marx, develops a way of reading 
objects to locate meanings embedded within them. I do not mean to imply here that 
Oppen’s interest in objects relates only to this particular aspect of commodity fetishism—
although I do think such a reading is evident at times within Discrete Series—but rather 




to expose the potential for what a poetry of “truth” stands to recover. As Bill Brown 
acknowledges, “The rhetorical force [of Marx’s argument in Capital] of the declared and 
richly described mystery lies in its capacity to convince us that there is truth—the whole 
truth of Capital understood as a system—lurking at the bottom of the mystery, lingering 
there, right there in the commodity” (SOT 29). If the poet can uncover the ideologies 
lurking within objects, he can forge a more truthful relationship in their transformation, 
via the poem, into things. 
Oppen’s Objectivism as a Modernist Poetics of Things 
To date, Oppen’s work has not been widely read through traditional narratives of 
modernism. Discrete Series arrived more than a decade after Pound’s Hugh Selwyn 
Mauberley (1920), Eliot’s The Waste Land (1922), and Williams’s Spring and All (1923), 
at a moment when some critics suggest modernism was already beginning to wane.64 
Associated with Objectivist poets Louis Zukofsky and Charles Reznikoff, Oppen more 
frequently figures into critical conversations of work after modernism, as part of a lineage 
bridging the generations between the Imagists of the teens and the Black Mountain poets 
of the 1950s. In addition, Oppen’s 25-year silence following Discrete Series has 
complicated his place in critical genealogies, and his increasing experimentation, 
culminating with Seascape: Needle’s Eye (1972), Myth of the Blaze (1972-1975), and 
Primitive (1978), has made him a predecessor frequently cited among the Language 
                                                 
64 James Longenbach points out that even by the 1930s, many American poets felt they were responding to 
Modernism in the creation of a postmodern aesthetic:   
As early as the 1930s, Modernism seemed to such poets as Randall Jarrell (born in 1914) 
to be a thing of the past—something to which they could respond to but in which they 
could no longer participate. “Who could have believed that modernism would collapse so 
fast?” asked Jarrell in “The End of the Line” (1942), an essay that remains one of the 
subtlest accounts of Modernism we have. Even at this early date, modern poetry looked 
to Jarrell as it appears to us today—squeezed on the one side by its romantic precursors 
and on the other by its postmodern inheritors. (“Modern Poetry” 100-101) 




School poets and other experimental postmodernists.65 Nevertheless, Oppen outlines a 
form of prosody, as well as a concept of poetic “things,” corresponding to the 
object/thing distinction I have been exploring through contemporary thing theory; thus, 
he participates in a poetic tradition similar to that of the other modernists examined in 
this study. It is important to note that, like Williams, Oppen does not employ terminology 
of “objects” and “things” with the same precision of Bill Brown’s definitions. For Oppen 
words such as “object,” “thing” and “material” prove synonymous and represent what in 
Brown’s use would be the “object”—the actual material existing in the world. In Oppen’s 
poetics, the Brownian “thing,” or the artist’s resulting creation, is the Objectivist poem he 
produces: the poem that has become its own object, and which can be evaluated for 
meanings beyond the actual materials that may constitute its subject matter. As Oppen 
engages material objects to test meaning, he uses the form of the poem to strip outdated 
meanings and gain a more informed perception.  Yet, the resulting Objectivist “things” of 
Oppen’s early poetics—difficult poems whose fragmented forms frequently challenge the 
reader’s interpretive practices—reflect the poet’s sense of struggle as he pursues 
understanding of relations to modern materials. In exploring Oppen’s work specifically 
through its object focus, I argue that the poems reveal a larger preoccupation about the 
poet’s function at a tumultuous moment in history.  
                                                 
65 Of course, establishing critical genealogies is itself a highly debatable project. For example, in The 
Dance of the Intellect: Studies in the Poetry of the Pound Tradition (1985), Marjorie Perloff identifies 
Oppen as part of this post-modern lineage, but defines it as one coming out of a “Pound tradition” of 
twentieth-century poetry dismissing the lyric in favor of poetry as the imitation of an action (22). She 
identifies a rift in critical readings of modernism between Romantic expectations of the lyric and a more 
de-centered form of collage. Perloff includes Oppen as a link between Pound and Williams in the first half 
of the century, and Beckett and the Language School in the second half; thus, Oppen bridges forms of 
modernism and postmodernism exploring non-lyrical fragmentation. I include Perloff’s assessment to 
illustrate the variety of ways Oppen has been read against and in relation to his modernist contemporaries 
and predecessors. 




As Oppen reveals in “The Mind’s Own Place,” he retroactively defined “Modern 
American poetry” through its attention to things—even as critics have, rightfully, pointed 
out his selective sidestepping of modernist trends falling outside of this focus.66 And 
despite clear distinctions between Oppen’s poetics and that of Pound or Williams, he 
acknowledges their influence in his conception of a thing-based poetics. Asked for his 
thoughts on Williams’s well-known claim in Paterson, “no ideas but in things,” Oppen 
told Dembo: 
A. I have always wondered whether that expression didn’t apply to the 
construction of meaning in a poem—not necessarily that there are out 
there no ideas but in things, but rather that there would be in the poem no 
ideas but those which could be expressed through the description of 
things. I took it that he meant the latter until I found that the expression 
was frequently understood in a different way.  
 
Q. Anyway, if your interpretation of the Williams line is correct, it seems 
to me you would in fact partly resemble him. 
 
A. Perhaps. (CL 170) 
 
Oppen’s interpretation reveals a great deal about his own goals for exploring “things.” 
Within the medium of the poem, things convey the subject’s ideas. Although such ideas 
could be expressed through multiple techniques—such as metaphor, allusion, testimony 
or dialogue, as we have seen among other modernists—Oppen favors a poetics in which 
ideas are presented through descriptions of materials; thus, the objects of his poems must 
                                                 
66 Peter Nicholls finds that Oppen’s definition provides “only the most partial account of literary 
modernism” (GOFM 8), leaving out modernism’s focus on tradition, myth, and literary allusiveness, as 
well as the debate within the movement by figures such as Eliot and Williams over what should constitute 
the “data of experience.” Nicholls points out: 
It is notable that while Williams famously repudiated Eliot’s traditionalism and, in doing 
so, proposed an alternative, American version, Oppen characteristically sidesteps the 
whole debate. “I felt myself to be as I found myself,” he says, a comment which 
demonstrates the kind of independence he felt from a “nascent canon” of modernist 
writings and his related sense that even in his first book he was striking out in a different 
direction. 
Nicholls places Oppen’s poetics as falling between the two extreme forms of modernism—traditionalism 
and avant-gardism—in presenting an alternative “poetics of being … that was not reducible to either a 
myth of the past or to stylistic experimentation masquerading as politics” (2). 




be read through their relations to the subject experiencing them. Oppen describes a 
concern with “the substantive, with the subject of the sentence, with what we are talking 
about, and not rushing over the subject-matter in order to make a comment about it” 
(161). Concrete representation supersedes subjective commentary or observation. Yet, 
even concrete description can convey the poet’s emotional response to interaction, since 
perception, Oppen claims, “is a tremendous emotional response, which fills us with the 
experience that we describe as seeing…. It can only be interpreted emotionally” (173). 
Oppen’s poetics aims to capture a “reality” deeply reflective of the human subject 
experiencing it, as we have now seen in the work of all the modernists in this study.  
 Oppen’s association with Objectivist poets Zukofsky and Reznikoff, with whom 
he claimed to share “a certain attitude toward poetry” (Dembo, CL 160), helps clarify his 
approach to objects as one founded in Imagism but moving beyond that earlier movement 
in important ways:  
What I felt I was doing was beginning from imagism as a position of 
honesty. The first question at that time in poetry was simply the question 
of honesty, sincerity. But I learned from Louis [Zukofsky], as against the 
romanticism or even quaintness of the imagist position, the necessity for 
forming a poem properly, for achieving form. That’s what “objectivist” 
really means. . . .  The other point for me, and I think for Louis, too, was 
the attempt to construct meaning, to construct a method of thought from 
the imagist technique of poetry—from the imagist intensity of vision. If no 
one were going to challenge me, I would say, “a test of truth.” If I had to 
back it up I’d say anyway, “a test of sincerity”—that there is a moment, an 




actual time, when you believe something to be true, and you construct a 
meaning from these moments of conviction. (160-61)    
Oppen outlines a dual experience of the object that proves consistent with the ideas of 
contemporary thing theory, in the poet’s treatment of an actual object and the resulting 
objectification into a separate formed thing. The achieved “objectification” through form 
is the constructed thing in Bill Brown’s sense of that term: a thing carrying meanings 
now exceeding the original object’s value. As Objectivist poets turn the poem into a 
poetic object (or Brownian “thing”), its form performs the required “test of truth,” 
containing the very method through which the reader can access meaning. When Oppen 
acknowledges that his poetics begins from “imagist technique,” he commits to Imagism’s 
foundational principle of “direct treatment of the ‘thing,’ whether subjective or objective” 
(Flint 199), via the poet’s concrete representation. Yet, while Objectivists employ the 
same “intensity of vision,” they do not pursue the object through “romanticism” or 
“quaintness”; in fact, Oppen’s fragmented syntax and description more frequently 
obstruct traditional or outdated meanings associated with the object. Instead, the poet’s 
representation of the object allows him to “construct a method of thought” that can access 
the “truth” underlying subject-object relations.67 
 In accepting Oppen’s doctrine for Objectivism, it is important to understand the 
terminology underlying the theory. Words such as “honesty,” “sincerity” and “truth” 
convey ambitious concepts that must be unpacked in Oppen’s application. “Truth,” for 
                                                 
67 Oppen’s rejection of “romanticism” here invites us to more critically consider the connections between 
his poetics and romanticism, a movement in which the subject undergoes a process of change through his 
consideration of the external world. Because Oppen’s poetics provides a method of revelation that 
promotes the subject’s expanded recognition and transformation, one could argue that the poems reveal a 
hidden romanticism. Yet, even as Oppen’s subject pursues “truth,” he remains focused on knowledge of 
material existence.  




Oppen, is synonymous with “sincerity,” and for Objectivists, sincerity has little to do 
with the ethos of the poetic speaker or its association with sentimentality. According to 
Zukofksy, in his 1931 essay outlining the values of the Objectivists, sincerity reflects “the 
detail, not mirage, of seeing, of thinking with the things as they exist, and of directing 
them along a line of melody. Shapes suggest themselves, and the mind senses and 
receives awareness” (273). Sincerity is the process by which the poet transforms vision 
into form: it is inseparable from the shape of the poem—the Objectivist’s achieved 
thing—where “shapes appear concomitants of word combinations, precursors of (if there 
is continuance) completed sound of structure, melody or form.” This type of poetry does 
not “create” a world or impose a particular vision of experience, but rather, by digging 
through the details, allows the poet to uncover the world “as it exists.” The poetic 
transformation can best represent such existence because the poem’s form reveals 
qualities that would otherwise remain hidden. As Oppen states in a Discrete Series poem, 
“People everywhere, time and the work  pauseless:/ One moves between reading and 
re-reading,/ The shape is a moment” (NCP 25).  In “reading and rereading” the 
experience of “people everywhere”—and forcing an actual pause at the precise moment 
he highlights the monotony of modern labor, through the spatial break between “work” 
and “pauseless”—Oppen crafts the particular moment into a shape.   
When one considers the degree of formal experimentation, the obsessive, often 
minute manipulations of syntax, and the careful constructing and reshaping of line, 
Discrete Series poems reflect a clear aesthetic fascination focused on rendering materials 
into poetic things. Yet, Oppen’s creation of the thing is less about elevating the object to 
some realm of aesthetic pleasure, so that the reader may admire it from a distance or 




ponder the nature of its existence. Instead, his experimental techniques require a different 
type of involvement: the poem refuses the possibility for easy interaction. Oppen creates 
a space in which inquiry and revelation come through discomfort and disruption. The 
difficulty of encountering the poem and the effort required to read the revelation model a 
broader stance the reader must take toward objects in the actual world. Readers cannot 
accept the surfaces and must search for what remains hidden. As he states in an early 
Daybook,68 “As human history accumulates the people come to see ‘the world as a 
limited whole’ [sic] That vision has no answer to it. Perhaps it is lethal” (SPDP 59). 
Human history, as it is commonly accepted, remains only a “limited” vision of reality and 
thus the subject cannot adequately respond to it without gaining a more expansive vision. 
Given what Oppen considers the potentially “lethal” nature of these conditions, the 
subject’s partial perception of the material world, he promotes a mode of seeing that 
comes by recognizing real relations between subjects and objects, as well as the 
ideologies and relationships of power that, too often, remain hidden in this interaction. 
Undoubtedly, Oppen outlines a political vision in such statements, but it, nonetheless, 
proves to be one underlying his approach to objects.   
One such poem in which we can read political aims into the object depictions is 
the Discrete Series poem examining the garments of bourgeois women. Here, Oppen 
exposes how certain modern objects prove restrictive to subjects, particularly in relation 
to sexuality:   
                                                 
68 The Daybooks were a collection of notes, ideas, and prose that Oppen kept throughout the 1960s. When I 
cite from the Daybooks, I include editor Stephen Cope’s editorial practice of making Oppen’s corrections 
transparent, including passages scratched out (strikethrough) and those that were later added in handwritten 
inscriptions (italics with insertion arrows, ^). 
 





‘O city ladies’ 
Your coats wrapped, 
Your hips a possession 
 
Your shoes arched 
Your walk is sharp 
 
Your breasts 
 Pertain to lingerie 
 
The fields are road-sides, 
Rooms outlast you.    (NCP 29)        
At first glance, this poem sounds similar to the visual imagery of a Williams poem, 
particularly in its emphasis on the female body. In fact, the poem is much more 
syntactically-straightforward than several others in Discrete Series. However, Oppen 
presents these objects—the coats, shoes, breasts—by highlighting their relations to social 
power structures. When he describes hips as a “possession,” the implicit question left 
unanswered in the line is: whose possession? When he states that the breasts “pertain to 
lingerie,” he again evokes the idea that breasts have a relationship to lingerie, but it is not 
necessarily a “real” or natural one. In fact, this particular description denaturalizes the 
sexual desire implied through the poem’s gaze. The image of lingerie, itself a form of 
restraint covering the body, demonstrates another mode of regulation. The poem raises 
the question: Who or what is regulating this desire? The social critique becomes apparent 
in the line, “Rooms outlast you.” Social structures prove bigger than the individual, 
whom they predate and will outlast. It seems pertinent to make such an observation in a 
poem about bourgeois women, given the poem’s attention to class as a structure that 
reproduces itself. The women are products of these rooms and the ideologies that support 
them. They are themselves objects decorating rooms, and thus the women—as objects—




epitomize the kind of perfected exterior Oppen wants to shatter in order to expose what 
remains hidden. 
“The sequence of disclosure”: Oppen’s form as the “test of truth” 
In previous chapters, I have identified particular techniques each poet employs in 
transforming objects into things, for example, in Frost’s application of metaphor, 
Moore’s use of formal patterns and quotation, and Williams’s frequently-enjambed 
accumulation of detail. Oppen also employs experimentation in his use of syntax to test 
the subject’s experience. As he attests, the poet’s individual use of language proves vital 
for validating “sincerity” and “conviction” (“The Mind’s Own Place” 32): 
We cannot assert the poet’s relation to reality, nor exhort him to face 
reality, nor do any of these desirable things, nor be sure that we are not 
insisting merely that he discuss only those things we are accustomed to 
talk about, unless we somehow manage to restore a meaning to the word. 
Bertrand Russell wrote “If I were to describe reality as I found it, I would 
have to include my arm.” In the shock of that sentence—out of context—
perhaps the meaning of the word may be restored, or in the fragment of 
Heraclitus: “If it all went up in smoke” that smoke would remain. It is the 
arbitrary fact, and not any quality of wisdom literature, which creates the 
impact of poets. (30) 
 
The arbitrariness of language requires the poet to “restore a meaning to the word” before 
he can address “reality” in a new way. Oppen suggests that restoration of such meaning 
comes through recognition of the subject’s actual experience (in Bertrand Russell’s sense 
of a reality that incorporates the subject’s physical being). The very arbitrariness of 
language, which Ferdinand de Saussure defines so explicitly in structuralist theory, 
creates the need for poetry; the poet’s individual application of language grants his 
“impact.” While writers presenting “wisdom literature” may expound on intellectual 
ideas and philosophies, poets aware of the conditions of language must challenge the 
reader’s very interaction with words. Oppen recognizes that when preexisting meanings 




or ideas are removed—when it “all goes up in smoke”—smoke remains: the word still 
exists as abstract vessel for meaning. Thus, the act of the poem, through the forms and 
techniques of its revelation, becomes essential for allowing new meanings to emerge. In a 
later Daybook,69 Oppen confirms this idea: 
what concerns the artist is that the thing exists—and he starts with a ruined 
language ^ He must day by day and then by man, destroyed^ achieves 
language. The trouble is that it is possible to 
 
Must try to get back to what does exist   the onta 
 to language which can confront, can stand. 
 
which is not merely a series of self-indulgent gestures, indications of  
attitude or sentiment. 
 
a poem may be devoted to giving clear meaning to one word. (SPDP 78) 
 
 Oppen’s use of form, and in particular his use of syntax and the line, prove critical 
for demonstrating how his subjects interact with materiality in order to gain a more 
truthful vision. Yet, my attention to Oppen’s technique is not new; in fact, his radical 
experimentation has generated significant critical attention, and from some of the book’s 
earliest reviews. In his 1934 review in Poetry, Williams praises Oppen’s “technical 
excellence” and “poetical economy” (267), which he claims convey an “imaginable new 
social order” that “would require a skeleton of severe discipline for its realization and 
maintenance” (269). More recently, James Longenbach calls Oppen “one of the twentieth 
century’s most dazzling makers of lines”: “Reading him, it is impossible not to be aware 
of how, in the strategic absence of meter and rhyme, line becomes the crucial means by 
which a poet controls stress, intonation, and speed” (42). Michael Heller examines the 
form as reflecting the individual’s constant struggle for a unified sense of self in the face 
                                                 
69 This passage is taken from Oppen’s “Pipe-Stem Daybook,” a series of papers fastened by means of a 
pipe-stem cleaner and accumulated between 1962-65, according to Cope. 




of a fragmentary, disjointed modern world: “Oppen’s radical use of syntax, while 
bordering on the disjunctive effects of much experimental poetry, never quite loses, never 
seems to want to lose, coherence. Rather it is a constant struggle for coherence mounted 
against dispersal and disintegration” (139). These three observations share the sense that 
Oppen’s formal experimentation reflects a poetic practice addressing the historical (and 
literary) conditions of his time. As Williams speaks of a poet responding to a “new social 
order,” he identifies “severe discipline” as the tool for realization, suggesting that the 
rhetorical and sentimental excesses of nineteenth-century poets are no longer sufficient 
for addressing the significant social transformations of modernity. Longenbach places his 
emphasis on formal technique as a response to the free verse of Imagism that, by the 
1920s, had been watered down into visual descriptions of objects (in what many poets, 
including Pound and Williams, decried as “Amygism”70). Finally, Heller examines 
Oppen’s response as reflective of a particular experience of alienation and fragmentation 
distinguishing modern subjectivity. These claims for Oppen’s technique suggest that one 
cannot read truth into his objects without viewing them through “human history,” to 
again borrow Oppen’s term from the Daybooks—and one he applies with clear Marxist  
implications.  
To assess how Oppen’s technique works in its application to objects, it is helpful 
to consider the poet’s own insights on his prosody in his “Statement on Poetics”: 
Prosody is a language, but it is a language that tests itself. Or it tests itself 
in music—I think one must say that. It tests the relations of things: it 
                                                 
70 Oppen cites this very problem in his interview with Dembo, reflecting on certain modernist poets who 
talk of the poem as an object: “Right. And this existed in the context of the sloppy American imagism 
descending out of Amy Lowell and a thousand others” (CL 161). Oppen clearly aimed for his own 
objectification to improve upon the practice of certain Imagist predecessors who were presenting object 
description, but without any larger aims.  




carries the sequence of disclosure. And that is its vividness. More vivid 
than falsification, a test of conviction, the sequence of disclosure. I am not 
speaking of philosophical naiveté . . . . I am thinking of actualness, not 
some toughness of “realism,” some manly toughness: I am talking of 
consciousness—which is to say, I am talking of experience, telling of 
experience, and THAT is to say, I am talking of emotion. . . .And actualness 
is prosody, it is the purpose of prosody and its achievement, the instant of 
meaning, the achievement of meaning and of presence, the sequence of 
disclosure which comes from everywhere. (26-27)  
This passage, itself rich in syntactic complexity, reveals several important points about 
Oppen’s view of poetics and its potential for presenting truth. Through the poem’s form, 
the poet can test the relations of subjects and objects. Syntax provides the optimal means 
to stage such inquiries because it offers a particular “sequence of disclosure.” The very 
order of words—and, by extension, any deliberate disruptions or elisions—can induce a 
new understanding of the relationships between those words and can, in turn, create a 
“vividness” that colors one’s conception of the world; this type of vividness eschews 
“falsification.” A significant element of Oppen’s statement is his distinction between 
“realism” and what he terms “actualness.” When he characterizes “realism” in poetry as 
“manly toughness,” he critiques a familiar stance in which the poet attempts to penetrate 
materials by imposing his own order. I would argue that Oppen’s critique here extends to 
other Imagist poets, particularly Pound, who uses techniques of collage and juxtaposition, 
history and culture, to stabilize his sense of the self in the modern world and to create his 




own order. In fact, Pound’s emphasis on applying order to the world may help explain his 
sympathies with fascism.71  
One can also read Williams, who is in many ways more similar to Oppen than 
Pound, in a masculine vein, particularly in his approach to composition. As Williams 
writes in the Author’s Introduction to his 1944 The Wedge, 
When a man makes a poem, makes it, mind you, he takes words as he 
finds them interrelated about him and composes them—without distortion 
which would mar their exact significances—into an intense expression of 
his perceptions and his ardors that they may constitute a revelation in the 
speech that he uses. It isn’t what he says that counts as a work of art, it’s 
what he makes.  (CPII 54)  
 
Williams’s focus on the poet’s perceptions, and his goal of “making” the words replicate 
these perceptions, suggests that language should reproduce an already-achieved 
revelation about the subject’s experience; artistic creation becomes a process of poetic 
control in elevating experience into representation. As we have seen Williams claim in 
Spring and All, the creation of the “thing,” via the imagination, becomes an act of 
asserting language on “a wordless/ world// without personality” (I 142); the act of naming 
grants the poet’s authority in making things. Although the motives suggested here may be 
pure—to depict a realistic version of the world,72 “without distortion”—Oppen deems the 
result ultimately false. Oppen’s description of “toughness” in the earlier quote suggests 
that a move toward realism represents a futile attempt to assert control in a world where 
                                                 
71 Pound’s fascination with the hyper-masculine Troubadour poets is well-known. Peter Nicholls has 
characterized modernism’s “Men of 1914”—Pound, Eliot, Wyndham Lewis and James Joyce—as writers 
concerned with a politics of gender that reflects their underlying “preoccupation with forms of authority” 
(Modernisms 192). He contends that this emphasis on masculinity leads toward the containment of emotion 
(itself a feminine threat) through the objectification of objects. Oppen reinforces this sense of Pound’s 
poetics in a 1973 letter when he describes, “Pound’s ego system – the specific system   everything for the 
opportunity of stupid masculine rhetoric (i.e. where he is lousy) Not where he is not lousy” (SL 254).  
72 Williams makes it clear in Spring and All that his use of the imagination does not aim to distort reality 
but, in fact, to renew the reader’s perception of it: “Imagination is not to avoid reality, nor is it description 
nor an evocation of objects or situation, it is to say that poetry does not tamper with the world but moves 
it—It affirms reality most powerfully” (I 149). 




the individual too often lacks it. This very impulse is evident in the work of Robert Frost, 
wherein the poem becomes a space to assert, through language, masculine authority over 
conditions that have left the speaker vulnerable. In contrast, a poet striving to articulate 
“actualness” of experience depicts the world as he receives it; the posture becomes one of 
passivity rather than agency. In fact, Oppen frequently articulates the subject’s passive 
relations to external materials as he strives to understand his real conditions. This poet 
need not fully comprehend the “words interrelated around him” or the precise nature of 
his experience as he examines his relations to objects. Instead, the poem becomes a space 
of inquiry and discovery. This experience of consciousness proves more truthful, for it 
presents a subject testing experience in a particular moment to gain meaning. Such a 
process is consistent with Oppen’s compositional practice, which, according to Stephen 
Cope, often involved cutting up phrases and pasting them onto one another at various 
stages of revision (SPDP 16). Thus, even Oppen’s own “experience of consciousness” 
did not come automatically through interaction with the object world. Instead, by using 
syntax to test language within the poem, Oppen can present a consciousness awakening 
to truths within things. As he observes in his Statement, “Note by note the prosody 
carries the relation of things and the sequence: the poet learns almost everything from his 
own verse, his own prosody” (26). The poet reassesses the nature of language and the 
subject’s relationship to the object just as the reader engages these very tasks.   
 As Oppen uses language to delve into things, he adopts a practice that finds value 
in even the smallest details of grammar and diction. He told Burton Hatlen in 1980, “All 
along I’ve had a sense that the structure of the sentence closes off the little words. That’s 
where the mysteries are, in the little words. ‘The’ and ‘and’ are the greatest mysteries of 




all” (38). The deliberate nature of his fragmented syntax allows readers to mine the 
“mysteries” of relations. The “little words”—the ands, buts, ofs, and ins—offer greater 
potential to highlight disparate, disjointed relationships in the world. It is through such 
words that the subject can determine relationships between words and, in turn, apply 
these connections to the objects represented. Oppen plays against the reader’s 
expectations for conventional discourse in order to redirect attention and reveal 
unexpected—often hidden—relationships to things. 
 Equating “realism” with “manly toughness,” Oppen clearly recognizes the 
gendered implications he is undertaking by applying a more feminine approach to 
perception. It is thus significant that he opens Discrete Series with an image of Henry 
James’s Maude Blessingbourne73 staring through her window at the world “with which/ 
one shares the century” (NCP 5), an allusion to James’s short story, “The Story In It.” 
Maud is a young widow staying at the home of Mrs. Dyott, who, unbeknownst to Maud, 
is having an affair with Colonel Voyt. When Voyt comes to lunch one afternoon, Maud 
hides her infatuation with the flirtatious colonel as the two engage in conversation over 
French novels and the degree to which women can ever express their true desires. Maud 
remains trapped in expectations of women’s virtue that require her to keep her passions 
hidden. The irony, of course, is that Mrs. Dyott easily recognizes Maud’s secret, and, by 
the end, informs Colonel Voyt—“the object” of Maud’s passions—of the crush. When 
Maud critiques the lack of “decent” heroines in French novels and their depiction of “the 
                                                 
73 James spells his character’s name “Maud,” while Oppen adds the ‘e’ to “Maude.” Although there is little 
to suggest that Oppen’s spelling change is anything other than an error, Harold Schimmel reads the move 
as a credit to Oppen’s enrichment of this character: “Even poor, lovely Maud Blessingbourne is given the 
additional ballast of Oppen’s ‘e’” (299). Because, in some sense, I see James’s Maud and Oppen’s Maude 
as two different characters, I will alter the spelling to reflect the particular version to which I am referring; I 
find that Oppen’s Maude has much greater visionary potential—precisely because of Oppen’s poetic 
technique—than James’s character ever demonstrates. 




poverty of life,” Voyt replies, “To me, when all’s said and done, they seem to be—as 
near as art can come—in the truth of the truth. . . . Your complaint of their monotony is a 
complaint of their conditions” (422). Voyt repeats this idea that literature offers truths 
about human conditions that “decency” may require us to repress; his interest in “truth” 
proves a literary fascination in line with Oppen’s own aims. While Maud easily 
withdraws from her unhappiness and boredom into the pleasure of her secret fantasy, 
James’s title—the “Story In It”—suggests there is always a dimension of truth that 
remains hidden and must be mined for any real knowledge of the world being 
represented.  
 Tom Sharp finds Oppen’s invocation of Maud to be ironic, given that “Maude 
Blessingbourne had been contented to love from a distance, but Oppen felt more a part of 
‘the world, weather-swept, with which/ one shares the century,’ the world he threw 
himself into” (280). I find this reading slightly problematic, given that Oppen opens 
Discrete Series with this poem, making it doubtful he would expect readers to recognize 
irony within a poetic stance he has not yet fully articulated. Rather, Oppen identifies to 
some extent with Maud’s stance toward the world, her repression of secret desires, and 
her superficial attention to the world. (She, after all, fails to recognize Colonel Voyt’s 
affair with her friend.) Maud’s error is one readers too often make. In repressing certain 
truths, the world takes on a tamer, cleaner quality, though one’s interaction with it is 
rendered false. Although Oppen may understand Maud’s stance, he nevertheless critiques 
it and uses his poetics to promote a different kind of encounter. As Charles Altieri notes 
in his 1979 essay defining “The Objectivist Tradition,” Objectivism “is not merely 
attention to objects: it entails the construction of aesthetic objects in such a way that the 




conditions of desire are themselves dramatized and forced to take responsibility for their 
productions” (12). Altieri’s point speaks to Maud’s condition; through Oppen’s poetics 
he forces such desires to the surface.  
 That he enacts this challenge through a female-gendered gaze distances Oppen’s 
poetics from the “manly” control presented in the other modernists thus far examined in 
this study; he is not shaping an authoritative representation of the world, but instead 
communicating the subject’s complicated relations to objects more truthfully. His 
positioning of Maude above the world and watching through a pane of glass also proves 
significant: she does not interact with the objects she sees, but stands a lens eye above 
them—in the sense of an “Objective” as Zukofsky defines the term in his Poetry essay: 
“The lens bringing the rays from an object to a focus” (268). Yet, through a form of 
vision that the poem enacts—one that tests the nature of language and of experience—she 
comes to understand her relation to this world with greater “actualness.” Oppen achieves 
this effect specifically through his use of syntax and his divisions of the line that prompt 
particular reconsideration of Maude’s relations: 
 The knowledge not of sorrow, you were 
           saying, but of boredom 
 Is—aside from reading speaking 
           smoking— 
 Of what, Maude Blessingbourne it was, 
           wished to know when, having risen, 
 “approached the window as if to see 
           what really was going on”;  
 And saw rain falling, in the distance 
           more slowly, 
 The road clear from her past the window- 
           glass— 
 Of the world, weather-swept, with which 
           one shares the century.  (NCP 5) 
 




The poem opens with a series of deliberate disruptions that negate or interrupt clear 
delivery of the information. Oppen begins not with the sentence’s subject (Maude) but 
rather with its direct object, “knowledge,” placing the emphasis on what she desires while 
obscuring her identity. When we do identify Blessingbourne nearly halfway through the 
poem, Oppen particularizes the agent only for the purposes of the poem (suggesting, for 
example, that “in this instance it was Maude Blessingbourne”). By keeping the 
perpetrator deliberately obscure, and by syntactically emphasizing the object of her 
desires, Oppen suggests that Maude’s stance could be anyone’s—indeed ours.  
The “knowledge” in the first line is itself modified through prepositional phrases, 
first negated as “not of sorrow” but rather “of boredom.” In this poem, as well as in his 
later work, Oppen emphasizes boredom as the means through which one gains greater 
knowledge of being. Seeing something through boredom, through superficial acceptance, 
is of course the stance that Oppen wants to disrupt, but he nonetheless considers it the 
starting point for greater inquiry. Much has been written about Oppen’s fascination with 
Heidegger’s notion of boredom. However, when Oppen wrote this poem in 1929, he had 
not yet encountered Heidegger’s ideas, although Heidegger presented his concept of 
boredom in a 1929 Acceptance Speech of the Chair of Philosophy at Freiburg. As Oppen 
told Dembo, “The words ‘boredom’ and ‘knowledge’ are, in their German equivalents, 
the words he uses. So I feel I have a natural sympathy with Heidegger—that he should 
use as a philosophic concept a mood of boredom” (CL 169). It is quite clear in his 
interview that the similarity in 1929 was merely serendipitous and not based on any 
exposure to Heidegger’s ideas. Oppen’s notion of boredom becomes his entry-point for 
knowledge because it enacts a stance in which one has tired of common acceptance of the 




surface world (Oppen’s claim in the Daybooks of “the world as a limited whole”) and is 
thus positioned to look deeper.  
We see Maude Blessingbourne, in fact, enacting this very stance of boredom in 
the poem’s second line, which opens with “Is,” creating an emphasis on the static 
experience of being. However, the full syntactical structure is interrupted again, this time 
with the “aside from” phrase that separates “reading speaking smoking” from the main 
action of the sentence. Oppen uses these words as gerunds, transferring their function 
from simple verbs to nominal verb phrases, and in the process he destabilizes their 
function. The disconnection between “reading speaking smoking” and the rest of the 
sentence suggests that these actions have failed to inspire in Maude the kind of 
knowledge she seeks; such mundane activities have only perpetuated her condition of 
boredom. Because they have not produced an awakened consciousness, the poet must 
find another means to do so.  
Maude has taken the step of “having risen” from her seat and is now positioned 
beside the window. The conditional “as if” suggests there is no guaranty she will attain a 
vision of “what really was going on.” In James’s story, Maud’s action of going to the 
window proves merely an empty gesture. Yet, Oppen denies his readers such superficial 
interaction: through the poem’s form, we must work to see “what really was going on.” 
Oppen emphasizes this point through his use of the semicolon at the end of the quoted 
line, even though it is not grammatically necessary. This device establishes a solid break 
between the two actions (“approached the window” . . . “And saw rain falling”) and thus 
acknowledges two distinct modes of “seeing”—observation that merely looks at the 
world from a distance (in this case, Maud’s cursory glance) but fails to acquire a true 




understanding of relations within it; and a more visionary gaze that obtains both 
recognition and connection.  
The second half of the poem provides a glimpse of how such recognition can 
occur, a direction Oppen again offers through his syntax. The last three lines contain 
several chains of propositional phrases, grammatical devices that indicate temporal, 
spatial, or logical relationships between objects and the remaining information in a 
sentence. Maude observes rain falling “in the distance more slowly,” and the rest of the 
poem traces a consciousness awakening first to the physical realities of her 
surroundings—to rain slowing in the distance as she looks down the road—and then to 
the larger world of history. Maude must draw connections between herself and “the 
world, weather-swept, with which [she] shares the century.” The first such awakening 
occurs in the phrase “from her,” which suggests an awareness that the road she is 
watching originates from her own space; she takes on a temporal and spatial presence in 
relation to the objects she is watching. The ambiguous placement of “past” in that same 
line, which can fit both as the object of the phrase (“from her past”) and a preposition 
introducing the next (“past the window-glass”), forces the reader to assess the 
relationships between the words. Oppen avoids grouping the word with either phrase by 
refusing to insert a comma, and thus “past” serves a double function: to link Maude’s 
personal history to the larger world—and promote a greater view of the “human history” 
Oppen cites in his Daybooks—and to emphasize the distance Maude must overcome to 
establish a connection with objects beyond the glass. Further syntactical disruption occurs 
when “Of the world” interrupts the chain of prepositions. The object to which this phrase 
is linked, the what of the world, is not clearly indicated. However, the repetition of “Of” 




at the start of a line directs the reader back to the third line (“Of what”), suggesting that 
Oppen has now replaced the ambiguous “what” of line three with “the world.” As Maude 
has awakened to consciousness, she now understands that the knowledge she seeks is 
knowledge “of the world”; her boredom impels her to see the world more truthfully and 
to understand her relation to the objects in it. Through the poem both Maude and the 
reader learn how to engage the world from a more informed perspective.  
The significance of this poem cannot be overstated within Discrete Series or 
within Oppen’s ideas of his poetics. He alludes to this poem in “Route,” in his 1968 Of 
Being Numerous, saying “Not to reduce the thing to nothing—// I might at the top of my 
ability stand at a window/ and say, look out; there is the world” (NCP 193). Here, Oppen 
affirms the value of the “thing,” and of engaging with the objects of the world, as a 
vehicle for achieving knowledge of “being.” In Daybook IV: II, Oppen again alludes to 
Maude:  
The boredom which 
To Maude Blessingbourne, I wrote!, disclosed 
Everything, ^I wrote^ —  
 
I should have written, not the rain  
Of a nineteenth century day, ^but^ the motes 
In the air, the dust 
 
Here still. (202) 
 
“Motes” of dust, the smallest particles, are presumably unseen. For Maude to look out 
and see such dust, as well as its connection to history, to its presence “here still,” would 
imply that Maude’s enhanced perception now allows her to see dimensions of things 
hidden to a surface gaze, an achievement also in line with Oppen’s goals for his poetics.  




Although this opening poem does not feature object description as its rhetorical 
focus— instead emphasizing the nature of Maude’s stance toward perception—Discrete 
Series quickly moves into poems examining concrete objects more directly. Maude 
Blessingbourne serves as a model of the perceiving subject, with the poem’s syntactical 
experimentation illustrating how the subject should embark on object exploration. In the 
poems that follow, Oppen presents a subject encountering objects of modern technology 
and exploring aspects of these things that remain hidden as the subject ponders his 
relation to them. Oppen promptly turns his attention to a space inside one of modernity’s 
most powerful symbols, the modern skyscraper, with the subject looking up at an elevator 
shaft—itself a hidden internal mechanism of a modern building.74 In this poem, the 
subject speaks from inside the object, subsumed within the very structures of modern 
technology. Perhaps the poem’s most defining characteristic is the alienating and 
unnatural experience of its object representation. In fact, Oppen obscures the elevator to 
the point where it is nearly unrecognizable. Until Tom Sharp confirmed directly with 
Oppen that the poem refers to an elevator (many of which in New York in the 1930s had 
a device shaped like a T), several critics cited the obscurity of the referent, with some 
even misidentifying it.75 As Chilton claims, “Significantly, we can only provisionally 
identify the referent of the first poem from the text. Charles Tomlinson sees it as an 
elevator. For the uninitiated, it may seem equally likely to refer to a light fixture or even a 
milk-dispensing machine. The real question may be whether or not we need to identify it” 
                                                 
74 Tom Sharp notes that Zukofsky made just this observation when he included the poem in An 
“Objectivists” Anthology, writing to Carl Rakosi that the anthology would represent Oppen through “a 
short poem presenting the modern skyscraper—the sense of being inside it” (qtd. in Sharp 282). Sharp 
observes, “For Zukofsky, the poem does not simply record the elevator portal. The poem is synecdochic; 
the part represents the whole.” 
75 See Abby Shapiro’s essay, “Building a Phenomenological World: Cubist Technique in the Poetry of 
George Oppen,” in which she claims it may be a human being (250). 




(93). Although I find the object’s identity of particular importance, Chilton’s point is 
useful for illustrating the degree to which Oppen avoids visual clarity in the object 
description. Instead, he draws attention to the elevator’s parts, as well as the speaker’s 
perspective as a passive, still spectator looking up from within the structure. The poem is 
as much about the speaker’s vantage point as it is the elevator:   
1. 
White.   From the 
Under arm of T 
 
The red globe. 
 
Up 




From the quiet 
 
Stone floor…    (NCP 6) 
In contrast to the still and quiet speaker, the object has some measure of power in its 
motion: it moves up and down and exhibits rich textures (“shiny” and “round” with its 
beaming “red globe”). The structure seems to move independently of any human agent.  
Steven Shoemaker suggests that the poem presents “a kind of subject/object 
confusion” (71), in which a modern subject examines the increasingly dominant 
experience of being subsumed inside a machine. More broadly, Shoemaker reads 
Discrete Series as a text in which Oppen illustrates modernity’s “crisis of 
dis/embodiment” resulting from an increasingly “posthuman order” that boasts “profound 
implications for the fate of the human subject” (63). In this emerging order—a term 
Shoemaker applies from Katherine Hayles and Jean Baudrillard—the human subject 




becomes diminished alongside the ascendancy of machines. Shoemaker concludes that 
Oppen is “mapping an early moment in our evolution toward the posthuman condition.” 
The human experience portrayed, Shoemaker argues, is often that of a disembodied 
subject negotiating new relations to machines: “Again and again in Oppen’s series, the 
human presence is nearly overwhelmed by the machined environment, but the poems 
remain dedicated to giving meticulous accounts of the transformations, conflicts, and 
confusions engendered by the dynamics of various sorts of urban encounters” (78). 
Shoemaker’s reading proves consistent with my own assessment of Oppen’s subject as 
overwhelmed by external materials. Yet, my reading focuses on moments of “subject-
object confusion” where the subject strives to better understand its own existence and the 
conditions of being that are changing within modernity. Thus, despite the poems’ 
frequent attention to object descriptions, they just as often recognize the subject striving 
for meaning.  
In the elevator poem, for example, the final two lines emphasize the speaker’s 
location against the moving machine. By highlighting these lines on individual stanzas, 
Oppen creates a distinct break between the motion of the object (enticing the eye with its 
“Round/ Shiny fixed/ Alternatives”) and the subject reporting “From the quiet,” 
ultimately drawing the reader’s eye to rest on the subject pondering this mechanical 
“alternative” to humanity: a mechanism that has radically transformed relations of power 
and labor. For as both Sharp and Shoemaker point out, the elevator plays a particular role 
within modernity that has allowed transformations of urban life and economics to take 
place. Shoemaker notes, “In terms of ‘architectural history,’ the modern is 
skyscraper/machine would not have been possible without the invention of the passenger 




elevator. The elevator is what makes the skyscraper work” (70). Yet, even as the poem 
highlights this internal mechanism of modern labor, it is ultimately grounded through the 
observing speaker, who remains situated on the “stone floor.” In its fragmented 
syntactical structure, the poem stages the disorienting nature of the subject’s relationship 
to this modern thing: as the world moves in new ways, the subject remains rooted in a 
place from which to ponder his new conditions.      
Oppen continues to examine transformations in capitalist relations of power that 
threaten the modern subject in the unnamed fragment marked “2” (which immediately 
follows “1” above). When he opens the poem with the connective “Thus,” the obvious 
syntactical inclination would be to link this cause-and-effect relation to the preceding 
poem. Yet, a thematic connection between the two poems proves unclear. The true 
correlation may be in the perspective Oppen illustrates, in which the subject looks up 
from within the thing and wrestles to gain understanding of transformed labor conditions: 











Plane of lunch, of wives 
Removes itself 
(As soda-jerking from  





big-Business    (NCP 7) 





In a first reading, the causal relation of “thus” remains unclear. Something has asserted 
agency to “hide the parts,” but the poet can only lament the loss of what has been hidden. 
In a broader sense, I read this poem as a statement confirming Marx’s observations on the 
fetish nature of the commodity. Through his analysis of what gets hidden, the “prudery of 
Frigidaire,” Oppen makes visible the labor that sustains capitalism. Moreover, Oppen’s 
own syntactical fragmentation serves to make visible the labor behind the poem itself: 
This creative act proves one of testing and revelation; it is through form that Oppen can 
uncover relations of power. Power and agency prove central themes of the poem, with the 
syntax uncovering how such power relations work. Two lines contain only the word 
“Thus,” suggesting causal relationships, with undetermined agents enacting power. 
Another line contains only the words, “Above the,” suggesting an order of hierarchy. The 
poem reflects the experience of a particular social order where an ambiguous agent exists 
to assert power, to create certain effects upon individual subjects, and to stand apart and 
above the “Plane of lunch” where consumption actually occurs.  
 The concept of the “prudery/ Of Frigidaire, of/ Soda-jerking” contains several 
layers of repression, in particular, hiding the human experiences involved in production 
and creation. The move to bracket the object (the Frigidaire) with prepositions makes 
visible that a particular system of relations actually produces this kind of prudery in 
which a refrigerator or a soda-jerk can offer clean surface imagery with no hint of the 
messy labor embedded within. Prudery represents a form of observation that refuses to 
look into things, but prudery also brings us back to Maud Blessingbourne and the idea of 
repressed sexuality. The evocative language of “soda-jerking,” as well as the sexual 
connotations of “the private act// Of/ Cracking eggs” cannot be ignored. Oppen critiques 




a social prudery that denies honesty even about the way humans are conceived. The 
relationship of “big-Business” to this sexual repression suggests a larger system of 
regulation being enacted through social and economic structures, in which messy aspects 
of life—labor, sexuality, desire—become repressed within the thing.  
 Oppen addresses other “unreal” surfaces of technology in at least two poems 
representing cars, where he again presents the subject exploring his sense of self among 
changing modern conditions. Through his representation of this object, Oppen invites 
readers to look through the car’s “unreal” surfaces and consider how this object has 
altered the subject’s existence. This proves a deliberate goal of the poem that begins 
“Closed car—closed in glass,” a poem he cites in his interview with Dembo as 
distinguishing his poetics from that of Williams. Since Pound’s preface to Discrete Series 
comparing the two poets, Oppen has widely been associated with Williams due to the 
poet’s similarities in theme and syntactical experimentation. Yet, Oppen always resisted 
the association, telling Dembo, “my attitudes are opposite those of Williams” (CL 169).76 
Critics such as Charles Altieri, Marjorie Perloff, Eleanor Berry, and Randolph Chilton 
have also explored dissimilarities between Williams and Oppen. Chilton’s analysis is 
useful in his observation that “Williams is not unaware that the true nature of the 
existence of things is often obscured (by society and even language, for example), but his 
                                                 
76 Williams has commonly been situated within the larger Objectivist nexus, due to his personal friendships 
and professional affiliations with Objectivist poets and Oppen’s Objectivist Press. In his Autobiography, he 
claims a significant role in inaugurating the movement, offering this summary of Objectivist theory:  
The poem, like every other form of art, is an object, an object that in itself formally presents its 
case and its meaning by the very form it assumes. . . . The poem being an object (like a symphony 
or cubist painting) it must be the purpose of the poet to make his words a new form: to invest, that 
is, an object consonant with his day. That was what we hoped to imply by Objectivism, an 
antidote, in a sense, to the bare image haphazardly presented in loose verse. (264-265) 
But to this, he adds, “Nothing much happened in the end” (265). Although he was clearly affiliated with the 
theories behind the Objectivists, I would argue that his use of the object—even by the 1930s—was much 
different than that of Oppen. 




poetry for the most part attempts to return us to the perception of true essences (in the 
concrete, of course). Truth is accessible to perception; we have the ability to perceive it” 
(94). This distinction supports my own sense of the poets’ differences: Williams’s poetry, 
even through its use of fragmentation and linguistic play, remains focused on visual 
clarity so the poet’s descriptions can promote access to some universal form of 
knowledge within the thing. In other words, language can represent perception. For 
Oppen, on the other hand, language itself must be defamiliarized for the subject to gain 
real understanding of knowledge hidden within the thing. The poem provides the means 
of testing perception, although, in the space of the poem, the subject may not have yet 
fully realized the results of this test. Oppen told Dembo: 
Williams likes to name those objects: wheelbarrow, white chickens, etc. I, 
too, have a sense—I hesitate to say it because I have no way of defending 
it—of the greater reality of certain kinds of objects than of others. It’s a 
sentiment. I have a very early poem about a car closed in glass. I felt that 
somehow it was unreal and I said so—the light inside that car. Shall I read 
it? It’s very short. . . . In fact a lot of the poems talk about that sort of 
thing.  
  Closed car—closed in glass— 
  At the curb, 
  Unapplied and empty: 
  A thing among others 
  Over which clouds pass and the alteration of lighting,77 
  An overstatement 
  Hardly an exterior. 
  Moving in traffic 
  This thing is less strange— 
                                                 
77 In the poem’s representation in Discrete Series, the enjambment of this line is slightly altered to read:  
“Over which clouds pass and the  
  alteration of lighting,” (NCP 13). 




  Tho the face, still within it, 
  Between glasses—place, over which 
    Time passes—a false light. [Discrete Series] 
 
There is my feeling of something false in overprotection and over-
luxury—my idea of categories of realness. (CL 167-168) 
I am interested here in Oppen’s emphasis on the “greater reality” of certain kinds of 
objects, and yet the “unreality” or “falseness” in the way we perceive them. While 
Williams designates these objects, bringing them into clarity through the act of naming—
and pursuing universality through the poetic construction of the thing—for Oppen 
naming alone does not make us see what lies hidden beneath the “exterior.” In this poem, 
a car is merely a “thing among other things” whose actual use-value has been obscured 
through its strange exterior. Only when the car begins to move in traffic does it become 
“less strange,” so the speaker sitting within it can begin to conceptualize its purpose in 
the modern world. However, the poem’s anxiety over the passage of time, which 
nonetheless haunts the speaker, suggests that occupying the car remains troubling, 
“strange,” and “unreal,” particularly as the speaker considers this object in relation to 
history. If Oppen is concerned with “categories of realness,” then he must ascertain what 
makes this object real: to understand its function within his historical moment and how 
this object has changed human interaction with the material world. Rather than in eras 
past, when man might sit atop his horse, exercising control over the reigns and thus over 
his speed and motion, Oppen’s subject remains hidden, reduced only to a “face, still 
within it,/ Between glasses.” He looks out upon the world he moves through but remains 




disconnected through layers of glass, rendered oddly passive in the face of the car’s 
power.78  
 Finding what is real in the scene comes only through a consideration of the “false 
light,” an experience Oppen highlights through line breaks and syntax. What ultimately 
proves “false” is not the object itself, but the subject’s condition within it. For all the 
techniques promoting inquiry of the object, the poem—much like we saw in the elevator 
poem—ends by returning to the subject’s relation to this unreal thing; in fact, what 
emerges are questions about how this object has transformed the subject’s sense of his 
own conditions. This shift begins with Oppen’s attention to “alteration of lighting” (in the 
enjambment of the poem as published in Discrete Series), which proves “An 
overstatement,” suggesting that this subject has been misreading the nature of his 
relationship to the car, previously existing in un-critical, passivity. Instead, Oppen’s form 
promotes a different kind of interaction. The disruptive syntax of the final lines 
emphasizes the experience of the subject inside the car, existing between planes of glass, 
in a space “over which/ time passes.” Although this subject is rooted in history, the 
representation thus far has not been one of “human history” highlighting the subject’s 
real conditions. Yet, by positioning the speaker within the object—and formally so, 
through the use of dashes—Oppen draws attention to the “false” nature of this 
experience. Exposing the strangeness of the subject-object relationship, he depicts a 
subject deconstructing the nature of his own existence.    
                                                 
78 Oppen’s treatment of the car here is reminiscent of F.S. Fitzgerald’s representation of the automobile in 
The Great Gatsby (1925), where cars take on deadly power while seemingly rendering their drivers 
powerless. As one of Gatsby’s party guests laments after a car crash, “I know very little about driving—
next to nothing. It happened, and that’s all I know” (54).  




 Oppen explores similar tensions over the subject’s experience in relation to 
technology in another unnamed car poem: 
The evening, water in a glass 
Thru which our car runs on a higher road. 
 
Over what has the air frozen? 
 
Nothing can equal in polish and obscured 
      origin that dark instrument 
A car 
 (Which. 
Ease; the hand on the sword-hilt   (NCP 8) 
 
Here, riding in the car renders the world beyond this object an unreal “what”; again, the 
car as an instrument of modern technology disconnects man from the natural world. How 
can nature compete with the “polished” instrument of a car, whose description suggests a 
constructed kind of perfection—one whose origins of labor are notably “obscured”? 
Again, the syntactic and grammatical choices prove significant for provoking Oppen’s 
exploration of the thing, specifically in the final three lines. He privileges the car by 
placing the word on its own line. Yet, the relationships that follow prove ambiguous. 
Why does the next line begin with a parenthesis that is never completed? Why does the 
penultimate line end with a period, and the final line include a semicolon after “ease”? 
Oppen experiments with punctuation to induce a particular stance of inquiry. He 
juxtaposes “a car” with the relative pronoun “which” to explore the very nature of that 
object. Relative pronouns introduce subordinate or modifying information about a 
subject. However, Oppen’s use of the parenthesis here suggests uncertainty in his line of 
questioning. Can he actually identify the modifying nature of a car? Can he ascertain 
whether it produces “ease”? The use of the period to end this inquiry suggests that the 
uncertainty itself is a finality: man can never fully know this object to assess its impact on 




our experience. Yet, in the face of such uncertainty, the poem turns instead to the 
subject’s condition: the final image of “the hand on the sword-hilt” invites us to consider 
the subject. A hand poised on the handle of a sword, prepared for thrusting it into battle, 
would have particular power and authority. Oppen again calls upon an image of eras past 
to question the agency and authority of this modern subject. Does this driver wield 
similar power? Who holds the real control—the man or that “dark instrument” of the car? 
The poem reveals the subject’s anxieties over changing modern conditions.   
 As Oppen represents objects of modern technology, he also considers the 
subject’s relations to certain natural objects, revealing a sense of alienation and 
disconnection. In “Party on Shipboard” (one of the few titled poems in the collection), 
party-goers demonstrate a kind of unreal interaction with the sea, with whom they are 
“incapable of contact/ Save in incidents” (NCP 15). Because the party-goers have little 
actual connection with the sea, it is difficult for them to determine their relationship to 
this object. The poem continually questions what the sea “is,” after informing the reader 
that “the sea is not/ water.” This thing becomes different from what composes it, is “a 
constant weight/ In its bed,” as the poet negotiates a new understanding of “the sea/ 
Freely tumultuous.” Oppen told Dembo he considered this poem a failure because it does 
not penetrate the object to provide greater vision of the sea. He explained this was the last 
Discrete Series poem he wrote and his “inability to see”—this essential failure of his 
poetic experiment—was one of the reasons he stopped writing poetry for the next 25 
years: 
The “Party on Shipboard,”—I just remembered it better—records the 
failure of that perception of the sea, though the concept is still in my mind. 




But it ends with just the waves homogenously . . . they just leap about. At 
least within that image I didn’t . . . I left it as a contradiction, that I know 
there is such a thing as “the sea,” the whole. But the poem doesn’t manage 
to see it, and it records the poet’s—my own—inability to see it. So that it 
leads directly to what I’ve told you about my giving up poetry. (“Oppen 
on His Poems” 202)  
As the subject strives to understand the way certain objects have reshaped modern 
experience, this poem’s “failure” proves particularly problematic. Ultimately, there is a 
limit to what the subject can perceive and what the poem’s form can achieve by testing 
experience. For a poet questioning the efficacy of his poetics at this moment in history, 
Oppen’s inability to penetrate the thing to better understand human experience 
contributes to his preoccupation with his poetic function.  
Despite Oppen’s personal sense of inadequacy over “Party on Shipboard,” my 
reading of other Discrete Series poems illustrates the potential of his poetics of things. As 
the poems become things themselves to be examined, their form allows the reader to 
better explore subject-object relations amidst particular modern conditions. Thus, Oppen 
invites readers to see beyond the surface of objects, to enact a stance of questioning that 
promotes recognition of the “actualness” of experience. As Oppen wrote in one of his 
final poems, a collection of “Twenty-Six Fragments” entitled by archivists, “The Last 
Words of George Oppen”:   
Poetry must be 
 
Clarity means, among 
other things, to know 
 how the words come to  
 meaning 





to experience how the  
words come to meaning    (SPDP 235) 
The poems of Discrete Series meet this very standard, requiring the reader to experience 
how language—used to effect “clarity”—can reveal new depths to the objects we 
encounter.    




Chapter Five: “the tipping of an object toward the light”:  
Modernism and the Possession of Things 
 
 In the poem “The Fish” from her debut collection, North and South (1946), 
Elizabeth Bishop demonstrates her own fascination with themes of observation and 
possession. The subject engages in the act of looking and demonstrates a preoccupation 
with how one comes to know—and, in turn, possess—an object under observation. 
Bishop captures the fish, both in the poet’s rhetorical act of looking and the speaker’s 
physical act in the opening lines as she announces, “I caught a tremendous fish/ and held 
him beside the boat/ half out of water” (42). A poetic form of capture ensues in which the 
subject comes to know the object through layers of meticulous description. Bishop 
frames the encounter as one of domination and possession: the fish is “battered and 
venerable/ and homely.” He has not fought his capture and seems resigned to his status as 
a thing fixed with the speaker’s “hook/ fast in a corner of his mouth.” Yet, we quickly 
find that physical possession of the object by no means guarantees the speaker’s 
domination. When she describes the fish’s “brown skin . . . like ancient wallpaper,” 
decorated with “shapes like full-blown roses/ stained and lost through age,” Bishop 
depicts an elusive figure, whose markings have gradually faded. External shapes that 
were once brightly stained have since been “lost”; such markings contain meanings now 
inaccessible to the speaker. Instead, the poet turns to other details:  
  He was speckled with barnacles, 
  fine rosettes of lime 
  and infested 
  with tiny white sea lice, 
  and underneath two or three 
  rags of green weed hung down.  
 




Although attention to the object’s external features sustains the speaker’s opening act, the 
poem shifts when the speaker attempts to pierce the boundary of the fish’s flesh and 
consider its internal conditions: 
I thought of the coarse white flesh 
packed in like feathers, 
the big bones and the little bones, 
the dramatic reds and blacks 
of his shiny entrails, 
and the pink swim-bladder 
like a peony.    
 
However, in these descriptions, we see that this form of domination-through-description, 
achieved in the poet’s thorough details, was always an act of the mind. The speaker 
captures the fish only through the imaginative act. What was once simply “I caught” has 
become the very different gesture inherent in “I thought,” with the rhyme pattern that 
links these two concepts underscoring the transformation from the first action to the 
second.  Bishop’s description of the “dramatic reds and blacks” of the fish’s insides 
suggests the performative nature of her own descriptions; in these lines the poem relies 
entirely on dramatic, figurative details, with the speaker likening the fish’s bladder to a 
vibrant pink peony. Thus far, the speaker achieves capture solely through poetic 
construction.  
 The poem consistently shifts with each of the speaker’s references to self. In the 
second half, the sequence of self-referential gestures transition from “I looked into his 
eyes/ which were far larger than mine/ but shallower, and yellowed” (42) to “I admired 
his sullen face/ the mechanism of his jaw” (43), and, finally, to “I stared and stared/ and 
victory filled up the boat.” The poem thus reveals its narrative in the speaker’s 
consideration of her own act of looking: what begins as a definitive claim of capture ends 




with the speaker’s acknowledgment that she cannot, in fact, possess the thing; she can 
merely stare. Along the way, she embarks on an imaginative attempt at possession (“I 
thought”) and one in which she seeks the object via her own identification (“I looked into 
his eyes/ which were far larger than mine”). In looking for some reflective gaze that can 
“look back” and validate this subject-object interaction, the subject recognizes only a 
clouded, scratched, and semi-transparent substance that refuses deeper access. Instead, 
the speaker observes “the irises backed and packed/ with tarnished tinfoil/ seen through 
the lenses/ of old scratched isinglass.” The fish’s eyes are resistant to penetration and 
unwilling to respond to the speaker’s expectant, covetous stare. Her final admission that 
“I stared and stared,” even after her admission of admiration for the fish’s continued 
survival, reminds the reader of the continual effort observation requires: the speaker has 
relentlessly pursued access—first through description, then through identification, and, 
finally, through admiration—that will secure her capture of this thing.  
Yet, the fish, we have learned in the poem’s narrative, cannot be captured. The 
speaker finds evidence of its resistance to other attempts:  
and then I saw 
that from his lower lip 
—if you could call it a lip— 
grim, wet, and weaponlike, 
hung five old pieces of fish-line, 
or four and a wire leader 
with the swivel still attached, 
with all their five big hooks 
grown firmly in his mouth. 
A green line, frayed at the end 
where he broke it, two heavier lines, 
and a fine black thread 
still crimped from the strain and snap 
when it broke and he got away. 
Like medals with their ribbons 
frayed and wavering, 




a five-haired beard of wisdom 
trailing from his aching jaw.      
 
The speaker gains admiration for the fish’s markings of survival, its “beard of wisdom” 
that serves as proof of its autonomy and resistance. Here, the very effort of possession 
becomes a type of battle. Reminiscent of the dissection-possession we find in Marianne 
Moore’s “Those Various Scalpels,” possession in Bishop’s poem proves an act with 
brutal, and lasting, consequences for the object; the fish has resisted through its 
defensive, “weaponlike” armor. The speaker gains a genuine moment of admiration by 
recognizing the object’s autonomy, its history, and the strength underlying its rugged 
exterior. As this fact destabilizes the speaker’s authority in claiming possession of the 
fish, it prompts the poem’s climactic moment: 
I stared and stared 
and victory filled up 
the little rented boat, 
from the pool of bilge 
where oil had spread a rainbow 
around the rusted engine 
to the bailer rusted orange 
the sun-cracked thwarts, 
the oarlocks on their strings, 
the gunnels—until everything 
was rainbow, rainbow, rainbow! 
And I let the fish go. (43-44) 
 
This passage is notable as much for what the speaker does not say as for what she does. 
The ambiguity around the idea of “victory” heightens the tension over whether the fish 
has, again, resisted capture, or whether the speaker has gained victory via the poetic 
capture. Does the victory belong to the subject or the object? In presenting such 
ambiguity, Bishop invites us to consider “victory” as the poet’s achievement of 




convergence between subject and object:79 the poem dramatizes her moment of 
recognition, and love, for the object she looks upon, a temporary experience of 
connection. This achievement of “victory” eliminates the very need for capture. The 
speaker describes an experience in which all distinctions between the subject and object 
drop out, and there is no longer a need to delineate boundaries: “everything” becomes 
“rainbow.” Every imperfect feature of the scene—the dilapidated boat, the cracked seat, 
the rusted engine, the spreading oil—becomes another brush-stroke coloring the 
emotional intensity of the subject-object connection. The speaker’s perception of such 
detail has facilitated her convergence with the object, because she has been able to 
imaginatively embody its experience. Her encounter with the fish has heightened her 
perception of her own flawed world, and the speaker can now let the fish go. This final 
gesture suggests that the process, for Bishop, was never about possession, nor was she 
attempting to claim authority by transforming dilapidated objects into perfected things. 
Instead, the act of observation—described here only as the “tipping of the object toward 
the light” but never as the object’s full revelation—allows the subject to wrestle with 
epistemological questions of knowing. How can the subject know objects outside of the 
self? Further, how does such knowledge exchange take place? The answer, this poem 
suggests, is that the subject must humble herself to the object through a different process 
of interaction—recognition.     
                                                 
79 Although I am using language of romantic concepts—in, for example, the subject’s convergence with the 
object—I do not read this process in Bishop as one of romantic transcendence. Bishop’s subject does not 
gain certain knowledge or truth, of either the object or herself; she remains firmly grounded in the 
limitations of her subjective position. Further, her connection with the fish remains fleeting and 
inaccessible, difficult to even translate into language. What this convergence does provide the subject, 
however, is a new form of love for the world with which she interacts. 




 I begin this conclusion with a lengthy reading of Bishop’s “The Fish” because it 
underscores themes I have been developing throughout this dissertation, particularly 
themes of observation, possession, and authority. In a poem like “The Fish,” Bishop 
places herself in the particular lineage I have been exploring among a strain of modernist 
American poets. Given, for example, Bishop’s own admissions of Marianne Moore’s 
influence on her work (and particularly in her early collection, in which “The Fish” was 
published), Bishop’s poem self-consciously engages many of the same questions we find 
in Moore’s poem of the same title. And yet, as I have been suggesting in my reading, 
Bishop arrives at very different conclusions. If the modernists in my study have been 
engaging questions of how the poet can reshape the object into a newly-transformed 
thing—an aesthetic thing that ultimately grants the subject distance from more personal 
preoccupations—Bishop demonstrates a different relation to the object. The poet’s 
function is not to capture or possess the object, or even to transform it into a highly-
crafted thing that can rest in permanence as the product of a skilled artistic hand, thus 
removed from the chaotic conditions of its own history. Instead, Bishop recognizes such 
conditions and, in the process, better acknowledges those tumultuous markings of history 
that may distinguish her own experience. Unlike the constructed things in the work of 
Moore or Williams, achieved via the imagination; the domesticated things in Frost’s 
poems as he asserts a masculine voice of authority to mask his own anxieties; and even 
the syntactically-disjointed things Oppen assembles to regain a sense of authority in the 
face of destabilizing technology, Bishop does not attempt to polish or hyper-construct the 
object in her descriptions. Her fish is “battered” and “homely,” “sullen” and “aching.” It 
has survived, in fact, because of its pain; it cannot be dismantled piece by piece and 




reshaped into a form that will smooth away the rugged imperfections of its exterior. 
Instead, Bishop’s representation celebrates such markings as the poem displays the 
speaker’s recognition of these very qualities. If there is a post-modern shift embodied in 
Bishop’s poem, it is a shift away from authority and perfection. Art can no longer resolve 
or recast anxieties; the poet can no longer transform the object into a form that exists only 
in art. Instead, the threats and conditions one finds in the world—the devastation 
suggested in the poem’s references to weaponry and war—pervade the poetic space, 
where the object remains the object, and the poet’s job is to recognize—and admire—the 
rich history that has shaped its experience. Through such recognition, the subject gains a 
better understanding of conditions also afflicting the self. In the poetic space, such 
anxieties can now be laid bare; they need not be recast into some other form. The subject 
can admit the limitations of knowledge, just as the poet can reveal the limitations of 
representation. The poet reaches a point when the object can be “let go.”  
 In this reading of Bishop’s work, the drive to distinguish between “objects” and 
“things,” in Bill Brown’s sense, becomes less urgent. This dissertation has been aimed at 
exploring how modernist poets used objects to make things. In the poets I have examined, 
the construction of the thing proves a self-conscious act that allows the poet to resolve 
particular preoccupations. In making “things,” the poet can transform experience into 
new forms. Things serve as proof of the subject’s encounter, with their constructed 
exteriors—whether polished, in the case of Moore and Frost, or messy and disjointed, as 
we more often see in Williams and Oppen—allowing the poet to overcome particular 
concerns inherent in their making. For all the poets in this study, the thing’s construction 
involved the poet’s use of technical innovations, but was never a certain or simple 




process. Nevertheless, the thing proved the goal of the object study, its achievement a 
sign of the poet’s authority. 
 In Bishop’s “The Fish,” we find the subject coming to better know her own 
conditions by exploring the boundaries between subject and object. The speaker’s 
connection to the fish, achieved through her acknowledgement of a certain history of 
possession and domination, suggests she has come to terms with her own inheritance of 
that history. Yet, she no longer wishes to perpetuate this kind of domination, what I am 
reading as the continued pursuit of the wisdom, authority, universality, and truth that 
were upheld by the modernists in my study. Bishop’s own act of observation allows her 
to move beyond this lineage even as she illustrates its revision. The poem provides 
instruction on how the poet can move beyond a form of subject-object interaction that 
depends upon the object’s transformation as its goal. “The Fish” opens with the speaker’s 
capture and ends with her reversal of this action. Although the poem depicts a kind of 
transformation, it is not one of the object, as we saw taking place in the work of these 
modernists. Instead, it is a transformation of the subject’s knowledge, and one that takes 
place specifically through poetic recognition. The poet can engage in observation without 
needing to achieve certainties—of knowledge, representation, or truth. Instead, the 
pursuit becomes for genuine recognition of the external object.      
 My study sheds light on an aspect of American modernist poetry that, to date, has 
not been fully explored: the way that a strain of American poets in the early twentieth 
century resolved questions and preoccupations of poetic authority in their construction of 
things. At a moment of social and political turmoil, amidst American landscapes that 
were themselves undergoing tremendous transformation, we find poets who were, each in 




their own ways, considering the role of the poet to respond to particular cultural needs. 
And, even as such figures as Frost and Williams outspokenly claim the poet’s cultural 
authority, we also see in their poems evidence of their preoccupations with the value and 
efficacy of creative labor. Can the poetic act grant didactic wisdom? What vocal and 
poetic gestures must be used to dispense such knowledge? Can the imagination and the 
declarative power of language promote a move from local contact to universal 
experience? In Moore we see such questions of poetic authority illustrated in the poet’s 
fascination with aesthetic forms. Can an art object’s carefully-constructed exterior elevate 
it to some form that hides the subject, and the subject’s own preoccupations, within it? In 
Oppen, we find a poet wrestling with the very function of poetry at a moment of political 
and economic turmoil. What can poetry actually do (in contrast to more pragmatic 
means) to effect tangible change? Although each of these poets presents a different 
concept of poetic authority, they share the belief that the poet can use language to reshape 
knowledge of the external world, and they often demonstrate this point specifically in 
their representation of things.  
 This fascination with things is not unique to the modernist poets featured in this 
study; poets as stylistically-diverse as Wallace Stevens, Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot, H.D., and 
Gertrude Stein all demonstrate a preoccupation with objects and their transformation in 
the poetic space. Among the poets I have not discussed at length, Stevens proves most 
useful to conclude with, because his ideas about poetry and the imagination underscore 
several of the major issues this dissertation addresses. Not only does Stevens display a 
keen interest in objects, but his poems provide a series of meta-statements about poetic 
function in the modern moment, as well as the process by which subjects can use objects 




to reflect aspects of the self. In Parts of a World (1942), for example, Stevens presents a 
diverse collection of object-related poems with such titles as “Prelude to Objects,” “Study 
of Two Pears,” and “Woman Looking at a Vase of Flowers.” In the latter of these, 
Stevens illustrates the object’s very transformation into a thing that carries meanings 
individual to the subject: 
Hoot, little owl within her, how 
High blue became particular 
In the leaf and bud and how the red, 
Flicked into pieces, points of air, 
Became—how the central, essential red 
Escaped its large abstraction, became, 
First, summer, then a lesser time, 
Then the sides of peaches, of dusky pears. 
 
Hoot how the inhuman colors fell 
Into place beside her, where she was, 
Like human conciliations, more like 
A profounder reconciling, an act, 
An affirmation free from doubt. 
The crude and jealous formlessness  
Became the form and the fragrance of things 
Without clairvoyance, close to her. (CP 246-247) 
 
Stevens presents the very process by which the abstractions of color are, first, 
particularized into the shape of the object; the formless takes on form. A second layer of 
transformation takes place in which the subject reconciles the “inhuman colors” with an 
idea she can better understand, “an affirmation free from doubt.” By calling this act one 
of “[profound] reconciling,” Stevens presents the process as one of making external, 
inhuman objects compatible with the subject’s own experience: the objects takes on a 
form representing the “fragrance of things . . . close to her.” The abstraction becomes 
something that speaks directly to the subject’s own experience. The thing exists “without 
clairvoyance” because it can not penetrate the speaker; it does not look back or possess 




its own vision or wisdom. Instead, it becomes the product of the woman’s act: it has 
become a thing in her own mind.   
In poems such as “Sunday Morning,” “The Poems of Our Climate,” “Of Modern 
Poetry,” and “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction,” Stevens examines the poet’s role in the 
modern moment, elevating poetry as an essential response to a world that no longer has 
religion to dispense certain truths. As Stevens claims in “The Poems of Our Climate,” 
even as the poet transforms the world into crisp, manageable forms, such representations 
must still account for the inherently messy conditions of the world. Stevens gives the 
example of a poem capturing a still life of flowers, where “the day itself/ Is simplified: a 
bowl of white,/ Cold, a cold porcelain, low and round/ With nothing more than the 
carnations there” (193). Yet, this thing must speak to the frequently chaotic human 
experiences underlying the simple, precise object description. Stevens implores, “Still 
one would want more, one would need more,/ More than a world of white and snowy 
scents” (194). As poetry responds to humanity’s need to explore itself, the object 
representation must provide more than meticulous description; it must speak to the 
imperfect conditions the subject faces. Any attempt that has “stripped one of all one’s 
torments, concealed/ The evilly compounded, vital I” (193) remains wholly inadequate. 
“There would still remain the never-resting mind,” Stevens tells us, “So that one would 
want to escape, come back/ To what had been so long composed” (194). Presented with a 
perfected object, the subject will return to the mind’s imperfect, never-resting chaos: 
“The imperfect is our paradise./ Note that, in this bitterness, delight,/ Since the imperfect 
is so hot in us,/ Lies in flawed words and stubborn sounds.”  Language remains a “flaw” 
and an approximation, but it nonetheless allows us to better understand the imperfect 




aspects of existence—those experiences that yield both bitterness and delight, those 
experiences the mind “composes” into forms. Stevens implores his readers to look 
beneath the simplistic forms of objects to locate their complex, human meanings as 
things. 
For Stevens, poetry provides a model of thought, recording the mind’s act of 
reckoning with the external world. In the moment of modernity, such form is necessary, 
wherein the poem illustrates “the mind in the act of finding/ What will suffice,” as 
Stevens describes in “Of Modern Poetry” (239). Stevens raises this idea of sufficiency 
again when he describes a mind that “has to think about war/ And it has to find what will 
suffice” (240). Faced with extreme and tumultuous conditions, the mind turns to language 
to find a form that will be adequate. The mind constructs the poem—“construct[s] a new 
stage”—that can sufficiently resolve the human need for order. The poem proves a type 
of response to the world that “must/ Be the finding of a satisfaction,” as it records the 
process of finding what will “suffice.” “Sufficiency” here poses a very different concept 
than some attainable perfection through art, as we might have seen in the Romantic 
subject’s transformation of objects into aesthetic forms. Instead, the poem provides an 
attempt to resolve the poet’s own preoccupations and anxieties.  
In “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction” (1947), Stevens goes even further in 
characterizing poetry’s necessity in the modern moment. Here, he describes poetry as a 
“supreme fiction” through which humanity can explore essential epistemological and 
philosophical questions. His use of the word “fiction” implies a false narrative; 
nevertheless, its portrayal as “supreme” classifies it as a necessary fiction. The poet 
becomes an essential figure and the poem a vital space of questioning. This concept of 




poetic function proves consistent with ones we have now seen several modernist poets 
aspire toward. All the poets in this study have, in one form or another, pursued poetry 
that can elevate a “supreme fiction”: Frost, Moore, Williams, and Oppen each use the 
object’s transformation to achieve some kind of lasting truth that can be preserved within 
the thing. For Frost, this fiction upholds the poet’s capacity to assert wisdom. For Moore, 
the poet’s achievement of imaginary possession validates her position of cultural 
authority. For Williams, the poetic transformation renders the local object a universal 
thing. And, finally, for Oppen, the act of mining objects for “truth” exposes the subject’s 
real relations to things. In each of these modernists, the fiction itself proves the goal of 
the object transformation. And although all these poets recognize language itself as 
abstract, flawed, and vulnerable to multiplicity, they remain, at times, uncritical about the 
“supreme fiction” they pursue in the concepts of universality, possession, knowledge, and 
truth.  
Yet, even as these poets aspire toward “supreme fictions,” or universalizing ideas, 
they prove distinct from Romantic poets because modern preoccupations and anxieties 
pervade the poetic space. The very goal of the universal remains a “fiction,” albeit a 
desirable one. These poets also recognize certain challenges inherent in language that 
destabilize the poet’s sense of authority. As the poem chronicles the object’s 
transformation into a “thing,” it simultaneously illustrates the poet’s achievement of 
authority, but such authority is never certain or guaranteed. This sense of the urgency 
over the need to renew language itself helps explain the technical experimentations we 
have now seen these poets use to resolve their own preoccupations with poetic authority. 
Frost illustrates the instability of metaphor for projecting meaning; Moore employs 




techniques that can mask the subject’s personal conditions and affect a voice of 
authoritative distancing; Williams fragments the object, and the line, in order to craft a 
new means of perception that can locate the object’s universalizing potential; and Oppen 
defamiliarizes syntax to expose relations between things. Through all of these techniques, 
we see these modernists testing the means by which poets can assert meaning through 
things.  
Despite these concerns over poetic function, the transformation of the thing 
carries the potential for these modernists to assert knowledge that will be “sufficient” in a 
fractured modern world. Unlike for the Romantics, the world is no longer coherent, and 
the sublime remains out of reach. The object is no longer a vessel through which the 
subject can achieve harmony and spiritual transcendence, as it was for Wordsworth or 
Keats. Instead, the pursuit of the whole, of the universal, of truth, remains, ultimately, a 
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